A related part is the destructive analysis work at the Argonne National Laboratory. Argonne has completed destructive chemical analysis of the assay gage validation rod and is prepared to begin destructive analysis of selected breeder core rods. Destructive analysis of the breeder core rods will provide data to calibrate the assay gage to be used at the Expended Core Facility. Question: What is the status and future plans for the Shippingport site? Answer: The Shippingport Atomic Power Station terminated power operation on October 1, 1982 with the shutdown of the Light Water Breeder Reactor. De fueling of the reactor and shipment of the fuel from the site will be completed by the end of FY 1984. When the last fuel modules are shipped, responsibility for the station will be turned over to another group within DOE, the Office of Terminal Waste Disposal and Remedial Action, for decommissioning. The decommissioning contractor has been selected and is to be on site in the spring of 1984 to begin preparations for decommissioning. Question: Why is it necessary to evaluate the reactor's core over the next several years as you plan? Answer: It is necessary to evaluate the Light Water Breeder Reactor core now since the spent core is available, specialized equipment has been built and is currently installed and being checked out and qualified, and the uniquely qualified technical people who built the core are available now to do the technical evaluation. A General Accounting Office review in 1983 confirmed that the core should be evaluated and that present plans are the most cost effective way to accomplish the evaluation. Initial data obtained from operation of the Light Water Breeder Reactor indicates that the core performed as predicted. However, verification of how well the core bred is necessary to determine potential uranium requirements of the Light Water Breeder Reactor concept. Determining performance of fuel, structural materials, and various features to extend fuel burn-up through physical examination, will tell how close the materials were to their limiting conditions after having operated for almost twice their design life. Information on the core's material condition is also of interest for non-breeding reactor designs. Deferral of core evaluation work would mean a major R&D effort of significant potential benefit would be left hanging when over 90% complete. Question: Have you had any recent indications that the nuclear industry is interested in the Light Water Breeder Reactor? Answer: The nuclear industry has indicated interest in the Light Water Breeder Reactor. General Accounting Office reviews in 1981 and 1983 found the nuclear industry was knowledgeable concerning the Light Water Breeder Reactor and wanted the work completed so they could have Light Water Breeder Reactor technology available for potential future application. Currently, industry is applying various facets of Light Water Breeder Reactor technology such as the use of computer codes, and metallurgy and fuel cycles studies. ATOMIC ENERGY DEFENSE ACTIVITIES STATEMENT OF ROBERT L. MORGAN, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR DEFENSE PROGRAMS, DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY ACCOMPANIED BY: MAJ. GEN. WILLIAM W. HOOVER, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR MILITARY APPLICATIONS F. CHARLES GILBERT, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR NUCLEAR MATERIALS JAMES W. CULPEPPER, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR SECURITY AFFAIRS RICHARD L. WAGNER, ASSISTANT TO THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (ATOMIC ENERGY) PREPARED STATEMENTS Senator DOMENICI. Let's proceed, Mr. Morgan, with your testimony on the weapons activities of DOE. Mr. MORGAN. I'd like to submit the testimony of the Deputy Assistant Secretaries and myself as part of the record, and I would like to also submit as part of the record the vu-graphs that I am planning to use as part of my testimony. STATEMENT OF ROBERT L. MORGAN INTRODUCTION Mr. Chairman and members of the Committee, it is my pleasure to be here today to share with you the rationale to support the Defense Programs portion of the Department of Energy's Atomic Energy Defense Activities appropriation request for Fiscal Year 1985 and our Supplemental request for Fiscal Year 1984. With me today are Dr. Richard Wagner, Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Atomic Energy; Major General William W. Hoover, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Military Application; Dr. F. Charles Gilbert, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Nuclear Materials; Mr. James W. Culpepper, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Security Affairs; and Mr. Charles V. Boykin, Defense Programs newly appointed Deputy Assistant Secretary for Intelligence. Mr. Boykin's intelligence organization, formerly part of the • responsible for all Department of Energy intelligence activities. The intelligence organization is placed in Defense Programs because of its close working relationship with our Office of International Security Affairs and the weapons laboratories. Mr. Boykin will have direct access to the Office of the Secretary. Because of Mr. Boykin's very recent appointment, Mr. Culpepper will cover the intelligence budget request. THE WHY OF DEFENSE PROGRAMS (Chart 1) The Department of Energy is responsible for designing, developing, testing, producing, and maintaining all of the United States' nuclear weapons in support of the Department of Defense, and the other supporting functions shown on this Chart. The Defense Department's requirements are coordinated with the Department of Energy to assure that we in DOE will be able to satisfy them; then these requirements are specifically approved by the President (Chart 2). This Department of Defense/Department of Energy/White House relationship is in accordance with the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, and the subsequent legislation establishing the Department of Energy. Dr. Wagner, who will follow me in presenting his testimony, will elaborate further on the cooperative relationship between our two Departments. ADJUSTING TO CHANGE Because the work of our organization is vital to the national defense, we must strive to conduct our business in a manner that will prompt neither a negative public nor regulatory reaction which could threaten to compromise our ability to get the job done; we must manage our business in ways that we as citizens, would hope that other industrial operations would be managed. This means our operations must be carried out in a secure, safe, and environmentally responsible manner. In addition, our operations must produce the required weapons quantities while meeting the stringent quality requirements that will assure their safety and reliability. All of our efforts must be managed efficiently and economically. In recent years the operational standards against which we must work have been changing. The experience of the Three Mile Island incident has tightened the standards and practice for the operation of defense related reactors. The increasing world-wide incidence of terrorist activities has required that we enhance the physical security afforded nuclear materials in our sensitive facilities. Our ongoing efforts to effectively manage radioactivity since the inception of our program have paid off; but now, the adequacy of previously accepted industrial standards and practices for management of other chemicals and waste for the protection of the environment and the public is more and more coming into question. We are adjusting to each of these changes in a careful, responsible way. We have reviewed our most critical facilities and operations to define areas needing improvement. We are continuing these studies throughout the Defense Programs complex. We have developed prioritized plans for addressing the identified deficiences. Our Fiscal Year 1984 supplemental request and our Fiscal Year 1985 budget request that we will justify to you, contain near-tern priority upgrades necessary to correct known deficiencies. Our primary responsibility, however, is to produce and maintain the nuclear weapons stockpile in a safe, secure, and environnéntally responsible manner. THE ISSUES In their testimony following my statement, the Defense Prograns Deputy Assistant Secretaries will be describing their responsibilities and the manner in which they are re addressed in the Fiscal Year 1985 budget and Fiscal Year 1984 supplemental request. They will cover the major issues and challenges before then, and they will address the security, safety, and environmental actions proposed and underway to assure the success of their programs. General Hoover, the Deputy Assistant Secretary for Military Application, will address the reasons why, in support of the Defense Department, we are engaged in a substantial effort to replace the older weapons in the United States arsenal with more advanced state-of-the-art systems along with some of the technical challenges involved in pursuing the President's Strategic Defense Initiative and other weapon developments. Dr. Gilbert, the Deputy Assistant Secretary for Nuclear Materials, will discuss the reasons why the Department must continue to produce increased quantities of plutonium and tritium for the weapon program and the steps we are planning, to provide for responsible interim and long-term management of our radioactive waste. Mr. Culpepper, the Deputy Assistant Secretary for Security Affairs, will discuss with you the issues associated with safeguards and security at our nuclear facilities, classification concerns and activities of the Verification and Control Technology program. |