Admiral CROWE. Yes, and we have several versions of it. The most recent versions are the most classified.

Mrs. SCHROEDER. I guess my question then is through all this Iran stuff, do we feel that the Russians may have gotten some information about the TOW missile through this, is there a way we can know that or trace that or has it been compromised?

Admiral CROWE. I understand that the version they have is not a problem. Incidentally, we have these missiles around the world and there are other ways, which we try and keep track of, et cetera. Mrs. SCHROEDER. But you feel that we know for sure that Iran did not pass the information on

-

Admiral CROWE. They didn't have our more advanced versions. Mrs. SCHROEDER. So it was not the advanced versions and the others we are not as worried about?

Admiral CROWE. That is correct.

Mrs. SCHROEDER. Thank you, Admiral.

The CHAIRMAN. Sam?

Mr. STRATTON. Let me ask a question in connection with the possibility that we might have to expand our conventional capabilities as a result of the zero/zero program. Is it not the case that one of our major shortages if we are going to go conventional is manpower, and is it not likely that if we really have to go that way, we are going to have to institute something on the order of a draft, and that clearly is not likely in terms of getting through the Congress? Admiral CROWE. Well, certainly the demographics are not encouraging when it comes to large standing arms or conventional forces and attempting to match the Soviets man for man. Even more so in Europe. I think the German demographics

Mr. STRATTON. The Germans have a serious problem there.
Admiral CROWE. Yes.

Mr. STRATTON. The thing that bothers me is that a number of people seem to think that conventional warfare is sort of like a picnic and it is going to be much easier than the kind of thing that we would have to do if we continue to maintain nuclear weapons. But the last time that we had a conventional fight some 30-40 million people died, and I think there is a tendency to make it sound as though conventional is really nothing to be concerned about-we are going to be living in a much safer era.

Admiral CROWE. I think it is something to be very, very concerned about. I not only oppose nuclear war, I don't advocate conventional war, either.

Mr. STRATTON. You and I were both in that last one?
Admiral CROWE. That is right.

The CHAIRMAN. Ike?

Mr. SKELTON. Admiral, I want to thank you for your candor in your testimony today. It is heartwarming to know that we have people like you and that you are the Chairman and willing to come forward and tell it like it is. I am sorry that the White House didn't take advantage of your knowledge, your good judgment, and your candor, which I think would have averted a real black eye that our country got with our friends and allies throughout the world.

Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Let me just say something in follow-up to what Ike said. I agree with his sentiments. Admiral, what Ike Skelton and I and Bill Nichols and Sam Nunn and Barry Goldwater over in the Senate were interested in was having a strong Chairman of the Joint Chiefs and a place where we could get consistent and good military advice in the system. We saw that the system that was in existence was not producing either usable or good strategic military advice to the President. And to do that we felt that you had to have the reorganization and we hope it is going to work out. We will see and make adjustments if it doesn't, but what we really need is good cogent military advice.

What is of concern is that the system is in place, but was not being used and I think the episodes this fall caused some concern among members of the committee here that were interested in that, that it was not being used.

We would like the process to work better. I am concerned that the process is not working and I am a little concerned, if I can be frank, sir, I wish you were a little more assertive. For this new system to work the first Chairman, which is you, will have to be quite assertive in making it work, and assertive in the system, and I wish you were more assertive or had been a little more assertive this fall. I guess maybe in some areas you might say the same thing, looking back.

But it is going to require more assertiveness and in this town the squeaky wheel gets paid attention to, and I think you have got to squeak a little more. Your guys are pretty assertive on a background basis, as I read in the paper; you are less assertive when you come in person and that is perhaps your style, but I think that assertiveness is part of the equation here and somehow we want this new system to work.

It is true we haven't had much time under it

Admiral CROWE. I think that is an important consideration, Mr. Chairman. I think you are going to have to put this system—it has just been passed and putting the system into effect you are asking an awful lot of people to change their way of life and doing business. I am not talking about just out of the military, I am talking in the military. I think the first few months are critical, that it is done in the right fashion, in a thorough way, not a hasty way. I said at the outset of the agitation for reorganization it will take 5 years before this system begins to be in place and is well accepted and begins to show real results, so I don't think you can expect too much too quickly. We may regret it if we do.

But I appreciate your advice.

The CHAIRMAN. Let me also say that there has been some recent news. Admiral, it has just been announced on the tube that Admiral Poindexter and Colonel North are leaving the NSC staff. Who their replacements are has not been announced, but in answer to Pat Schroeder's question-you probably have got them now. They are probably yours, sir. What are you going to do with them? Admiral CROWE. We are wondering, too.

The CHAIRMAN. Let me just say that there have been some reports that there was a certain amount of friction. Your backgrounders are more assertive than you are. We are clearly pretty unhappy with some of the things that were going on and there

were some reports coming out of the background that the Pentagon was very unhappy with Poindexter and Colonel North and that they would not be happy to see them.

What are you going to do with them?

Admiral CROWE. You just told me about it, Mr. Chairman.
The CHAIRMAN. We would like to have your views.

Admiral CROWE. Let me say with regard to some of the things that have been said, I don't enjoy doing my business in the newspaper. You can advise me to be assertive, but I don't enjoy doing my business in the newspaper, and I don't think everything in the newspaper is accurate as regards my presumed argument with Admiral Poindexter. We have been associates for many years and are good friends, and he has been very easy to work with over the course of the last 14 months and has been very cooperative with

me.

It has been portrayed otherwise in the media in many cases on the basis of sources, whatever they are. This is not to say that I do not have differences with the NSC. We have had and we still do. We are not the only agency in the Government that does, and I think that is sort of normal animal. To your question what are we going to do with them, I don't know, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Stratton.

Mr. STRATTON. Admiral, would you say that all operations that are covert are bad and immoral and not helpful to the national interest?

Admiral CROWE. Absolutely not.

Mr. STRATTON. I think that is a very important statement, because we seem to think that if it is covert somehow it is bad, and it shouldn't be carried out by the United States, and we are making a big mistake in that attitude.

Admiral CROWE. I agree with you wholeheartedly, Congressman. The CHAIRMAN. Any other questions?

Admiral, we appreciate your coming. Are you interested in talking in private session with the admiral? We will do it another time. It is already pretty late.

Thank you very much.

[Whereupon, at 12:23 p.m., the committee was adjourned, subject to the call of the Chair.]

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,

DEFENSE POLICY PANEL OF THE

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES,

Washington, DC, Tuesday, December 2, 1986.

The panel met, pursuant to call, at 10:05 a.m., in room 2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Les Aspin (chairman of the panel) presiding.

STATEMENT OF HON. LES ASPIN, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM WISCONSIN, CHAIRMAN, DEFENSE POLICY PANEL OF THE HOUSE COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

The CHAIRMAN. The meeting will come to order.

This is the fourth in a series of hearings by the Defense Policy Panel into the Reykjavik summit-both the substance of the summit and the process by which it was handled.

Yesterday we had been scheduled to hear from Ambassador Paul Nitze. The Ambassador asked to be excused at the last minute because of illness and that hearing was canceled. I'm trying to reschedule Ambassador Nitze and hope we will soon be able to hear from him.

Thus far we have heard from officials of the current administration-Richard Perle, Ken Adelman, and Adm. William Crowe. Today we will hear from a former officeholder, with experience as a Cabinet member in both Republican and Democratic administrations, a rare occurrence indeed in our Nation's history-and one he may recommend not repeating.

But I asked Jim Schlesinger to appear before us today not simply because he was a very good Secretary of Defense, but because he has been a very thoughtful participant in the debates on strategic issues for a quarter of a century. For someone with as much experience in the bureaucracy as Jim, he has retained a remarkable facility for always having something of substance to say, and for always saying it with clarity and without jargon.

Secretary Schlesinger, we welcome you before the panel. Please proceed as you wish.

STATEMENT OF JAMES R. SCHLESINGER, FORMER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Mr. SCHLESINGER. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman, for that overwhelming introduction. I am delighted to appear before you today to discuss Reykjavik. This hearing, to me, is very important because we should know two things: First, what went wrong in the process, and second, what the consequences would be if the proposals put forward and to some extent accepted at Reykjavik were to be implemented.

The events at Reykjavik have been overtaken, as we recognize, by the developments in Iran and funding of the Contras. Those