When Congress created NASA in 1958, it authorized that agency to

pursue policies to foster greater international cooperation and peaceful application of knowledge gathered through joint space ventures. Joint cooperation between the United States and U.S.S.R. culminated in 1975 when three American astronauts in an Apollo spacecraft linked up in Earth orbit with two Soviet cosmonauts in a Soyuz spacecraft. Born out of the 1972 space cooperation treaty, the Apollo-Soyuz mission was a great international success on many fronts.

Scientists from both nations were thrust into a multi-year working relationship which called for constant communication, and an open sharing of ideas, equipment, manpower, and technology. In 1973, the Soviets admitted for the first time an American delegation to the previously top secret Soviet mission control center. for the purpose of coordinating communications and tracking. The following year, American astronauts visited the Soviet launch site at Tyuratam and Soviet cosmonauts trained in Houston. Before the project was concluded, the Soviets and Americans had negotiated and signed 133 documents, an unprecedented

achievement.

It should be noted that the Apollo-Soyuz mission had its share of practical, immediate scientific benefits. During the mission, the two nations successfully demonstrated new technology for international space rescue capabilities. The Soviet-American docking also had a more special, enduring significance.

In describing the potential benefits of the project, NASA in 1975 pointed out that "in perspective, the most important result of this international manned mission may be the mutual confidence and trust it

creates--confidence and trust that may be significant not just for what people working together may accomplish in space, but also for what peoples working together may achieve on earth."

While the success of the Apollo-Soyuz mission was made possible by the period of detente in the early 1970's, the success of the rendezvous encouraged both nations to enter into new agreements designed to enhance their working relationship in outer space. A new Soviet-American agreement was concluded in May of 1977 which established the basis for space cooperation in the post Apollo-Soyuz period.

In 1977, the Soviet Academy of Sciences and NASA agreed to study the "Objectives, Feasibility and Means of Accomplishing Joint Experimental Flights of a Long Duration," utilizing the long orbital capacity of the Salyut space station and the reusable shuttle space vehicle. The two nations also pledged to continue cooperation in a wide range of space science and space application activities and agree to resolve problems of international law on the peaceful use of space. For the next several years, the United States and U.S.S.R. continued to make important gains in space cooperation. For example, American scientists provided radar maps

of Venus produced by a Pioneer spacecraft to help Soviet scientists select landing sites. In return, the Soviets shared data from these missions with American scientists. There has also been significant cooperation and continuing exchange of data with the Soviets regarding various biological experiments. Three satellites carrying test animals were sent into space the by/Russians in 1975, 1977,/1979. The United States participated in these missions by providing the experiments and received in return the results

1

and

of the experiments. Because the United States did not have a biosatellite program, and therefore could benefit at minimum cost from the Soviet life

sciences program, American participation in this program was especially

beneficial.

As a result of increased political tensions between ourselves and the Soviets, recent official space cooperation between the two nations has been greatly curtailed. Discussion of future cooperation in the field of planetary science were cancelled in 1982 by the Reagan administration. Working groups established under the 1972 space cooperation agreement to arrange for joint ventures in space meteorology, environmental studies, lunar and planetary exploration, and space biology and medicine have Instead, the two space powers have begun to enter the most

disbanded.

threatening and destabilizing period in the history of space development. The Soviet Union has already developed an antisatellite weapon. The Soviet ASAT system has only limited capability and can only strike targets in low Earth orbit, and therefore is not a direct threat to our military communications satellites at this time. However, Soviet development of an ASAT weapon has prompted the United States to begin testing a much more versatile and accurate ASAT system. The American ASAT system is small and would be carried on F-15 jets. As a result the Soviets would have great difficulty determining the number of ASAT's in our inventory, and predicting where and when they will be launched.

Mr. Chairman, I feel that full deployment of an American ASAT system will launch an arms race in space. This new phase of arms competition is particularly dangerous and destabilizing because the weapons involved already threaten our reconnaissance satellites and may eventually threaten the nerve centers of our strategic nuclear arsenal--the early warning, and communications satellites that alone can insure that an accident or

miscalculation does not deteriorate into global holocaust. Unless we guarantee the protection of our satellites, international weapons verifi

cation will become less credible, and the move toward meaningful arms

control will be less feasible.

Rather than engage in a costly and destabilizing space arms race, the two space powers should attempt to work more closely together. In the immediate sense, space cooperation can provide both countries with valuable, new scientific information at a reduced cost. Ultimately, it is my hope that once we and the Soviets begin to address officially the notion of cooperation in space, our attention will be drawn to our mutual interests and the need to protect them. We will not begin to east tensions with the Soviets until we begin to work with them. If we are committed to preserving peace, then we must find an alternative to the present military course of space development. The alternative not only serves the

interests of the two space powers, but of all mankind.

I want to thank the Chairman and the Members of the Subcommittee for permitting me to submit for the record my comments on the President's policy regarding the control of space weapons.

I will keep my comments brief. I want to address two aspects of the space weapons issue that are of paramount concern. The first is how we in Congress are being asked to consider the President's so-called Strategic Defense Initiative. The second is the retreating rationale which various Administration officials, including the President himself, have used to explain and justify their budget request and their policy goals.

The Administration has requested over $24 billion tax dollars for research, only research, on ballistic missile defense over the next five years. They claim this money is needed simply to determine if such weapons are technologically feasible. we should approve their request in order to provide future Presidents with options.

They say

why

My problem with this argument, and with the request, is this: must we spend $24 billion tax dollars to determine whether these weapons (and this whole concept) are feasible before we decide whether they are desirable?

Must we have operative prototypes and "technology demonstrations" to decide whether or not space-based missile defense is good policy, a good idea? I do not think so.

I ask the Members of the Subcommittee to consider the folly of embarking on a crash research program without first deciding that we want to deploy the weapons we seek to create. I think we should have a national debate on the merits of space-based missile defense now, not after we have spent tens of billions of tax dollars. And not after we have created a powerful advocacy bureaucracy within the Pentagon and industry.

I hope these hearings will be expanded to take into consideration the broad national security implications of even going ahead with the President's program, and signaling our intention to seek space-based missile defense. The arms control implications of such a move by the United States are enormous. The likely reactions of the Soviet Union are frightening.

The second aspect of the President's "Star Wars" program I would like to comment on are the various rationales presented in its defense.