not promote Virtue, or discourage Vice, you cannot distinguish Good from Evil in his Cafe, but muft afflict both alike? What will you say? Shall the general Maxim prevail Reasons upon contrary to the very which the Maxim itself is founded? Or fhall the Reafons of Justice and Equity prevail to supersede a general Law, which is not applicable to the present Cafe?

Now there is the fame Difference between the Judgments of God, and the Judgments of Men, as there is between the Rules of Law, and the Reason of Law: For Men are tied down to judge by the Rules which the Law prefcribes; but the Judgment of God does not arise from any Rule or Maxim of Law, but in every Inftance follows the Reason of the Thing to be judged of; otherwise his Judgments would not in every Case be reafonable. It is mere Weakness that makes Men go by Rules; and because they are not able to judge accurately upon all emergent Cafes, therefore they have general Rules for their Direction. But how abfurd would it be to imagine God as acting by any fuch Rules, as having recourse to stated Laws or Maxims for the Direction of his Judgment in particular Inftances? As Reafon is in all

Cafes

Cafes the Fountain of Juftice, and of all Laws and Principles of Law, fo the Divine Reason, which is perfect, is in every Cafe the true Measure of Juftice. From hence it evidently appears, that fince the Judgments of God are not formed upon the general Notions and Principles of Juftice which we are converfant in, those Notions can be no fafe Rules for us in the Examination of the Ways of Providence, because our Rules do not always extend to the Reason of particular Cafes; but the Judgments of God do always regard the Reasons and Circumstances of every Cafe.

Farther: These Confiderations will help us to form distinct Notions of Justice and Mercy, and discover to us, if not what they always are, yet at least what they always fhould be. Juftice is thought to be a Thing fixed and certain, and to have its proper Bounds and Limits, which it cannot tranfgress without losing its Name: But Mercy is taken to be of a more variable, uncertain Nature, to have no Rule to go by, but to arife from the Will of the Governor': And confequently we usually speak of Justice and Mercy as Oppofites to each other, and fuppofe that Mercy can have no Place, unless Justice

What

Juftice recedes to make room for it. does or may happen in the World we are not concerned to inquire; our Business is to search after the true Notions of Justice and Mercy, not the corrupt Practices in either. Now Mercy and Justice would not be distinguished, were it not for the Intervention of general and particular Laws, which often fall very heavy upon particular Perfons; whence it is that we complain of the Rigor and Hardness of the Law: But were Men perfect both in their Reason and in their Wills, fo that they could neither judge amiss nor act amifs, they would then do that which is exactly right and reasonable in every Case, and there would be no room to correct the Rigor of Justice by the Interpofition of Mercy; for there is no Rigor in that which is perfectly right and reasonable. For confider what are the Pleas for Mercy: Do they not arise from the Circumstances of the Perfon, or the Action, which fhew that the Law is too hard in his Cafe, and that he ought in Reason to be eased against the Extremity of the Law? But had all these Circumstances been weighed in the first Judgment, and Juftice adapted to the very Merits of the Case, all the Pleas for Mercy had

been

been prevented, and confequently there had been no room for Mercy; for Mercy without Reason is a mere Effect of arbitrary Power, and not of Goodness. But now that all Cafes are judged by Laws made long before the Cafes happened, and which cannot confider the Alleviations or Aggravations of particular Facts, it comes to pafs fometimes, that the Law is a very inadequate Rule of Justice in Cafes that fall under it. Shall the Person then fuffer according to the Rule of Juftice against all Reason of Juftice? No; he ought to have the Benefit of Mercy, and to be relieved against the Rigor of the Law. What then, because the Punishment of the Law is too heavy for his Crime, ought he therefore to go unpunished? because this Punishment is unreasonable, fhall he therefore escape that which is reasonable? No; for though Mercy ought to take off the Rigor of Justice, yet it ought not to destroy Juftice itself. It is evident then, that it is the proper Work of Mercy to correct the Rules of Juftice by the Reafon of Justice; and, consequently, were all Judgments formed upon the true Reasons of Juftice, Juftice and Mercy would be one and the fame Thing.

Hence, perhaps, we may be able to account for a Difficulty, which is apt mightily to disturb Men when they ponder the Judgments of God: They confider him as effentially just, and effentially merciful, from whence they rightly conclude, that he can never be otherwife than merciful, never otherwise than juft; and yet how to reconcile these Attributes in every Cafe they fee not. In human Judgments, it is plain, where Mercy prevails, Justice sleeps; where Justice acts, Mercy is filent: But this cannot be the Cafe in divine Judgments, because God can neither cease to be juft or merciful. But, if we confider that the Acts of Mercy and Justice, as they are diftinguished from one another, are relative to stated Rules and Laws, and that they are both the fame with respect to the Reason of Justice; we shall eafily difcern how God, who always acts by the purest Reason, that is, by his own, may be said in every Judgment to do juftly and mercifully. For when God does that which is perfectly reasonable, all Circumstances weighed, in every Cafe, there is no Cafe in which any one can complain for want either of Mercy or Justice; for, if there be any Reason to complain, it must be because the Thing, in VOL. III.

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