CHAPTER III.

THE PRINCIPLES WHICH SHOULD GUIDE THE CIVIL MAGISTRATE IN ESTABLISHING A RELIGION.

1. Having ascertained on Scriptural authority, that the civil magistrate has a right and is bound to interpose in matters of religion, we must now determine upon the same authority the principles by which he should be guided in the discharge of this duty.

2. It is obviously a duty, the performance of which is confined within the boundaries of the kingdom or province over which he presides. An Establishment being the grant of civil privileges, cannot be extended beyond the limits of the magistrate's civil jurisdiction, without an infringement of the rights of independent states. Scriptural evidence will hereafter be produced for National Churches, and it is desirable that the subjects of each temporal sovereignty should live in a spiritual uniformity. "It is fit that every people under one prince (or at least of one nation using the same language, civil law and fashions) should be united

in the bands of ecclesiastical polity; for that such a unity apparently is conducible to the peace and welfare both of Church and State; to the furtherance of God's worship and service; to the edification of people in charity and piety; by the encouragement of secular powers, by the concurrent advice and aid of ecclesiastical powers, by many advantages hence arising 1"

3. In the discharge of this duty also, the magistrate must make choice of some particular form of Christianity. It is not within the range of possibility to extend the power of the State to the support of all the religious parties into which the Christian world is divided. Nor, if it were possible, would it be advisable to patronize creeds fundamentally opposed, and sects the most hostile; for that would be to encourage an unceasing war of irreconcileable opinions and conflicting interests. As all religions, moreover, cannot be true, nor all equally good; and as he cannot possibly equally approve of all, if he be a sincere believer in Jesus, he will not only feel inclined, but is in a manner constrained, from a sense of duty, and in obedience to conscience, to give the preference to some one or other. Yet, among the vast variety of sects, and innumerable opinions existing on the subject of religion, which is he to select? and by what

1 Barrow, on the Unity of the Church.

principles ought he to be directed in making that selection?

It is maintained by many, as Locke, Warburton, Paley, that he is to be guided solely by reasons of state and political expediency. He has no concern, say they, with the truth or falsehood of the doctrines he establishes; his duty being to choose a religion not because of its truth, but because he deems it most conducive to the ends of good government. The writers alluded to, though widely differing in their statement, and partially in their views, coincide in this principle; but no one has treated it with so much method, so much ingenuity, and in so imposing a manner, as Bp. Warburton. His theory is briefly this: The Church and State are supposed to be two societies, the one religious, the other civil; the one extending its care only to the soul, the other only to the body and its concerns, but both sovereign and independent of each other; and consequently an union between them can only be produced by voluntary compact, because what is sovereign and independent can be brought to no act without its own

consent.

The motives the magistrate had for seeking this alliance, were the temporal advantages which the Church affords; and those which induced the Church to accept it were the security and protection it reeeived from the civil

power. According to this theory, "the true end for which religion is established is not to provide for the true faith, but for civil utility1."

But this, and all other merely utilitarian views, are, to say the least, imperfect; for, admitting the conclusion established in the preceding chapter, the magistrate's choice of a religion must be in connection with its truth. The word of God, which imposes the obligation, renders it imperative upon him to sanction such a creed, and such a constitution of the Church, as are strictly scriptural. No man ought to act, or be compelled to act, against the convictions of his own conscience; and to attempt on any account to support what he is fully persuaded is erroneous, or heretical, is a flagrant violation both of morality and religion. The directions to "search the scriptures," to approve "whatsoever things are true," to "prove all things," to "hold fast that which is good,” to retain "the truth as it is in Jesus," extend to all classes and ranks of mankind. No circumstance can justify either individuals or societies in the profession and maintenance of a corrupt creed; and the command to propagate the Gospel necessarily infers the propagation of it in its integrity. If, then, it be the duty of the

1 Warburton's Alliance, p. 287. See Archbishop Magee's Charge, in 1826; Archdeacon Pott's Charge, Rights of Sovereignty, &c.

H

civil ruler to support the diffusion of Christian knowledge, it must be equally so to support it in its purest form.

The utilitarian scheme, so far from being opposed, is rather favourable to this conclusion. The mere politician, even a deist, will naturally take religion under his special protection, for the sake of the temporal benefits derivable from it to the State; and, as religious societies will establish themselves in some degree or other, the magistrate having no power to prevent it', common prudence requires him to lend the weight of his influence to that which, in his judgment, maintains religion in its purity; "for if TRUTH and PUBLIC UTILITY coincide, the nearer any religion approaches to the truth of things, the fitter that religion is for the service of the State"." The line of conduct which Revelation prescribes to supreme rulers will always correspond with the decisions of sound policy.

With the sovereign, however, who owns subjection to the law of Christ, it will be a sacred obligation to support the true and purest form of Christianity; but how is he to judge of it? On what grounds is he to form his decision? The answer is, that, and that alone, is the true faith, which in all its parts is accordant with the

1 See ante, chap. ii. sect. 1.

2 Alliance, p. 90. See also p. 271, et seq.