ding to the Hiftory of Mofes, the Divine Providence in over-ruling all Nations and People, the new Doctrine of Repentance by the preaching of the Gospel, the Refurrection of the Dead, and the appointed Day of an universal Judgment. To all which particulars by God's Permiffion and afsistance I fhall fay fomething in due time. But at present I have confined my self to that near and intrinfecal and convincing Argument of the Being of God, which we have from Human Nature it self; and which appears to be principally here recommended by St. Paul in the words of the Text, That they fhould feek the Lord, if haply they might feel after him, and find him, though he be not far from every one us. For in him (that is by his power) we live, and move, and have our being.

The Propofition, which I shall speak to, from this Text is this: That the very Life and Vital Motion and the Formal Effence and Nature of Man is wholly owing to the power of God: and that the confideration of our Selves, of our own Souls and Bodies, doth directly and nearly conduct us to the acknowledgment of his Existence. And,

1. I fhall prove, That there is an immaterial Substance in us, which we call Soul and Spirit, ef fentially diftinct from our Bodies: and that this Spirit doth necessarily evince the Existence of a Supreme and Spiritual Being. And,

B 2

2. That

2. That the Organical Structure of Human Bo dies, whereby they are fitted to live and move and be vitally informed by the Soul, is unquestionably the workmanship of a moft wife and powerfull and beneficent Maker. But I will referve this latter part for the next opportunity; and my present undertaking fhall be this, To evince the Being of God from the confideration of Human Souls.

(1.) And first, I say, there is an immaterialSubstance in us, which we call Soul, effentially distinct from our Bodies. I fhall lay this down as self-evident, That there is something in our Compofition, that thinks and apprehends, and reflects and deliberates, determins and doubts, consents and denies; that wills, and demurrs, and refolves, and chooses, and rejects; that receives various fenfations and impreffions from external objects, and produces voluntary motions of several parts of our Bodies. This every man is conscious of; neither can any one be so sceptical as to doubt of or deny it that very doubting or denying being each of them mentioned and supposed before, and inclu ding several of the reft in their Idea's and Notions. And in the next place 'tis as felf evident, that these Faculties and Operations of Thinking, and Willing, and Perceiving, muft proceed from fomething or other as their efficient Caufe: meer Nothing being

never able to produce any thing at all. So that if these powers of Cogitation, and Volition, and Sensation, are neither inherent in Matter as fuch, nor acquirable to Matter by any motion and modification of it; it neceffarily follows, that they proceed from fome cogitative Subftance, fome incorporeal Inhabitant within us, which we call Spi rit and Soul.

(1.) But first, these Faculties of Sensation and Perception are not inherent in Matter as fuch. For if it were fo; what monftrous abfurdities would follow? Every Stock and Stone would be a percipient and rational Creature. We fhould have as much feeling upon the clipping off a Hair, as the cutting off a Nerve. Or rather, as Men, that is a complex Being compounded of many vital parts, we should have no feeling nor perception at all. For every single Atom of our Bodies would be a diftinct Animal, endued with felf-consciousness and perfonal Senfation of its own. And a great number of fuch living and thinking Particles could not poffibly by their mutual contract and preffing and ftriking compofe one greater individual Animal, with one Mind and Understanding, and a vital Confenfion of the whole Body: any more than a swarmof Bees, or a crowd of Men and Women can be conceived to make up one particular Living Crea-

ture

ture compounded and constituted of the aggregate of them all.

(2.) It remains therefore, fecondly, that seeing Matter in general, as Matter, has not any Senfation or Thought; if it have them at all, they must be the refult of fome Modification of it: it must acquire them by fome Organical Difpofition; by fuch and fuch determinate Motions, by the action and re-action of one Particle upon another. And this is the Opinion of every Atheift and counterfeit Deist of these times, that believes there is no Subftance but Matter; and excludes all incorporeal Nature out of the number of Beings.

Now to give a clearer and fuller confutation of this Atheistical Affertion, I will proceed in this method.

1. Firft I will give a true Notion and Idea of Matter; whereby it will appear that it has no inherent Faculty of Sense and Perception.

2. I will prove, that no particular Species of Matter, as the Brain and Animal Spirit, hath any power of Senfe and Perception.

3. I will fhew, that Motion in general fuperadded to Matter cannot produce any Sense and Perception.

4. I will demonftrate, that no Determinate Motion, as of the Animal Spirit through Muscles

and

and Nerves, can beget Sense and Perception.

5. I will evince, that no Action and Percuffion of the Animal Spirit, one Particle against another, can create any Sense and Perception.

6. I will answer the Atheist's Argument of matter of Fact and Experience in brute Beasts; which, say they, are allowed to be meer Matter, and yet have fome degree of Sense and Perception.

And first I will give a true Notion and Idea of Matter; whereby it will appear that it has no inherent Faculty of Sense and Perception. And I will offer no other, but what all competent Judges, and even Atheists themselves do allow of; and which being part of the Epicurean and Democritean Philofophy is providentially one of the beft Antidotes againft their other impious opinions: as the Oil of Scorpions is faid to be against the poison of their Stings. When we frame in our minds any notion of Matter, we conceive nothing else but Extenfion and Buik; which is impenetrable and divisible and paffive; by which three properties is understood, that any particular quantity of Matter doch hinder all other from intruding into its place, till it felf be removed out of it; that it may be divided and broke into numerous parts of different sizes and figures, which by various ranking and difpofing may produce an immense diversity of Surfaces and

Textures;