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As shown in the chart, the INRAD exposure to personnel is estimated by considering their location and exposure times, and by considering shielding naturally pro vided by the weapon system and environment. Many options exist to reduce the already quite low exposures. Warhead design might be modified to reduce INRAD, but shielding both within the weapons system and in the environment, such as aboard ships, might be added. Administrative controls might also be implemented to minimize the presence of personnel in specified areas. Cost and effectiveness of all such options are considered during the development of new warheads.


These examples illustrate the partnership necessary in the joint DOD/DOE nuclear weapons program to meet the substantial requirements that now exist. On our side we have increased our sensitivity to the impacts of our requirements on the DOE, and the DOE continues to advise us of those impacts. Certainly we can and will do even more to reduce the stresses on DOE of keeping options open over extended periods. The success of the nuclear weapons program has been, and will continue to be, dependent on cooperation by both partners in these areas of joint responsibility.

The fiscal year 1984–89 nuclear weapon stockpile memorandum has been approved by the President


The DOD requirements for nuclear weapons from the DOE, in [deleted] aggregate, represent an ordered, well-reasoned modernization of our nuclear forces and are by no means unprecedented in terms of stockpile size, production rates, or retirement rates (see charts).


Planning for, and providing the materials to meet, our nuclear weapons needs is a complex process. (Deleted.]

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DOE AS PART OF THE OVERALL NATIONAL DEFENSE TECHNOLOGY BASE The technology base resident in the DOE laboratories contributes to our national defense in many ways besides nuclear weapon design and support for warhead production. The Department of Energy laboratories are a unique source and pool of the Nation's technical expertise, which supports the overall national defense infrastructure in important but often not very visible ways. They have the world's most sophisticated computers and a tremendous pool of highly trained and motivated people. This national resource should be used in the broadest ways we can manage, not exclusively nuclear oriented. Closer interactions with the DOD can draw the theoretical knowledge from the laboratories to many practical applications. Expansion into nonnuclear ordnance and energy related projects are examples. Expansion of formal and informal interchanges are being encouraged to make fullest use of our joint resources.

There's more to nuclear deterrence than just having the weapons, especially when both sides have about the same numbers. The Soviets think about nuclear weapons in terms of warfighting-how the weapons would actually be used—and to deter them we must demonstrate competence in military use-effective targeting and operations with nuclear weapons, safety, security, survivability, weapons effects, long-term endurance. All these are needed to demonstrate that we could actually use the weapons if we had to, and are thus required for a robust deterrent posture. Much of it comes down to having people in the military who are trained and competent in these areas.

The Atomic Energy Act, by removing from DOD the responsibility for warhead design and production, has removed from DOD one of the focal points around which what I might call “broad deterrent competence" might be built. This was perhaps intended by the framers of the Atomic Energy Act, though I believe more important to them was denying custody of nuclear weapons to the military-a circumstance long since changed. (It is somewhat ironic that the situation in the Soviet Union appears to be reversed).

Make no mistake-the DOD, from top to bottom, takes nuclear weapons and deterrence seriously, and there are very competent people involved. But we handicapped by this separation from the research on weapons in fully building the requisite infrastructure. The Defense Nuclear Agency fills the gap to some extent, but much of DNA's base was created out of the AEC labs and continues to be nourished by them.

My point is that DOE is required to help compensate for this truncation of DOD's nuclear infrastructure, and that this is an important, though not very visible, contribution. Let me give you some examples (see chart):






1. Weapons effects—understanding them is extremely important for designing systems, ensuring survivability. The Nation is handicapped by the requirement to test underground, so those tests must be very elaborate, environments must be simulated by specially designed nuclear devices, and much must be done with elaborate calculations. A little over a decade ago, the AEC labs had several hundred people doing this kind of work, and most of the difficult problems in weapons effects were identified by the AE labs. hese people provided a base from which the DOD competence in this area was nourished, often by good people leaving the labs and going to work for the DOD contractor community. Today this base at the labs is only about a tenth of what it was a decade or so ago. Much of the slack has been picked up by DNA and the service labs, but what remains in DOE is extremely important. One example is the use, by DNA, of the Los Alamos computation base for DNA calculations.

2. Nuclear weapon systems design, as distinct from warhead design, and especially determination of warhead requirements and how the warhead interacts with the system. Of course much of this is done by the DOD, but the labs play an important role. Recent examples are the labs' contributions to MX basing considerations, modernization of fleet weapons, and simulations of theater weapons operations and engagements.

3. Nuclear weapon security. DOD is responsible for this area, and a fully fleshed-out operational system exists. But in the aftermath of the Munich Olympics and during the rise of international terrorism, when it was clear that we needed to improve our security posture, Sandia in particular took the initiative in identifying useful improvements. They continue to help us in many essential ways, and are a continuing and vital presence on the ground in the European theater especially.

4. Military applications of nuclear reactor systems. The nuclear navy has, of course, maintained the highest standards of competence. But those reactor applications have become quite narrowly applied to ship propulsion needs. The civil nuclear community, quite frankly, appears to lack the vitality to explore innovative military reactor applications. These applications may be very important in two areas-space nuclear power and secure, enduring power for military bases. The labs have maintained an interest in these areas which DOD is now beginning to draw on after decades of little effort

There are many other examples of how the labs nourish, support, and constructively criticize the DOD nuclear weapons infrastructure.


What I have been talking about so far is the way in which the DOE technology base contributes to the larger national nuclear deterrence infrastructure. But the labs' technology base, maintained for nuclear weapon R&D, also contributes importantly and increasingly to the nonnuclear defense posture of the Nation.




This viewgraph gives examples of this kind of work. Let me talk a little more about one area-nonnuclear munitions.

Of course this nonnuclear work is done on a reimbursable basis, with funding provided by DOD, but the basic capability is there because of the facilities and skills maintained by the nuclear weapon and other DOE-supported programs. If this base declines, or fails to be modernized, the nonnuclear defense posture of the Nation will also eventually be the poorer for it. This chart shows one aspect of the status of that base—that is, the people involved in building and maintaining it

Finally, let me observe that one very important product of the DOE tech base is experienced, quality people, trained at the DOE weapons labs, who have left the labs to take positions of responsibility in DOD and other parts of the defense community. This contribution ranges from the very high levels—including one Secretary of Defense, three Secretaries of the Air Force, four directors of defense research and engineering, at least one service chief of staff, and several people at the assistant secretary or equivalent levels in defense—to further down in the DOD infrastructure where people such as the hundreds of officers who have served at the labs as military research associates bring their experience to bear in creating a more effective nuclear deterrent posture. This is just one more extremely valuable product of the laboratories' technology base, and one which will also decline if the labs tech base declines, since the quality of the facilities and equipment in the long run, is what attracts good people to the program.

It is hard to quantify these kinds of contributions to defense. A guess on my part is that some 15 percent to 20 percent of the labs effort goes to these areas, which are less obvious than the actual warheads designed for production, but are also very important

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As you know, and as this chart (R&D Manpower) shows, the tech base effon declined during the 1970's, and we are still, to a greater extent than is prudent, living off technological capital built up before that decline. The following discusses these items in more detail.

This Nation's ability to influence world affairs is affected by the extent to which the United States maintains technological supremacy in the defense area. As you are aware, the national laboratories have assembled a massive and broad technological base in pursuit of their nuclear weapons R&D mission and much of this base is broadly applicable to nonnuclear military technology. These laboratories with their immense technical and computational capabilities represent a national resource that should not be limited to nuclear weapons programs. Just as these laboratories were created to develop a radically different weapon based on new science and new technology, they should now be tasked to pursue advanced weapon concepts of all types applicable to our projected critical miltary needs. The resources and people to support these R&D programs has improved slightly, but we believe much more needs to be done.

Level of effort funding, which has worked so well for nuclear R&D, is essential so that an efficient and stable research base can be maintained and the workload perturbations and uncertainties of contractual arrangements can be avoided. We are working with DOE to encourage some of the world's foremost scientists at the labs by providing broader opportunity to explore long-term research for new technologies with a wide variety of applications. As a first step toward this end, in the area of nonnuclear munitions, the DOD has set aside $10 million in fiscal year 1985 for research on nonnuclear munitions technology, and we anticipate that the DOE will request similar funding for this activity in future budgets. Our interest in expanding the R&D areas of the na

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