STATEMENT OF MAJ. GEN. WILLIAM W. HOOVER INTRODUCTION Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee; (Chart 1) It is my pleasure to appear before this Committee once again to discuss the Department of Energy (DOE) FY 1985 nuclear weapons and inertial confinement fusion programs and the funding necessary to carry out these programs. - - In previous testimony I have drawn the analogy between the DOE nuclear weapons complex and a major, high-technology corporation. I would like to continue to do so. We are similar in that our corporate assets must be maintained and improved; our long-range planning must take into account economic and political issues as well as technological variables; and we must position ourselves for the future in an uncertain world. We are different in that our nuclear warheads product line is unique and we have but one customer, the Department of Defense (DOD). Most importantly, we are the sole source in the Nation for this product line. Were there to be an increased need for nuclear capabilities, we could not turn elsewhere because a private industrial base is not available. In that sense we are fundamental to national security, and I would caution that an adequate margin of both nuclear weapon production and rescarch and development capacity must be maintained as a hedge against such a need. Our primary goal is to run the business efficiently, safely, and in an environmentally sound manner while ensuring the highest measure of safeguards and security. We realize there are disparate views about nuclear weapons. Whatever their views, our citizens have the right to be assured that, so long as we maintain a nuclear stockpile, the weapons and the facilities required for their design and production are safe, secure, and environmentally acceptable. (Chart 2) This is a time when the nuclear weapons program must be able to accommodate change and new ideas. The world events of the past year will affect our program directly or indirectly, both now and in the future. The nuclear freeze, arms control, and builddown proposals; the United States relationship within the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the deployment of both the Pershing II and Ground-Launched Cruise Missile (GLCM) systems, and the issue of conventional versus nuclear battlefield weapons; the global effects of nuclear war, and the President's initiative on strategic defense all impact nuclear weapons research and development. (Chart 3) The primary purpose of our nuclear weapons is to deter a nuclear or major conventional attack against the United States or its allies. To deter such an attack, we maintain a stockpile of various types of nuclear weapons. We are continually replacing and modernizing rather than merely increasing the number of weapons in this stockpile. We have incorporated features such as insensitive high-explosive, and ficantly reduce the chance of an explosion or dispersal of nuclear material in an abnormal environment such as an aircraft crash. Additional command and control features have also been included to DELETED which signi prevent unauthorized personnel from using the weapons. This modernization of older weapons, together with new production, has enabled the United States to counter the nuclear buildup by the Soviets during the last 20 years. (Chart 4) Our investment strategy to provide a strong viable nuclear weapons complex as a linchpin of our nuclear deterrence guides us into the 1990s by ensuring sufficient manufacturingcapacity to meet the current and planned production workload with some backup capability; enhancing capability in our national laboratories; increasing nuclear testing DELETED DELETED ; restoring and revitalizing the physical plant; maintaining an effective stockpile improvement program; employing modern management and manufacturing techniques to meet the challenges of the 1980s and 1990s; and ensuring that the nuclear weapons complex is environmentally sound and that safety and security are of continuing primary concern. I would like now to describe how this complex works; what we build; how we carry out our research, development, testing, and production responsibilities; and to review some new concepts that hold promise for the future. ASSETS (Chart 5) This chart gives you an idea of the national scope of the nuclear weapons complex with major facilities located in 10 states and with an average FY 1984 contractor employment of about 39,000. In these government-owned, contractor-operated facilities, there is a great diversity of equipment, including computercontrolled, automated machinery to increase productivity and reverse the trend toward obsolescence. (Chart 6) Unique capabilities are required to design, test, and manufacture United States nuclear weapons. The nuclear weapons complex includes three design laboratories, the Nevada Test Site (NTS), and seven production facilities. Of the three laboratories, the Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) and the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) are responsible for nuclear design and the Sandia National Laboratories (SNL) are responsible for ordnance engineering. All three are broad-based, multiprogram laboratories with unique capabilities in the physical sciences and in engineering. (Chart 7) The NTS is the only location where we currently conduct nuclear explosions. All these tests are conducted underground in accordance with the provisions of the Limited Test Ban Treaty and the 150 kiloton (kt) yield limit of the Threshold Test Ban Treaty. DELETED (Chart 8) The seven production facilities are located throughout the country and operate as an integrated industrial complex with all facilities responsible for production of specific weapon parts or components but only one facility responsible for final assembly. (Chart 9) A comparison is often made between the nuclear weapons production complex and a large industrial organization. We do, indeed, share many similarities with industry in the private sector, but on closer examination we also find dissimilarities They dissimilarities that make the production complex unique. arise as the result of technical factors, such as special materials and processes which are unavailable in private industry, and the necessity for stringent security standards. We also must operate at the frontier of high technology and in hazardous environments. This chart shows some examples of how we have begun to use the latest technological advances to handle hazardous materials such as plutonium and to produce weapons components that meet extremely demanding specifications. PRODUCT (Chart 10) In the broadest sense, our product is new ideas, techniques, designs, and processes from our research and development laboratories and fully assembled warheads from our weapons production complex. (Chart 11) Productivity increases continue to be a top management goal throughout the weapons complex. The effort involves both design and production elements. The investment made in restoration of the production facilities and acquisition of state-of-the-art capital equipment is increasing our ability to manufacture and design warhead components more economically, while refining manufacturing processes so as to decrease warhead costs. We have introduced extensive and detailed reviews, beginning at the subcomponent level, to insure that design intent is accommodated within the most cost effective manufacturing processes available. We have also |