we know not what it will do, as having no revelation in the case, it becomes us to suspend our judgment till the event hath determined it.

This we know, that providence hath ways enough, and time enough too between this and the day of judgment, to supply these destitute souls with all those spiritual advantages in the other life, which, for reasons best known to itself, it hath hitherto withheld from them: it may, if it pleases, extend their trial and probation beyond this life, and discover in the other life the light of the gospel, to so many of them at least as have here made any tolerable improvement under the light of nature, and if they make good use of it, reward them accordingly. For though we Christians have no reason to expect any farther trial after this life is expired, because we have passed the utmost trial already, yet who knows but God may make a farther trial of those in the other life upon whom the great experiment of the gospel was yet never made; and therefore since Providence can yet be infinitely good to them notwithstanding their wretched condition at present, and since, for all we know, it will be so, we ought not to object against it its present disregard of them, till we see the final issue of things; for that their present condition is so bad, is no ground for us to argue against providence, unless we were sure it would never be better; because, for all we know, it may yet be rendered good enough, not only to justify, but to glorify the goodness of God's providence towards them.

And now to conclude this great argument. Since we see how necessary the belief of providence is to our being truly religious, and what unanswerable

evidence there is of the truth and reality of it, what remains, but that we heartily endeavour, by a calm, fixed, and impartial consideration of these things, throughly to instruct ourselves in the nature, and firmly to establish ourselves in the belief of it: for our religion must necessarily ebb or flow according as it is influenced more or less by our understanding and belief of the divine providence, which are the great principles that move and govern it. For every branch of the divine providence is an inexhaustible fountain of religious rhetoric and persuasion; and in this single proposition, that God upholds and governs the world, there are a thousand times more inducements to piety and virtue, than in all other topics in the world. But how pregnant soever it is with arguments, and how powerful soever its arguments are, it is impossible it should prevail upon any reasonable mind that understands not the force and believes not the truth of it; for all the possible access which outward objects have to our minds is through our knowledge and belief of them, without which the most momentous proposals are no more capable of affecting us, than one of Tully's orations is of calming the north wind: but he who firmly believes the truth, and understands the full emphasis of a divine providence, must necessarily be affected by it, if he be but within the reach and power of persuasion; and unless his will be impregnably fortified against all the force of argument and reason, he will find himself so besieged with motives on every side, persuading him to submit to the obligations of religion, that it will be almost impossible for him to defend himself against their powerful importunities. For what man in his wits can sit un

concerned under the lively belief that he is in the hands of a most just and gracious, all-wise and almighty Providence, that is conscious to his inmost thoughts and purposes, and beholds all his actions with infinite complacency or abhorrence; that hath the disposal of his life and his soul, and of all the goods he can hope for, and all the evils he can fear, and will certainly reward him a thousand-fold if he doth well, as if he doth ill as certainly pursue him with a dire revenge? This belief carries with it such constraining terrors and allurements as cannot but affect all reasonable minds, and finally prevail with their hopes and fears against all contrary temptations. Wherefore, if we would fix the obligations of religion upon our minds, it concerns us, above all things, to be throughly instructed in the nature and confirmed in the belief of the divine providence.

CHAP. V.

Of the necessity of believing divine rewards and punishments, in order to our being truly religious.

HUMAN nature is framed to move upon the hinges of hope and fear, and to be elicited and drawn forth in action, either by the proposal of some attainable good, or prospect of some avoidable evil; the former of which begets hope in us, and that pursuit; the latter fear, and that flight and avoidance: and accordingly we find all laws address to the hopes and fears of men with proposals of reward and punishment, as to the master-springs and principles of their action, by which they are moved to do or forbear, according as they are required and enjoined.

And indeed to give laws to men without enforcing them with rewards and punishments, would be to leave it indifferent whether they obeyed them or no, which is inconsistent with the nature of laws; for laws necessarily imply an obligation to obedience; but what obligation could we have to obey them, did they leave it indifferent, as to any good or evil accruing from it, whether we obey them or no? for if it will be as well for us one way as the other, what matter is it which way we determine ourselves? And this holds good in nothing more than in matter of our obedience to the laws of religion, to which our corrupt nature is above all things backward and averse; all that spiritual exercise which those laws require being quite against the grain of our earthly and sensual inclinations; so that were we not drawn to it by the hope of good, and driven by the fear of evil, to be sure our own bad natures would keep us at an eternal distance from it; but unless we believe God to be a rewarder of those that obey, and a punisher of those that despise him, we have no ground to hope for any good, or to dread any evil at his hands.

For unless we believe that he will crown those that serve him with some mark of his favour, how can we think he is pleased with them; there being no other way for him to express his being pleased, but by crowning them with some signal reward: and if he be not pleased with those that serve him, to be sure he is not displeased with those that neglect him; and if he be not displeased with them, what reason have we to apprehend that he will punish them? Thus the unbelief of God's being a rewarder of those that obey him draws after it an unbelief of

his being a punisher of those that despise him, and so on the contrary. For unless we believe him to be so much concerned for his service as to punish those that neglect it, we have no reason to think he is so much concerned for it as to reward those that embrace it. So that the belief and unbelief of God's being a rewarder and a punisher do by necessary consequence mutually imply each other; and unless we believe both, there is no reason we should believe either. And when our nature is so averse, as it is, to his service, what should induce us to serve him when we expect no good from him, or hinder us from slighting him when we fear no evil? And what is there can bring us home to God, when we are carried from him with an impetuous tide of corrupt inclinations, and have neither hope nor fear to bound or restrain it? So that considering the aversation of our nature to God's service, it is morally impossible we should ever be heartily reconciled to it, without being drawn with the hope of reward, or driven with the fear of punishment.

In the prosecution of this argument, I shall endeavour to shew,

First, How far it is necessary that our belief of divine rewards and punishments should extend.

Secondly, What evidence there is to induce us to believe them.

Thirdly, By what means this is to be begotten and confirmed.

SECT. I.

How far it is necessary that our belief of divine rewards and punishments should extend.

FOR, to induce us to submit to the obligations of