attempt to tie the Arm of Omnipotence from doing any thing at all, because it can never do its Utmoft.

II. I proceed now to the Second Propofition, That neither Matter univerfally and abftractly confider'd, nor Motion can have endured a past Èternity. And to this I fhall speak the more briefly; not only because it is an abftruse and metaphyfical Speculation; but also of far lefs moment and confequence to us than the others: seeing that without this we can evince the Existence of God from the Origin and Frame of the Universe. For if the prefent or a like System of the World cannot poffibly have been eternal, by the first Propofition; and if without God it could neither naturally nor fortuitoufly emerge out of a Chaos, by the third Propofition; we must neceffarily have recourfe to a Deity, as the Contriver and Maker of Heaven and Earth; whether we fuppofe he created them out of Nothing, or had the Materials ready eternally to his hand. But nevertheless, because we are verily perfuaded of the truth of this Article, we shall briefly affign some reasons of our Belief in these following Particulars.

First, It is no Contradiction, that Matter should be produced out of Nothing. It is urged as an Univerfal

Universal Maxim; that nothing can proceed from Nothing. Now this we readily allow 5 and yet it will prove nothing against the Poffibility of Cre-ation. For when they fay, Nothing from Nothing; they must so understand it, as excluding all Causes, both material and efficient. In which fence it is most evidently and infallibly true: being equivalent to this propofition; that nothing can make it self, or, Nothing cannot bring its no-felf. out of non entity into Something. Which only proves thus much, That Matter did not produce it felf, or that all Subftances did not emerge out of an Universal Nothing. Now who-ever talked at that rate? We do not create the World from No-thing and by Nothing; we affert an eternal God to have been the Efficient Cause of it. So that a Creation of the World out of Nothing by Something; and by that Something, that includes in its Nature a necessary Existence and perfection of Power; is certainly no Contradiction; nor opposes that common Maxim. Whence it manifeftly follows, That feeing God may do any thing, that implies not a Contradiction; if there be fuch an Effence as God, he may have created Matter out of nothing, or given That an Existence, that had no Being be-fore.

Secondly,

Secondly, Some Things have been actually creSerm. II. ated out of Nothing. In a former Discourse we have proved fufficiently, that Human Souls are not mere modification of Matter, but real and fpiritual Subftances, that have as true an Existence, as our very Bodies themselves. Now no man in his wits can seriously think, that his own Soul hath exifted from all Eternity; not the Stuff or Matter of it, for it is no compound Being; not the personality of it, as I appeal to Common Sense; and if a man could believe, that his perfonal Soul hath been from everlasting, fuch an Opinion would be as deftructive to Atheism, as to concede the contrary now. So that the spiritual Souls of Men have confeffedly been produced out of Nothing. But if God hath actually created those intelligent Subftances, that have fuch Nobility and Excellency above brute fenfeless Matter; 'tis pervicaciousness to deny, that he created Matter alfo: unless necessary Existence be included in the very Effence and Idea of Matter.

Thirdly, Matter doth not include in its Nature a neceffity of Existence. Human Souls, as is proved before, have been actually created, and confequently have not necessary Exiftence included in their Effence. Now can I believe, that my spiritual Soul, that understands and judges and invents, c.

hath

hath notwithstanding a dependent and precarious Being; while the Particles of this dead Ink and Paper have been neceffarily eternal and uncreate? 'Tis against natural reason; and no one while he contemplates an individual Body, can discern fuch a neceffity. But men have been taught to believe, that Extenfion or Space, and Body are the selffame thing: fo that because they cannot imagine, how Space can either begin or cease to exift; they presently conclude, that extended infinite Matter muft needs eternally have a Being. But I fhall fully prove hereafter, that Body and Space or Diftance are quite different things, and that a Vacuity is interspersed among the Particles of Matter, and fuch a one as hath a vaftly larger Extenfion, than all the Matter of the Universe. Which now being fuppofed, they muft abftract their Imagination from that falfe infinite Extenfion, and conceive one Particle of Matter furrounded on all fides with vacuity, and contiguous to no other Body. So that all other Matter is divided and diftinct from it, by the very fuppofition. And hence it appears, that whereas formerly they fanfied an immense boundless Space, as an homogeneous One; which great Individual they believed might deferve the Attribute of neceffary Exiftence: Now the whole Question is about one folitary Atom, that hath no

E

depen

Serm. VII.

Lucret.

lib. I.

dependence on the reft of the World; and is no more sustained in Being by other Matter, than it could be created by it; whether this poor Atom, fluggish and unactive as it is, doth involve Neceffity of Existence (the first and highest of all perfections) in its particular nature and notion? I dare prefume for the Negative in the judgments of all serious men. And I obferve the Epicureans take much pains to convince us, that in natural corruptions and diffolutions, Atoms are not reduced to Nothing; which furely would be needless, if the very Idea of Atoms imported Self-existence. And yet if one Atom do not include fo much in its Notion and Effence; all Atoms put together, that is, all the Matter of the Univerfe does not include it. So that upon the whole matter, feeing that Creation is no contradiction, that God hath certainly created nobler Subftances than Matter, and that Matter is not neceffarily eternal; it is most reasona ble to believe, that the eternal and Self-exiftent God created the material World also, and produced it out of Nothing.

And Fourthly, it will be allowed as true, by all thofe that can reach these Speculations; That whatfoever hath not neceffarily an eternal felf-existence included in its very Nature and Definition, (which we have proved Matter hath not) cannot have

been