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tional laboratories in no way modifies their national security mission of nuclear weapons R&D. It will take greater advantage of their existing capabilities. The skills and knowledge acquired through research on nuclear weapons can be exploited to advance the technology of nonnuclear alternatives, and we are asking that Cogress work with us to accomplish this goal.
Of foremost importance among the various elements of our nuclear cooperation with our allies is the subject of safety and security of nuclear weapons (deleted).
There are many other areas of interaction. For example, analyses by the laboratories of weapon output and effects provided the foundation for systems vulnerability and survivability work now conducted by the Defense Nuclear Agency. Recently, the DOE labs have conducted special analytical studies that assisted DOD in system definition and other major decisions on the SM-2(N), battlefield weapons, and MX basing options. The expertise at the labs is used in many other ways, including nuclear intelligence assessment
Over the years, DOE has provided people of broad experience and unique technical background to fill technical and management positions in the DOD, other Government, and defense contractor areas. In a somewhat narrower source, personnel exchanges are an excellent way to bridge the technical expert-user gap. These exchanges should be formalized and more effectively used by both DOE and DOD, and we are working hard on improving these personnel exchanges. We have found over the years that the military officers who spend a tour at the laboratories find the experience they gain to be very beneficial later in other assignments. Similarly, the three DOE personnel on my staff, one at DNA, and others, find the experience very beneficial.
In the fall of 1982, DNA and DOE entered into an agreement whereby Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) provides computational resources to the roughly 140 contractor organization located throughout the country supporting the DNA RDT&E mission (see chart).
This support began in January last year, and is working very well. Access to computer resources at the LANL Central Computing Facility (CCF) are provided through an existing telecommunications network managed by DNA. This computational support included making available half of a cray, an archival file system, and extensive printer and graphics resources. LANL also agreed to integrate DNA's Cyber 176 computer into
their facility and manage its operations. LANL assumes the technical and operational responsibility for CCF resources made available to the DNA research community and provides technical planning and diagnostic support for the DNA communications network. DNA retains responsibility for identifying, specifying, and analyzing requirements and then manages the computational resources in accordance with agency priorities.
This arrangement between DNA and DOE has given the DNA scientific community access to superb computational facilities-second to none in the world-and it has done so at substantially lower cost than would otherwise have been possible.
Other areas of mutual cooperation and teamwork between DOD and DOE are too numerous to discuss in any great detail, but these include our joint efforts to protect classified information, to control the export of our defense-related high technology, to assist with nonproliferation activities, to verify compliance (or noncompliance) with existing treaties, and to assist in formulating U.S. positions in the arms reduction negotiations.
ADVANCED TECHNOLOGY AND SOVIET CAPABILITY Since the early days of World War II, the work of the nuclear weapons program has been driven, in large degree, by uncertainties in what adversaries could do. The Manhattan Project was undertaken partly out of concern for German progress in nuclear physics. In the years after 1945, the hydrogen bomb decision was influenced by estimates of Soviet progress, or lack of it, toward that capability. We are, today, in the middle of the same kind of situation.
As you may know, the DOD has published and distributed two versions of “Soviet Military Power," which was first published in 1981 and updated in 1983, to provide the public with information about the scope and nature of the Soviet threat that we confront. The Armed Services Committee has also been provided a comprehensive briefing on the continuing growth of Soviet military capabilities.
of all the threats to our ability to encourage a peaceful world, none surpasses that posed by the Soviet nuclear arsenal. Since the first Soviet nuclear explosion on August 19, 1949, that threat has continued to grow larger with each passing year. Its growth pattern has been constant and unaffected by Soviet economic difficulties, our effort toward rapprochement, successes or failures in the arms control arena, or even international crises. The growth seems to move with a vitality and life of its own (see chart).
(Deleted.) (Deleted.] (Deleted.) (Deleted.) (Deleted.) (Deleted.)
As you know, President Reagan has directed that a comprehensive and intensive effort be initiated “to define a long-term research and development program to begin to achieve our ultimate goal of eliminating the threat posed by strategic nuclear missiles."
The SDI is a research program designed to provide options in the strategic defense arena. In recognition of the importance of the SDI, it will be centrally managed within DOD, with direct responsibility to the Secretary of Defense. Although funded separately, we believe the Department of Energy program is integral to the overall SDI program [deleted]
(Deleted) a memorandum of understanding, signed by the Secretaries of Defense and Energy, to establish the relationship between the overall DOD strategic defense initiative management responsibilities and the SDI research and technology development ac tivities executed by the Department of Energy is in preparation.
(Deleted.] (Deleted.] (Deleted.] (Deleted.]
RESOURCE LEVERAGE IN DOE NUCLEAR WEAPON PROGRAM (Deleted) also, although the great majority of the cost of a weapons system is borne by the DOD (see chart), the support provided by the DOE is essential. Seemingly
small decrements in the DOE budget (deleted] can have significant impact on the more costly DOD programs. Let me give some examples, first in the area of weapon production. Funding for direct warhead production has high leverage. Because of the stringent requirements for safety and reliability, there is inherently a large buy-in price in production. Once this buy-in price is payed, actual direct weapon production is not as expensive as it might appear on the surface. By the same token, small reductions in funding for production can result in disproportionately large reductions in weapons produced. (Deleted.)
(Deleted) while it is harder to quantify, this same kind of leverage clearly operates in the area of research and development "product.")
Congressional funding constraints such as those imposed on the Peacekeeper W87 warhead funding have greatly complicated our planning for warhead production, particularly in view of the simultaneous modernization requirements for our strategic and theater nuclear forces. Construction funds in both fiscal years 1983 and 1984 were fenced. The lack of timely release of funds causes a progressively riskier position in trying to meet IOC commitments, to have warheads available when the missile is ready for deployment. Other defense nuclear programs can suffer as an unavoidable result Because of the nature of nuclear weapon production, construction funds are necessary very early for DOE to support DOD requirements. When the Congress reduces DOE production funding and applies restrictive language on construction funds, this can constrain or delay DOD systems which have already been approved and funded. The result is reduced efficiency in the acquisition process and increased costs in both Departments.
[Deleted) in many such cases, small dollar investments can provide high dividends, not only in terms of DOD programs but the total cost of DOE programs. In simple terms, we must patch the chuck-holes in the road and fix the water pipes or the structure will not continue indefinitely carrying the load we now require.
(Deleted.) (Deleted.] (Deleted) SIS can play a significant role in the future production of SNM. (Deleted.) (Deleted.] (Deleted.] (Deleted.]
SUMMARY By way of summary, I would like to try to place the challenge before us today in context with similar decisions that the Nation's leadership faced in the past. Faced with the stresses of a world war, President Roosevelt reacted promptly and with high priority to Einstein's letter suggesting that development of an atomic bomb should be possible. We have all heard stories about the difficulties and successes of the Manhattan District Project conducted by General Groves and of the driving genius and philosophical stresses of the scientists who designed and built the first crude bombs. We know also that the German nuclear scientists were not far behind us in this research.
Ultimately, President Truman made the hard decision necessary to save many thousands of American lives which otherwise would have been lost in a protracted invasion of Japan. But perhaps the most lasting benefit to the world of President Truman's decision is the impression it has left with all of us that a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought.
President Reagan has stated this often, and I am sure we all strongly support this view. How then did we arrive at a condition where we must have nuclear weapons to deter their use? In a more perfect world we would eliminate all these weapons immediately.
After World War II, when the United States had the only existing atomic weapons, to preclude development by other nations we were prepared to place these weapons under the control of a world body. The Soviets effectively prevented this arrangement from succeeding, and we have had to manage in a world of confrontation ever since. We proceeded in stages from an overwhelming nuclear advantage, which allowed us to maintain a strategic deterrent posture characterized as “massive retaliation,” to a period
of approximate equivalence of strategic forces—but there is continuing Soviet growth Today we have a national strategy that we describe as "flexible response." Our deterrence policy and the strategy that implements it requires a complete spectrum of military capabilities and high confidence in our control procedures, but it still depends primarily on offensive weapon systems for a deterrent balance.
President Reagan has asked that the Nation's scientific community once again lead the way to a better defense, and we are working to begin that process even though it will probably take us many years of sustained and innovative technological development. I believe we can be successful if we can muster the collective commitment the effort will require.
I believe this because the weapons of war, and nuclear weapons in particular, come in both evolutionary and revolutionary steps. This is illustrated on these two charts.
1ST GENERATION 1945-55, FISSION
2ND GENERATION 1955-PRESENT THERMONUCLEAR
We have witnessed the first two major revolutions in nuclear weapon capabilities, and we are now seeing the first indications that a third generation is possible. There have also been continuing evolutionary improvements.
This new generation of weapon concepts places a very great responsibility on those of us who manage the programs and also on those in the Congress who reflect and to a great extent influence the national will. The judgments which we must make are perhaps larger than the decision to move from the first to the second generation of nuclear weapons.
I believe that we must proceed with this research, and with high priority. When a technology begins to mature, we do not yet know of a way to keep it from our potential enemies. The Soviets have repeatedly demonstrated their willingness to press every advantage we allow them. Conversely, if we are successful in directing this technology toward truly defensive initiatives we can progressively become less dependent on offensive systems for our defense. This can lead to a safer and more stable world.
CONCLUSION In conclusion, I hope I have demonstrated for you that the DOE weapons program is a national resource whose contributions to the national security are broader and more diverse than just the weapons that are produced, and that this resource is operating close to margin of effectiveness. What is to be done with this resource is truly a question of national strategy. In large measure, the United States depends on advanced technology for deterrence and how we nurture and deploy, so to speak, that technology is indeed a national strategy question. In the short term, it is not as momentous a question as some that make the headlines. However, in the long term, it may be more important to our national security, considering the leverage which this technology have and the risks associated with allowing us to be surprised.
Although this program has been subject to annual review in the administration and the Congress (deleted] I urge you, Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, to view the programs you will hear described during the next several hours of testimony in this light-that they are matters of long-term, national security strategy having to do with a major national resource.
The basic strategy issues involved here could have two outcomes. You could keep the program going just enough to get by, perhaps even satisfying most of the DOD'S
immediate, identified needs, perhaps gaining slightly on the burdens imposed on the program because of environmental and safeguards concerns, perhaps even doing some high-quality exploratory development in a few carefully selected areas (or what may be more likely, doing a marginal job over a larger range of areas because we do not know what the potential adversary is doing and we must be able to cover all the bases to some extent).
The other alternative is to take steps to begin a true revitalization of this program so that there will be no question that it is second to none; so that we will not be surprised by Soviet developments whose nature we might not even understand when we see them because we have not done the work ourselves; and so that the future applications of these incredible sources of energy will be used for deterrence in the causes we all support.
DOE PROGRAM LIMITATIONS IMPOSE RISK
Dr. WAGNER. Mr. Chairman, in the past, in this particular hearing, we have talked in some detail about the nuclear weapons systems and how they relate to deterrence and overall national security objectives. Much of that is included in Department of Defense testimony in other form, and I would prefer, in the short time we have, to address the Department of Energy nuclear weapons program in a somewhat more general way as we see it in DOD, and if I may use a few view graphs, I'd like to go up here and talk from them. (Chart deleted.]
As we look at the overall program, we see these three general observations. (Deleted.) I will describe Áriefly ways in which we do that.
The DOE technology base strengthens deterrence in a lot of ways besides just developing weapons for production and (deleted). ENSURING THAT DOD REQUESTS ARE FOR ONLY WHAT IS ACTUALLY NEEDED (Chart deleted.] On this first point, [deleted]. [Deleted.) Deleted. (Deleted.)
Dr. WAGNER. The DOE is placed in a somewhat difficult position, because they-DOE certainly responds with will to specific requests for the stockpile. But, the DOE structure supports the Department of Defense in other ways, beyond just weapons for the stockpile, and that support comes out of the DOE technology base, and we in DOD are very concerned about the general health of that base.
NUCLEAR DETERRENCE INFRASTRUCTURE
Let me show you some ways in which that base strengthens deterrence.