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A related part is the destructive analysis work at the Argonne National Laboratory. Argonne has completed destructive chemical analysis of the assay gage validation rod and is prepared to begin destructive analysis of selected breeder core rods. Destructive analysis of the breeder core rods will provide data to calibrate the assay gage to be used at the Expended Core Facility.

Question: What is the status and future plans for the Shippingport site?

Answer: The Shippingport Atomic Power Station terminated power operation on October 1, 1982 with the shutdown of the Light Water Breeder Reactor. De fueling of the reactor and shipment of the fuel from the site will be completed by the end of FY 1984.

When the last fuel modules are shipped, responsibility for the station will be turned over to another group within DOE, the Office of Terminal Waste Disposal and Remedial Action, for decommissioning. The decommissioning contractor has been selected and is to be on site in the spring of 1984 to begin preparations for decommissioning.

Question: Why is it necessary to evaluate the reactor's core over the next several years as you plan?

Answer: It is necessary to evaluate the Light Water Breeder Reactor core now since the spent core is available, specialized equipment has been built and is currently installed and being checked out and qualified, and the uniquely qualified technical people who built the core are available now to do the technical evaluation. A General Accounting Office review in 1983 confirmed that the core should be evaluated and that present plans are the most cost effective way to accomplish the evaluation.

Initial data obtained from operation of the Light Water Breeder Reactor indicates that the core performed as predicted. However, verification of how well the core bred is necessary to determine potential uranium requirements of the Light Water Breeder Reactor concept. Determining performance of fuel, structural materials, and various features to extend fuel burn-up through physical examination, will tell how close the materials were to their limiting conditions after having operated for almost twice their design life. Information on the core's material condition is also of interest for non-breeding reactor designs.

De ferral of core evaluation work would mean a major R&D effort of significant potential benefit would be left hanging when over 90% complete.

Question: Have you had any recent indications that the nuclear industry is interested in the Light Water Breeder Reactor?

Answer: The nuclear industry has indicated interest in the Light Water Breeder Reactor. General Accounting Office reviews in 1981 and 1983 found the nuclear industry was knowledgeable concerning the Light Water Breeder Reactor and wanted the work completed so they could have Light Water Breeder Reactor technology available for potential future application. Currently, industry is applying various facets of Light Water Breeder Reactor technology such as the use of computer codes, and metallurgy and fuel cycles studies.

ATOMIC ENERGY DEFENSE ACTIVITIES

STATEMENT OF ROBERT L. MORGAN, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY

FOR DEFENSE PROGRAMS, DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY
ACCOMPANIED BY:
MAJ. GEN. WILLIAM W. HOOVER, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR

MILITARY APPLICATIONS
F. CHARLES GILBERT, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR NUCLEAR

MATERIALS
JAMES W. CULPEPPER, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR SECU-

RITY AFFAIRS RICHARD L. WAGNER, ASSISTANT TO THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (ATOMIC ENERGY)

PREPARED STATEMENTS Senator DOMENICI. Let's proceed, Mr. Morgan, with your testimony on the weapons activities of DOE.

Mr. MORGAN. I'd like to submit the testimony of the Deputy Assistant Secretaries and myself as part of the record, and I would like to also submit as part of the record the vu-graphs that I am planning to use as part of my testimony. (The statements follow:)

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STATEMENT OF ROBERT L. MORGAN

INTRODUCTION Mr. Chairman and members of the Connittee, it is ay pleasure to be here today to share with you the rationale to support the Defense Prograns portion of the Departeent of Energy's acónic Energy Defense Activities appropriation request for Fiscal Year

1985 and our Supplemental request for Fiscal Year 1984.

with me today, are Dr. Richard Wagner, Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Atomic Energy; Major General William W. Hoover, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Military Application; Dr. F. Charles Gilbert, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Nuclear Materials; Mr. Janes W. Culpepper, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Security Affairs; and Mr. Charles V. Boykin, Defense Prograns newly appointed Deputy Assistant Secretary for Intelligence.

Mr. Boykin's intelligence organization, formerly part of the

Defense Programs Office of International Security Affairs, is

'respo asible for all Department of Energy intelligence activities.

The intelligence organization is placed in Defense Prograss because of its close working relationship with our Office of International Security Affairs and the weapons laboratories. Mr. Boykia vill have direct access to the office of the Secretary.

Because of Mr. Boykin's very recent appointaent, Mr. Culpepper vill cover the latelligence budget request.

THE WHY OF DEFENS Ė PROGRAMS

(Chart 1)

The Department of Energy'ls responsible for designing,

developing, testing, producing, and maintaining all of the United States' nuclear ve apons to support of the Departsent of Defense, and the other supporting functions shown on this Chart. The Defense De partsent's requirements are coordinated with the DepartRent of Energy to assure that we in Doe will be able to satisfy thes; then these requireseats are specifically approved by the President (Chart 2). This Departaent of Defense/ Departsent of

Laergy/White House relationship 18 in accordance with the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, and the subsequent legislation establishing the

Department of Energy.

Dr. Wagner, who will follow me in presenting his testimony, will elaborate further on the cooperative relationship between our two

Departments.

ADJUS TING TO CHANGE Because the work of our organization is vital to the national defense, we must strive to conduct our business in a manner that will prompt neither a negative public nor regulatory reaction which could threaten to compromise our ability to get the job done; we

Rust manage our business in ways that we as citizens, would hope

that other industrial operations would be managed.

This beans our operat 1028 must be carried out in a secure, safe,

and environmentally responsible manner.

In addition, our operations

must produce the required we apons quantities while meeting the stringent quality requirements that will assure their safety and reliability. All of our efforts must be managed efficiently and economically.

In recent years the operational standards against which we must work have been changing. The experience of the Three Mile Island

incident has tightened the standards and practice for the operation

of defense related reactors. The increasing world-wide incidence of terrorist activities has required that we enhance the physical

security afforded nuclear materials in our sensitive facilities.

Our ongoing efforts to effectively manage radioactivity since the

lnception of our program have paid off; but now, the adequacy of previously accepted industrial standards and practices for management of other chemicals and waste for the protection of the environment

and the public 18 more and more coming into question.

We are adjusting to each of these changes in a careful, responsible

way. We have reviewed our most critical facilities and operations

to define areas needing improvement. We are continuing these

studies throughout the Defesse Progress coaplez. Pe tere develsges mioritiut plass for addressing the idestilled deficiesces. Oraz 11sesi Test 1984 s597 lesestul request osé os 11xul lex: 1985 budget request that we w111 justify to gos, costais sekretera priority unrades necessary to correct keove deficiencies. Our

Pinary respossibility, bovever, is to produce and saistais the

nuclear weapons stockpile is a safe, secure, and estiretristally

responsible saaner.

THE ISSUES In their testimony following sy staterent, the Defense Programs Deputy Assistant Secretaries will be describing their res possib111ties and the manner 19 which they are addressed is the riscal Year 1985 budget and Fiscal Year 1984 supplerental request. They wi11 cover the sajor issues and challenges before ther, and they wi11 address the security, safety, and environseatal actions proposed and underway to assure the success of their prograss.

General Hoover, the Deputy Assistant Secretary for Military

Application, will address the reasons why, 10 support of the

Defense Department, we are engaged in a substantial effort to

replace the older weapons to the United States arsenal with more

advanced state-of-the-art systems along with some of the technical

challenges involved in pursuing the President's Strategic Defense Initiative and other we apon developaents.

Dr. 61 lbert, the Deputy Assistant Secretary for Nuclear Materials,

w111 discuss the reasons why the Department must continue to produce

increased quantities of plutonium and tritium for the weapon program and the steps we are planning, to provide for responsible interin and long-term management of our radioactive waste.

Mr. Culpepper, the Deputy Assistant Secretary for Security Affairs,

w111 discuss with you the issues associated with safeguards

and security at our nuclear facilities, classification concerns and

activities of the Verification and Control Technology program.

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