« PrécédentContinuer »
weapons goes hand-in-hand with our developing posture of deep attacks against echeloned forces.
Beyond these arguments about their survivability and forcing dispersal on the Soviets, there is a high probability that actual use of nuclear weapons on the battlefield would simply bring everything to a halt. There would be fires, tree blowdown, fallout, contaminated equipment and areas, psychological and other effects that can't be quantified or analyzed. The Soviets appear to know this, and spend effort to try to counter it. But one must suspect that the last thing they want is to see the attack just stop.
The total systems cost of nuclear artillery is low compared to other nuclear weapons systems, because the cannons and personnel already exist. All that is needed are the shells.
Because of its greatly improved military effectiveness, the W82 will significantly enhance our theater deterrence by substantially reducing the Soviet's estimate of success in a major ground offensive.
We are improving our deterrence posture with deployment of the GLCM and the Pershing II, and the new W79 does add some capability, but we believe the W82 is needed also.
As we field the modern theater and strategic systems, simultaneously the DOE is working along with DOD to retire our older weapons from the stockpile. This allows us to recover and reuse valuable nuclear materials and reduces the stockpiling of obso lete weapons, but it imposes an additional workload on the production complex that must be considered. The retirement of an old weapon involves nearly as much work as building a new one. Additionally, we are modifying selected weapons now in the stockpile to extend their utility and to add improved safety and security features. This reduces the need to build new weapons and saves resources, but it does impose some added workload on DOE.
Unfortunately, but necessarily, support of the expanded production workload has not allowed the needed facilities improvements and expansion of R&D efforts to proceed as rapidly as we would like. Maintaining a healthy infrastructure will be vital to our continued success in the years ahead.
Our longer range planning is obviously less exact; the estimated requirements are based upon the services' extended planning annex, joint staff inputs, and weapon systems concepts currently in research and development. In addition, we take into account leadtimes needed for facilities, plant equipment, R&D, and testing within DOE to avoid prematurely foreclosing a capability which requires long leadtime. In our longrange requirements we consider possible arms control agrements, but we also develop planning which preserves this Nation's capability so that we are not dependent on achieving any specific agreement.
Much has been made recently of the size of the U.S. weapon stockpile, which has been declining both in yield and number.
Deleted) as shown in this chart. Despite this. we do not attempt to match our estimates of the Soviet nuclear weapons stockpile weapon for weapon or system by system. Instead, we consider the deterrent capability needed, the contribution of our auclear weapons systems in providing both strategic and nonstrategic deterrence, and the deployment necessary to support our military forces with the necessary flexibility.
Let me put our requests for substantial weapon production during the next few years into perspective in light of the President's desires for, and work toward, arms reductions. It is certainly true that if the Soviets agree to deep cuts, some systems would be curtailed, with corresponding reduction in warhead builds. However, set against this are two other factors. First, in a number of cases the reductions would come from old systems, with production still needed for the new ones, since what we are about is a modernization because of the age of our weapons. (And remember that accelerated retirements also pose a substantial workload on DOE.) Second, planning for the levels of production that we are forecasting constitutes, in reality, a hedge against delays or failure in the Soviets' agreeing to reductions. Indeed, we would not want to hold out the prospect to the Soviets that, by simply waiting us out, they could achieve one-sided reductions in the United States because we had prematurely reduced our future planning levels. In terms of number of warheads, the threat is not so much the current imbalance, as it is the Soviet capacity to build many more warheads, continuing at their recent high rate. They clearly have this capacity, as evidenced by the rapid buildup in the last decade. They have no incentives to discontinue use of this capacity, which they have already bought and paid for, unless we can show the capacity to match them if need be. This is why planning for increases is so important-not because we want them, but to give the Soviets incentive to stop their buildup.
To improve our longer range planning, we have increased the interaction between the DOD and DOE during formulation of the nuclear weapon development guidance (NWDG). The NWDG is the long-range planning document that presents DOD-wide nuclear weapon development requirements and technology goals to the DOE The document formulation process was revised in May 1982 to encourage greater user/ developer interaction. A major element in the NWDG process is the use of technical assistance teams composed of DOD, DOE, and Defense Nuclear Agency (DNA) research personnel participating in workshops and discussions with nuclear capable unified and specified commands and other selected service activities. For the fiscal year 1983 NWDG Il workshops were held. The technology objectives identified in the fiscal year NWDG (see charts) center on [deleted).
(Deleted) the new NWDG formulation process will be conducted on a biennial basis in the future. Our intent is to improve the marriage between the technology “push” and the “pull” from military requirements.
Another example of increased cooperation between the DOD and DOE, as it relates to the stockpile and its future, is in the area of stockpile confidence tests. As the name suggests these are underground nuclear tests that complement our quality assurance program in confirming the reliability of our nuclear stockpile. An interagency planning committee works jointly to identify candidate warheads. The chart shows the stockpile confidence tests since 1970.
(Deleted.] Additionally, we are now working much more actively to take advantage of operational test and evaluation activities by adding research and reliability experiments where this can be done with minimum interference. The DOD and DOE also jointly develop plans for postdevelopment nonnuclear testing of nuclear weapon subsystems. The plans describe the testing that provides an objective basis for assessing nuclear weapon subsystem reliability throughout the post development life cycle. These plans are an important management tool because they provide a clear understanding of the separate and joint responsibilities for test, evaluation, and reporting for each weapon program, while avoiding unwarranted duplications in the test program.
In planning for the future the military services are now much more aware of the limited, finite resources available within DOE defense programs. As a result, the Military Liaison Committee (MLC) pays a lot of attention to ensuring that the weapon and related requirements which we transmit to DOE are realistic, necessary, and devoid of "gold plating." As a matter of course, all resource-related requirements for the DOE must be forwarded through the MLC. We give each careful attention to reduce the impact on DOE programs. Specific areas which are considered include: (Deleted.) Some of the ways we have scrutinized requirements are shown in the chart, and described in the following:
As an example of the detail in which we review nuclear weapon requirements, let me review for you our considerations related to intrinsic radiation requirements, which can have a substantial impact on both DOD nuclear weapon operations and DOE weapon design. In July 1980, the Military Liaison Committee was tasked to act as a committee on nuclear weapon intrinsic radiation (INRAD), to explore current work in this area, look for neglected areas of importance, and recommend any actions needed to assure a safe, well-documented approach to nuclear weapon operations with respect to intrinsic radiation in the future. A working group comprised of representatives from OSD, DNA, the services, the joint staff, and DOE participated in the study.
The recommendations, approved by the MLC last year, primarily involved: Implementation of a recently issued DOD instruction, “Occupational Radiation Protection Program"; incorporation of a total systems approach in the determination of INRAD military characteristics at the outset of the nuclear weapon system design process; and establishment of a follow-on group to maintain continuing attention in this area.
We have established a total system approach in determining INRAD military characteristics, because this requirement can substantially impact the warhead design, including the need for additional underground nuclear tests, and add complexities (and therefore additional costs) to subsequent production. This is an excellent example of actions we in the DOD are taking to conserve scarce DOE resources. Each project officer's group forms a subcommittee, with both service and DOE representatives, to investigate, evaluate, and resolve INRAD issues for military characteristics.
As shown in the chart, the INRAD exposure to personnel is estimated by considering their location and exposure times, and by considering shielding naturally pro vided by the weapon system and environment Many options exist to reduce the already quite low exposures. Warhead design might be modified to reduce INRAD. but shielding both within the weapons system and in the environment, such as aboard ships, might be added. Administrative controls might also be implemented to minimize the presence of personnel in specified areas. Cost and effectiveness of all such options are considered during the development of new warheads.
These examples illustrate the partnership necessary in the joint DOD/DOE nuclear weapons program to meet the substantial requirements that now exist. On our side we have increased our sensitivity to the impacts of our requirements on the DOE, and the DOE continues to advise us of those impacts. Certainly we can and will do even more to reduce the stresses on DOE of keeping options open over extended periods. The success of the nuclear weapons program has been, and will continue to be, dependent on cooperation by both partners in these areas of joint responsibility.
The fiscal year 1984–89 nuclear weapon stockpile memorandum has been approved by the President
The DOD requirements for nuclear weapons from the DOE in [deleted] aggregate, represent an ordered, well-reasoned modernization of our nuclear forces and are by no means unprecedented in terms of stockpile size, production rates, or retirement rates (see charts).
Planning for, and providing the materials to meet, our nuclear weapons needs is a complex process. (Deleted.]
[Deleted] (Deleted) [Deleted] Deleted]
DOE AS PART OF THE OVERALL NATIONAL DEFENSE TECHNOLOGY BASE The technology base resident in the DOE laboratories contributes to our national defense in many ways besides nuclear weapon design and support for warhead production. The Department of Energy laboratories are a unique source and pool of the Nation's technical expertise, which supports the overall national defense infrastructure in important but often not very visible ways. They have the world's most sophisticated computers and a tremendous pool of highly trained and motivated people. This national resource should be used in the broadest ways we can manage, not exclusively nuclear oriented. Closer interactions with the DOD can draw the theoretical knowledge from the laboratories to many practical applications. Expansion into nonnuclear ordnance and energy related projects are examples. Expansion of formal and informal interchanges are being encouraged to make fullest use of our joint resources.
There's more to nuclear deterrence than just having the weapons, especially when both sides have about the same numbers. The Soviets think about nuclear weapons in terms of warfighting-how the weapons would actually be used—and to deter them we must demonstrate competence in military use-effective targeting and operations with nuclear weapons, safety, security, survivability, weapons effects, long-term endurance. All these are needed to demonstrate that we could actually use the weapons if we had to, and are thus required for a robust deterrent posture. Much of it comes down to having people in the military who are trained and competent in these areas.
The Atomic Energy Act, by removing from DOD the responsibility for warhead design and production, has removed from DOD one of the focal points around which what I might call “broad deterrent competence" might be built. This was perhaps intended by the framers of the Atomic Energy Act, though I believe more important to them was denying custody of nuclear weapons to the military-a circumstance long since changed. (It is somewhat ironic that the situation in the Soviet Union appears to be reversed).
Make no mistake—the DOD, from top to bottom, takes nuclear weapons and deterrence seriously, and there are very competent people involved. But we are handicapped by this separation from the research on weapons in fully building the requisite infrastructure. The Defense Nuclear Agency fills the gap to some extent, but much of DNA's base was created out of the AEC labs and continues to be nourished by them.
My point is that DOE is required to help compensate for this truncation of DOD's nuclear infrastructure, and that this is an important, though not very visible, contribution. Let me give you some examples (see chart):
DOE TECHNOLOGY BASE CONTRIBUTES TO THE BROADER “NUCLEAR DETERRENCE
• NUCLEAR WEAPONS EFFECTS AND SURVIVABILITY • NUCLEAR WEAPON SYSTEM DESIGN • ANTI-TERRORIST SECURITY • REACTORS FOR SPACE AND MILITARY BASE POWER
(DELETED] • NUCLEAR INTELLIGENCE