WHEREAS, such federal legislation reserves solely to Congress the authority to determine the ultimate use of South Dakota water re Sources: NOW, THEREFORE, BE IT RESOLVED, by the Senate of the Fifty-ninth Legislature of the state of South Dakota, the House of Representatives concurring therein, that the United States Congress should take prompt action to revise the authorization language for the Gregory County project in a manner consistent with state policy so as to fully recognize the state's right to participate in the planning, development and management of its water resources and to allow the state to obtain the immediate and direct benefits of the project; and BE IT FURTHER RESOLVED, that those industries, public and private, interested in the use of the benefits to be derived from the project enter into serious discussion directed to assuring that the greatest possible public benefit will be realized for all the citizens of the state. Adopted by the Senate, February 22, 1984 Concurred in by the House of Representatives, February 24, 1984 Chairman HATFIELD. We will recess until Tuesday, next week, to hear explanation for the request for atomic energy defense activities of the DOE. [Whereupon, at 10:45 a.m. Wednesday, March 21, the subcommittee was recessed to reconvene at 10 a.m. Tuesday, March 27.] ENERGY AND WATER DEVELOPMENT TUESDAY, MARCH 27, 1984 U.S. SENATE, SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS, Washington, DC. The subcomittee met at 10:12 a.m. in room SD-116, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Pete Domenici presiding. Present: Senator Domenici. NAVAL REACTORS DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM STATEMENT OF ADM. KINNAIRD R. MCKEE, DIRECTOR, NAVAL NUCLEAR PROPULSION PROGRAM OPENING REMARKS Senator DOMENICI. The hearing will please come to order. Admiral McKee, we are pleased to have you as our first witness. We are very short of time. I assume we will have some written questions. We will ask you to answer them as quickly as possible. PREPARED STATEMENT Admiral MCKEE. All right, sir. I will be happy to do that. (951) STATEMENT OF ADM. KINNAIRD R. MCKEE Introduction Last year, I devoted a significant part of my statement to describing the defense contribution of our nuclear powered warships. I also described the general responsibilities of the Naval Nuclear Propulsion Program, emphasizing some of the basic philosophy that provides the foundation for our record of safe and successful operation. Since then the responsibilities of the Naval Nuclear Propulsion Program have grown as more ships continue to be delivered to the fleet. We also have important new things to do. During the past year, we commissioned our fourth Trident submarine, GEORGIA, bringing our Trident submarine force to four with seven more authorized. We delivered 4 more 688 Class submarines, bringing the 688 force to 25 with 19 more authorized. The Navy's FY 1985 budget proposes to add another Trident and four attack submarines to that force. Highly capable 688 Class submarines are entering the fleet in numbers today. Together with the still formidable 637 Class, they constitute an impressive submarine force that can handle its Soviet counterpart. That is fine for now, but we must also ensure that advantage for the future, in a harsher environment and against opposition by greater numbers of even more capable submarines and aircraft. To do that, we need to press vigorously ahead in all aspects of submarine development, integrating a proper balance of the most useful concepts into a new ship design. It is with that in mind that the Chief of Naval Operations has identified R&D funding for a new design attack submarine as a top priority item in the President's FY 1985 defense budget request. The Secretary of Defense has endorsed our current plans aimed toward authorization of a lead ship in FY 1989. This is a major undertaking; one that will draw extensively on R&D work supported by this Committee, so I thought it would be helpful if I explained what the ship must do and why we must get on with it. To do that, we need to focus on the utility of attack submarines and that, in turn, leads directly to a discussion of the tactical utility and the leverage they provide. Tactical and Strategic Leverage When we review naval engagements of the past, or estimate the outcome of engagements in the future, there is a tendency to become preoccupied with individual tactical considerations, but more important is the question of how each affected the overall course of the war. What leverage did the individual action, or threat of action, exercise on forces in another theatre and how did that affect the outcome of the war? We must understand this principle of leverage but we must also have the tools to use it to our advantage. - To do this, we must create in the minds of a potential adversary both a certainty and an uncertainty; a certainty with regard to our own ability what we can do and in combat, a terrible uncertainty as to what we will do. Certainty of our ability to inflict damage can dictate the scope and nature of resources dedicated to protect their forces, while uncertainty as to our intentions can dictate additional commitment of resources and redistribution of their military forces. The question of whether we win or lose will depend not only on the degree of damage our submarines can inflict, but also on how they influence the overall employment of enemy naval and air forces. In a crisis, fear of our attack submarines ties up Soviet naval and air forces that might otherwise be used against our NATO resupply, in support of a land campaign in Europe, or against our own supply lines. What we would most like to do is to insert such uncertainty into Soviet estimates that they will be deterred from executing their war plans in the first place. Historical Precedents while The leverage provided by submarine warfare first became evident in the early days of World War I when the German submarine U-9 sank three British cruisers in a single encounter. That action caused the British to withdraw the Grand Fleet first to Western Scotland, later to North Ireland they improved defenses at the Scapa Flow anchorage. They also made a major reassessment of their war plans that effectively reduced the useful size of their battle fleet and enabled an inferior German Navy to pose a more significant threat on the high seas. German submarine activity also created an attitude of excessive caution that hampered British naval operations for the remainder of the war. The Commander-in-Chief of the Grand Fleet, Sir John Jellicoe, explained it to the Admiralty this way: ... "If . the enemy battle fleet were to turn away from our advancing fleet, I should assume that the intention was to lead us over mines and submarines, and should decline to be so drawn." |