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1. Weapons effects—understanding them is extremely important for designing systems, ensuring survivability. The Nation is handicapped by the requirement to test underground, so those tests must be very elaborate, environments must be simulated by specially designed nuclear devices, and much must be done with elaborate calculations. A little over a decade ago, the AEC labs had several hundred people doing this kind of work, and most of the difficult problems in weapons effects were identified by the AEC labs. These people provided a base from which the DOD competence in this area was nourished, often by good people leaving the labs and going to work for the DOD contractor community. Today this base at the labs is only about a tenth of what it was a decade or so ago. Much of the slack has been picked up by DNA and the service labs, but what remains in DOE is extremely important. One example is the use, by DNA, of the Los Alamos computation base for DNA calculations.
2. Nuclear weapon systems design, as distinct from warhead design, and especially determination of warhead requirements and how the warhead interacts with the system. Of course much of this is done by the DOD, but the labs play an important role. Recent examples are the labs' contributions to MX basing considerations, modernization of fleet weapons, and simulations of theater weapons operations and engagements.
3. Nuclear weapon security. DOD is responsible for this area, and a fully fleshed-out operational system exists. But in the aftermath of the Munich Olympics and during the rise of international terrorism, when it was clear that we needed to improve our security posture, Sandia in particular took the initiative in identifying useful improve ments. They continue to help us in many essential ways, and are a continuing and vital presence on the ground in the European theater especially
4. Military applications of nuclear reactor systems. The nuclear navy has, of course, maintained the highest standards of competence. But those reactor applications have be come quite narrowly applied to ship propulsion needs. The civil nuclear community, quite frankly, appears to lack the vitality to explore innovative military reactor applications. These applications may be very important in two areas-space nuclear power and secure, enduring power for military bases. The labs have maintained an interest in these areas which DOD is now beginning to draw on after decades of little effort
There are many other examples of how the labs nourish, support, and constructively criticize the DOD nuclear weapons infrastructure.
What I have been talking about so far is the way in which the DOE technolog base contributes to the larger national nuclear deterrence infrastructure. But the labs technology base, maintained for nuclear weapon R&D, also contributes importantly and increasingly to the nonnuclear defense posture of the Nation.
DOE TECHNOLOGY BASE CONTRIBUTES TO
DOD'S NONNUCLEAR CAPABILITY AS WELL SOME EXAMPLES • NONNUCLEAR ADVANCED MUNITIONS • NONNUCLEAR DIRECTED ENERGY WEAPONS • ARMOR • BATTLEFIELD SENSORS • SUBMARINE QUIETING AND HYDRODYNAMIC
EFFICIENCY ASW SIGNAL PROCESSING • CHEMICAL WARFARE DEFENSE
This viewgraph gives examples of this kind of work. Let me talk a little more about one area-nonnuclear munitions.
Of course this nonnuclear work is done on a reimbursable basis, with funding provided by DOD, but the basic capability is there because of the facilities and skills maintained by the nuclear weapon and other DOE-supported programs. If this base declines, or fails to be modernized, the nonnuclear defense posture of the Nation will also eventually be the poorer for it. This chart shows one aspect of the status of that base that is, the people involved in building and maintaining it.
Finally, let me observe that one very important product of the DOE tech base is experienced, quality people, trained at the DOE weapons labs, who have left the labs to take positions of responsibility in DOD and other parts of the defense commun This contribution ranges from the very high levels-including one Secretary of Defense three Secretaries of the Air Force, four directors of defense research and engineering at least one service chief of staff, and several people at the assistant secretary of een alent levels in defense to further down in the DOD infrastructure where peope SLICE as the hundreds of officers who have served at the labs as military researct. astra bring their experience to bear in creating a more effective nuclear deterren DESIE This is just one more extremely valuable product of the laboratories technolog De and one which will also decline if the labs' tech base declines, since the quarr facilities and equipment in the long run, is what attracts good people t o: DIEZIE
It is hard to quantify these kinds of contributions to defense. A guest" : that some 15 percent to 20 percent of the labs effort goes to these I less obvious than the actual warheads designed for production DE 2 portant.
TOTAL WEAPONS ACTIVITIES
WEAPONS PERSONNEL (FTES)
WEAPONS IN NEAR-TERM
BASIC WEAPONS TECHNOLOGIES FOR
ADVANCED CONCEPTS OLIITILI 1970 1972 1974 1976 1978 1980
As you know, and as this chart (R&D Manpower) shows, the tech base effon declined during the 1970's, and we are still, to a greater extent than is prudent, living off technological capital built up before that decline. The following discusses these items in more detail.
This Nation's ability to influence world affairs is affected by the extent to which the United States maintains technological supremacy in the defense area. As you are aware, the national laboratories have assembled a massive and broad technological base in pursuit of their nuclear weapons R&D mission and much of this base is broadly applicable to nonnuclear military technology. These laboratories with their immense technical and computational capabilities represent a national resource that should not be limited to nuclear weapons programs. Just as these laboratories were created to develop a radically different weapon based on new science and new technology, they should now be tasked to pursue advanced weapon concepts of all types applicable to our projected critical miltary needs. The resources and people to support these R&D programs has improved slightly, but we believe much more needs to be done.
Level of effort funding, which has worked so well for nuclear R&D, is essential so that an efficient and stable research base can be maintained and the workload perturbations and uncertainties of contractual arrangements can be avoided. We are working with DOE to encourage some of the world's foremost scientists at the labs by providing broader opportunity to explore long-term research for new technologies with a wide variety of applications. As a first step toward this end, in the area of nonnuclear munitions, the DOD has set aside $10 million in fiscal year 1985 for research on nonnuclear munitions technology, and we anticipate that the DOE will request similar funding for this activity in future budgets. Our interest in expanding the R&D areas of the na
tional laboratories in no way modifies their national security mission of nuclear weapons R&D. It will take greater advantage of their existing capabilities. The skills and knowledge acquired through research on nuclear weapons can be exploited to advance the technology of nonnuclear alternatives, and we are asking that Cogress work with us to accomplish this goal.
Of foremost importance among the various elements of our nuclear cooperation with our allies is the subject of safety and security of nuclear weapons [deleted].
There are many other areas of interaction. For example, analyses by the laboratories of weapon output and effects provided the foundation for systems vulnerability and survivability work now conducted by the Defense Nuclear Agency. Recently, the DOE labs have conducted special analytical studies that assisted DOD in system definition and other major decisions on the SM-2(N), battlefield weapons, and MX basing options. The expertise at the labs is used in many other ways, including nuclear intelligence assessment
Over the years, DOE has provided people of broad experience and unique technical background to fill technical and management positions in the DOD, other Government, and defense contractor areas. In a somewhat narrower source, personnel exchanges are an excellent way to bridge the technical expert-user gap. These exchanges should be formalized and more effectively used by both DOE and DOD, and we are working hard on improving these personnel exchanges. We have found over the years that the military officers who spend a tour at the laboratories find the experience they gain to be very beneficial later in other assignments. Similarly, the three DOE personnel on my staff, one at DNA, and others, find the experience very beneficial.
In the fall of 1982, DNA and DOE entered into an agreement whereby Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) provides computational resources to the roughly 140 contractor organization located throughout the country supporting the DNA RDT&E mission (see chart).
This support began in January last year, and is working very well. Access to computer resources at the LANL Central Computing Facility (CCF) are provided through an existing telecommunications network managed by DNA. This computational support included making available half of a cray, an archival file system, and extensive printer and graphics resources. LANL also agreed to integrate DNA's Cyber 176 computer into their facility and manage its operations. LANL assumes the technical and operational responsibility for CCF resources made available to the DNA research community and provides technical planning and diagnostic support for the DNA communications network. DNA retains responsibility for identifying, specifying, and analyzing requirements and then manages the computational resources in accordance with agency priorities.
This arrangement between DNA and DOE has given the DNA scientific community access to superb computational facilities-second to none in the world and it has done so at substantially lower cost than would otherwise have been possible.
Other areas of mutual cooperation and teamwork between DOD and DOE are too numerous to discuss in any great detail, but these include our joint efforts to protect classified information, to control the export of our defense-related high technology, to assist with nonproliferation activities, to verify compliance (or noncompliance) with existing treaties, and to assist in formulating U.S. positions in the arms reduction negotiations.
ADVANCED TECHNOLOGY AND SOVIET CAPABILITY Since the early days of World War II, the work of the nuclear weapons program has been driven, in large degree, by uncertainties in what adversaries could do. The Manhattan Project was undertaken partly out of concern for German progress in nuclear physics. In the years after 1945, the hydrogen bomb decision was influenced by estimates of Soviet progress, or lack of it, toward that capability. We are, today, in the middle of the same kind of situation.
As you may know, the DOD has published and distributed two versions of "Soviet Military Power," which was first published in 1981 and updated in 1983, to provide the public with information about the scope and nature of the Soviet threat that we confront. The Armed Services Committee has also been provided a comprehensive briefing on the continuing growth of Soviet military capabilities.
Of all the threats to our ability to encourage a peaceful world, none surpasses that posed by the Soviet nuclear arsenal. Since the first Soviet nuclear explosion on August 19, 1949, that threat has continued to grow larger with each passing year. Its growth pattern has been constant and unaffected by Soviet economic difficulties, our effort toward rapprochement, successes or failures in the arms control arena, or even international crises. The growth seems to move with a vitality and life of its own (see chart).
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As you know, President Reagan has directed that a comprehensive and intensive effort be initiated “to define a long-term research and development program to begin to achieve our ultimate goal of eliminating the threat posed by strategic nuclear missiles."
The SDI is a research program designed to provide options in the strategic defense arena. In recognition of the importance of the SDI, it will be centrally managed within DOD, with direct responsibility to the Secretary of Defense. Although funded separately, we believe the Department of Energy program is integral to the overall SDI program [deleted].
(Deleted] a memorandum of understanding, signed by the Secretaries of Defense and Energy, to establish the relationship between the overall DOD strategic defense initiative management responsibilities and the SDI research and technology development ac tivities executed by the Department of Energy is in preparation.
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RESOURCE LEVERAGE IN DOE NUCLEAR WEAPON PROGRAM (Deleted) also, although the great majority of the cost of a weapons system is borne by the DOD (see chart), the support provided by the DOE is essential. Seemingly