discern from reading the

greater sophistication of

Administration Report. Given the

our satellites, and our lead in

virtually every technology exploited by satellites (see Richard DeLauer, FY1985 Department of Defense Program for Research, Development and Acquisition, February 27, 1984; page 11-32),

it is reasonably certain that U.S. satellites used in support roles for conventional operations are superior to their Soviet

variety does not withstand closer scrutiny.

3. Is crisis stability enhanced or diminished by ASATs? Satellites are "force multipliers" because they enhance the

destructive

power and the defensive posture of the forces

that they serve. This is increasingly true of low orbit satel

lites in conventional

and promtly transmit

operations as their ability to gather

all-weather

night-and-day intelligence

improves. The capacity to destroy such satellites could be irresistably seductive on the eve of hostilities despite the Hence a prompt and comprehensive ASAT

risk of escalation.

capability

against low-orbit

satellites could destabilize

a crisis or low-level conflict. A similar capability against

high altitude

(geosynchronous) satellites would pose far graver risks for these satellites are a central part of the nervous

system that governs the strategic forces.

and

4. What would ASAT deployment imply for arms race stability,

for

strategic arms control? This depends to a considerable

of the current

Low-altitude ASAT interceptors

generation do not have a direct impact on the

startegic balance, or on strategic arms control. On the other hand, more sophisticated technologies, such as laser weapons,

have a long-term ballistic missile defense (BMD) potential, and to the extent that they are developed for ASAT purposes they will inevitably erode confidence in the ABM Treaty. This "ASAT loophole" is a serious defect in the ABM Treaty. Since all existing strategic arms control is a lineal descendant of the ABM Treaty, unfettered ASAT activity could trigger a chain reaction that would unravel the treaty constraints on strategic offensive forces.

All these considerations therefore converge on the conclus

.

ion that we would be best off in a world without ASATS.

Unfortunately

1968 the Soviets

whose

4. THE SOVIET ASAT

we do not live in such a world. Since

have reportedly conducted some 20 ASAT tests,

results are summarized in Fig. 1. We must therefore assess whether this Soviet system requires us to enter into an ASAT competition, or whether we can find some combination of measures that would provide an adequate approximation to the ASAT-free world that we would prefer.

What is the threat posed by the Soviet ASAT? Here I can be brief, for in testimony to the Senate Foreign Relations July 11, 1979, the Air Force Chief of Staff,

Committee on

Source: N. Johnson, The Soviet Year in Space, 1982

General Lew Allen, said:

"I

think we give it a very questionable operational ability In other words, it is a threat that

for a few launches.

we are worried about, but they have not had a test program

tests.

that would cause us to believe it is a very credible

threat".

As Figure 1 shows, since that day the Soviets have held four Of these only one was successful, and it employed the radar homing technique that had been most extensively tested before 1979, and which formed the basis for General Allen's statement. The three other tests used a more sophisticated homing device instead of radar, and all failed. Hence

General Allen's assessment stands intact.

tellites are

these are of

Factors beyond the poor test performance enter into that assessment. First, as Figure 2 shows, a minority of U.S. sawithin reach of the Soviet ASAT, and none of importance to U.S. strategic forces in wartime. Second, since the Soviet ASAT is launched from the ground, it can only attack a satellite whose ground track runs close to the launch site; because of the turning of the earth and the motion of satellites, that only happens once every six hours on average for any given satellite. Third, in the success

of

ful tests, radar homing Occurs some three hours after launch the ASAT, which offers the would-be target opportunities for jamming and for evasive maneuvers. Fourth, the ASAT is lofted by a very massive booster; only a handful of suitable