STATEMENT OF JAMES W. CULPEPPER Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee, it is indeed a pleasure to appear before you today to address the Department of Energy's Security Affairs programs of Nuclear Safeguards and Security (including Classification), Security Investigations, and Verification and Control Technology and the Fiscal Year 1985 request and the Fiscal Year 1984 supplemental request required to carry out these important activities. The programs I will discuss with you today play a critical role in fulfilling the national security mission of the Department. They contribute significantly to preventing the theft or sabotage of nuclear weapons, materials, facilities, and classified information; developing and implementing policy for the classification and declassification of information; providing nuclear weapons systems expertise to the Intelligence Community; controlling proposed exports of nuclear materials and equipment; and providing the technology and equipment necessary to monitor treaty compliance of foreign nuclear weapons programs. SECURITY AFFAIRS As Mr. Morgan stated in his opening remarks, as the Deputy Assistant Secretary for Security Affairs, I am responsible to him for the direction and management oversight of the Security Affairs activities of the Department. Here with me today are: Mr. Ralph Caudle, Director, Office of All three individuals would be pleased to answer any questions you or the members of the Committee might have. Also here with us today is Mr. Charles Boykin, who was recently appointed the Deputy Assistant Secretary for Intelligence. DELETED accordingly, I will cover intelligence matters in my presentation today. Mr. Boykin will be happy to answer any questions you may have regarding our intelligence activities. With the Chairman's permission, I will submit my formal statement for the record. I would then like to make a presentation which covers the Department's safeguards and security activities, highlights some of Security Affairs program activities, and discusses the funding requested in the President's Fiscal Year 1985 budget and the Fiscal Year 1984 supplemental request. You each have copies of my formal statement and the viewgraphs I will use today. FISCAL YEAR 1985 BUDGET The overall funding requirement in Fiscal Year 1985 for Security Affairs' programs is $173.4 million. This consists of $62.7 million for Nuclear Safeguards and Security (including $3.9 million for Classification), $34.0 million for Security Investigations, and $76.7 million for Verification and Control Technology. I will now briefly discuss each of the Security Affairs programs. NUCLEAR SAFEGUARDS AND SECURITY The Nuclear Safeguards and Security program has three major program goals. These are: to prevent the unauthorized disclosure, theft, sabotage, or loss of nuclear materials, facilities, and classified information; to provide a base of safeguards and security technology and information which can be used to protect Department of Energy facilities, and control and account for nuclear weapons, materials, and classified information; and to strengthen international safeguards and physical security Before discussing some of our accomplishments during the past year, it is appropriate to make a more general statement about our Nuclear Safeguards and Security program. I think we are passing through a period of transition and progress based on a more systematic and direct approach to the safeguards and security programs of each Department of Energy field office. Today, in addition to meeting the requirements of all Department of Energy orders and directives, the effectiveness of each site's safeguards and security program is measured in terms of the total program's responsiveness to precluding the possibility of a successful malevolent act. We closely examine the overall effectiveness by onsite evaluations of the key elements of the program (physical protection, material control and accountability, technical security, and personnel security) to successfully address and counter the perceived threat to a given facility. We now routinely conduct exercises DELETED of the key security elements, including particularly complex reviews of guard force performance under simulated attack and fire as a major component of our current approach. This process is working extremely well and, as a result, both near-term and longrange system enhancements are being realized at an accelerated pace. ACCOMPLISHMENTS The accomplishments of the past year result from the major commitment of Secretary Hodel and the Department to quickly and effectively improve the safeguards and security posture at our most critical facilities. These include: significant initiatives to enhance the effectiveness of our protective forces; improved weapons and equipment capabilities; and facilitation of ratification procedures relating to onsite military assistance during a terrorist incident. The Secretary has recently approved the concept of an enhanced Inspection and Evaluation program that will provide for more frequent and more comprehensive evaluations of the Department's field offices and key facilities. Work is progressing on development of airspace restrictions over nine critical facilities. The formal rulemaking process began with a February 8, 1984, Federal Register notice, and a public hearing was held on March 13. During the past year, we also have developed safeguards and security plans for all our major facilities. These plans are used as a base line against which we measure our progress in meeting outstanding safeguards and security requirements. The groundwork has been completed for the establishment of a Central Training Facility at Kirtland Air Force Base in New Mexico to meet the needs of both security inspectors and mid- and senior-level Departmental representatives, and we are moving through the approval process to establish that facility. the With the Office of Safeguards and Security's assistance Department has established a policy requiring the Department's contractors and potential contractors to report any foreign ownership, control, or influence on their operations. An assessment of each firm's foreign relationships is now made to determine whether a risk to the national security exists. If a national security risk does exist, contracts can be terminated or contract bids denied. Underscoring all of the above efforts is the concept of corporate commitment--on the part of both Department of Energy officials and officials of major contractor organizations--to the Department's safeguards and security mission. The importance of corporate commitment in accomplishing existing and future safeguards and security improvements cannot be overstated. We have reassured ourselves of this commitment from our major nuclear facilities' contractors. I would now like to move on and discuss the activities and budget request for the five elements of the Nuclear Safeguards and Security program. These include: safeguards and security operations, technology development, international safeguards, classification, and program direction. SAFEGUARDS AND SECURITY OPERATIONS Specific safeguards and security operations activities include: direct assistance to Departmental field operations for physical protection systems improvements; oversight and operation of the nuclear materials management and safeguards system, which provides timely data on nuclear materials production, utilization, tracking, and storage; and the operation of the New Brunswick Laboratory, which carries out safeguards analysis tasks at Argonne, Illinois. A major objective of the safeguards and security operations element is to assist Department of Energy operating contractors in designing and applying safeguards and security technology in order to ensure the implementation of cost-effective, site-specific, physical protection systems. At the heart of this program is the continued need to provide field elements with timely information on advanced |