Ballistic Missiles: Threat and Response : Hearings Before the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, One Hundred Sixth Congress, First Session, April 15 and 20, May 4, 5, 13, 25, 26, and September 16, 1999, Volume 4U.S. Government Printing Office, 2000 - 487 pages |
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Expressions et termes fréquents
ABM systems ABM Treaty administration agree agreement Ambassador amendments arms control assess ballistic missile defense ballistic missile threat balloon Belarus believe capability Chairman China Chinese Clinton cold war Committee Congress continue Convention cooperation countermeasures countries deploy deployment deterrence early warning effective exist extinct fense flight test force former Soviet Garwin going ground-based ICBM ICBM's intelligence intercept interceptors international law Iran Iraq issue Kazakhstan limited long-range LPAR ment military missile defense system Moscow national missile defense negotiate NMD system North Korea nuclear weapons offensive party payload political President Professor Glennon proliferation question radar range reentry Rumsfeld Commission Russia Russian Federation SAM/ABM Secretary LEHMAN Senator BIDEN Senator HAGEL sensors SFRY sile Soviet Union space launch space-based START II strategic successor supra note Taepo Dong Taiwan target territory Thank tion Trea Ukraine United USSR vehicle velocity warhead
Fréquemment cités
Page 318 - Each Party shall in exercising its national sovereignty have the right to withdraw from the Treaty if it decides that extraordinary events, related to the subject matter of this Treaty, have jeopardized the supreme interests of its country.
Page 236 - President by an exertion of legislative power; but with such an authority plus the very delicate, plenary and exclusive power of the President as the sole organ of the federal government in the field of international relations...
Page 247 - For this purpose, where there is no treaty and no controlling executive or legislative act or judicial decision, resort must be had to the customs and usages of civilized nations and, as evidence of these, to the works of jurists and commentators who by years of labor, research, and experience have made themselves peculiarly well acquainted with the subjects of which they treat.
Page 424 - The Governments of the United States of America, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, hereinafter referred to as the "Original Parties", Proclaiming as their principal aim the speediest possible achievement of an agreement on general and complete disarmament under strict international control in accordance with the objectives of the United Nations which would put an end to the armaments race and eliminate the incentive...
Page 284 - When the President acts pursuant to an express or implied authorization of Congress, his authority is at its maximum, for it includes all that he possesses in his own right plus all that Congress can delegate.
Page 426 - For the purpose of providing assurance or compliance with the provisions of this Treaty, each Party shall use national technical means of verification at its disposal in a manner consistent with generally recognized principles of international law.
Page 438 - Treaty between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems...
Page 425 - To assure the viability and effectiveness of this Treaty, each Party undertakes not to transfer to other States, and not to deploy outside its national territory, ABM systems or their components limited by this Treaty.
Page 200 - Each Party undertakes not to deploy ABM systems for a defense of the territory of its country and not to provide a base for such a defense...
Page 429 - Agreement on certain measures with respect to the limitation of strategic offensive arms. The US Delegation believes that an objective of the follow-on negotiations should be to constrain and reduce on a long-term basis threats to the survivability of our respective strategic retaliatory forces.