strength, gave the auditors time to get away, and having provided for their safety, he afterwards escaped himself. What is related of the voracious appetite of the Athlete is almost incredible. a Milo's appetite was scarce satiated with twenty mine (pounds) of meat, the same quantity of bread, and three congii of wine every day. Athenæus relates, that this champion having fun the whole length of the stadium, with a bull four years old on his shoulders, he afterwards knocked him down with one stroke of his fist, and ate the whole beast that very day. I will take it for granted, that all the other particulars related of Milo, are true; but is it probable, that one man could devour a whole ox in so short a time? We are told that Milo, when advanced to a very great age, seeing the rest of the champions wrestling, and gazing upon his own arms, which once were so vigorous and robust, but were then very much enfeebled by time, he burst into tears and cried, "Alas! these arms are now dead." And yet he either forgot or concealed his weakness from himself; and the confident persuasion he entertained of his own strength, and which he preserved to the last, proved fatal to him. Happening to meet as he was travelling, an old oak, which had been opened by some wedges that were forced into it, he undertook to split it in two by his bare strength. But after forcing out the wedges, his arms were catched in the trunk of the tree, by the violence with which it closed; so that being unable to disengage his hands, he was devoured by wolves. An author has judiciously observed, that this surprisingly robust champion, who prided himself so much in his bodily strength, was the weakest of men with regard to a passion, which often subdues and captivates the strongest; a courtezan having gained so great an ascendant over Milo, that she tyrannized over him in the most imperious manner, and made him obey whatever commands she laid upon him. THE CHAPTER IIÍ. THE WAR OF PELOPONNESUS. HE Peleponnesian war, which I am now entering upon, began about the end of the first year of the 87th Olympiad, and lasted 27 years. Thucydides has written the a Athen. 1. x. p. 412. b Thirty pounds, or eighteen pints, d Pausan. I vi. p. 370. fA. M. 3573. Ant. J. C₫ 431. history of it to the 21st year inclusively. He gives us an accurate account of the several transactions of every year which he divides into campaigns and winter quarters. However, I shall not be so minute, and shall only extract such parts of it as appear most entertaining and instructive. Plutarch and Diodorus Siculus will also be of great assistance to me on this occasion. SECT. I. The Siege of Plataa by the Thebans. Alternate Ravages of Attica and Peloponnesus. Honours paid to the Athenians who fell in the first Campaign. THE FIRST YEAR OF THE WAR. • The first act of hostility by which the war began, was committed by the Thebans, who besieged Platææ, a city of Boeotia, in alliance with Athens. They were introduced into it by treachery; but the citizens falling upon them in the night, killed them all, with the exception of about two hundred, who were taken prisoners, and who a little after were put to death. The Athenians, as soon as the news was brought of the action at Platææ, sent succours and provisions thither, and cleared the city of all persons who were incapable of bearing arms. The truce being evidently broken, both sides prepared openly for war; and ambassadors were sent to all places to strengthen themselves by the alliance of the Greeks and Barbarians. Every part of Greece was in motion, some few states and cities excepted, which continued neuter, till they should see the event of the war. The majority were for the Lacedæmonians, as being the deliverers of Greece, and espoused their interest very warmly, because the Athenians, forgetting that the moderation and gentleness with which they commanded over others, had procured them many allies, had afterwards alienated the greatest part of them by their pride and the severity of their government; and incurred the hatred not only of those who were then subject to them, but of all such as were apprehensive of becoming their dependants. In this temper of mind were the Greeks at that time. The confederates of each of those states were as follow. All Peloponnesus, Argos excepted, which stood neuter, had declared for Lacedæmonia. The Achaians, the inha bitants of Pellene excepted, had also joined them; but the latter also engaged insensibly in that war. Out of Pelo & Thucyd. 1. ii. p. 99–122. Diod, l. xii. p. 97–100. Plut. in Perich. p. 170. ponnesus were the people of Megara, Locris, Boeotia, Phocis, Ambracia, Leucadia, and Anactorium. The confederates of the Athenians were, the people of Chios, Lesbos, Platex, the Messenians of Naupactus; the greatest part of the Acarnanians, Corcyrans, Cephalenians, and Zacynthians, besides the several tributary countries, as maritime Cária, Doria that lies near it, Ionia, the Hellespont; and the cities of Thráce, Chalcis and Potidea excepted; all the islands between Crete and Peloponnesus, eastward; and the Cyclades, Melos and Thera excepted. Immediately after the attempt on Platææ, the Lacedæmonians had ordered forces to be levied both within and without Peloponnesus; and made all the preparations necessary for entering the enemy's country. All things being ready, two-thirds of the troops marched to the isthmus of Corinth, and the rest were left to guard the country. Archidamus, king of Lacedæinonia, who commanded the army, assembled the generals and chief officers, and calling up the remembrance of the great actions performed by their ancestors, and those they themselves had done, or been eyewitnesses to, he exhorted them to support, with the utmost efforts of their valour, the pristine glory of their respective cities, as well as their own fame. He represented to them that the eyes of all Greece were upon them; and that in expectation of the issue of a war which would determine their fate, they were incesssantly addressing heaven in favour of a people, who were as dear to them as the Athenians were become odious: that, however he could not deny, but that they were going to march against an enemy, who, though greatly inferior to them in numbers and in strength, were nevertheless very powerful, warlike, and daring; and whose courage would doubtless be still more inflamed by the sight of danger, and the laying waste of their territories: a that therefore they must exert themselves to the utmost, to spread an immediate terror, in the country they were going to enter, and to inspire the allies with new vigour. The whole army answered with the loudest acclamations of joy, and repeated assurances that they would do their duty. The assembly breaking up, Archidamus, still zealous for the welfare of Greece, and resolving to neglect no expedient that might prevent a rupture, the dreadful consequences of which he foresaw, sent à Spartan to Athens, to endeavour, before they should come to hostilities, to prevail, if possible, with the Athenians to lay aside their designs; since otherwise an army would soon march into Attica. But the Athenians, so far from admitting him to audience, or hearing his ⚫a Gnarus primis eventibus metum aut fiduciam gigni. Tacit. Annál. xiii. C: 31. reasons, would not so much as suffer him to come into their city: Pericles having prevailed with the people to make an order, that no herald or ambassador should be received from the Lacedæmonians, till they had first laid down their arms. In consequence of this, the Spartan was commanded to leave the country that very day; and an escort was sent to guard him to the frontiers, and to prevent his speaking to any person by the way. At his taking leave of the Athenians, he told them, that day would be the beginning of the great calamities that would ensue to all Greece. Archidamus, seeing no hopes of a reconciliation, marched for Attica, at the head of 60,000 chosen forces. Pericles, before the Lacedæmonians had entered the country, declared to the Athenians, that should Archidamus, when he was laying waste their territories, spare his (Pericles') lands, either on account of the rights of hospitality which subsisted between them, or to furnish his enemies, and those who envied him, with a handle to slander him, as holding intelligence with him, he, from that day, made over all his lands and houses to the city of Athens. He demonstrated to the Athenians, that the welfare of the state depended upon consuming the enemy's troops, by protracting the war; and that for this purpose they must immediately remove all their effects out of the country, retire to the city, and shut themselves up in it without ever hazarding a battle. The Athenians, indeed, had not forces enough to take the field and oppose the enemy. Their troops, exclusive of those in garrison, amounted but to 13,000 heavy armed soldiers: and 16,000 inhabitants, including the young and old, the citizens as well as others, who were appointed to defend Athens and besides these 1,200 troopers, including the archers who rode on horseback, and 1,600 foot archers. This was the whole army of the Athenians. But their chief strength consisted in a fleet of 300 gallies, part of which were ordered to lay waste the enemy's country, and the rest to awe the allies, on whom contributions were levied, without which the Athenians could not defray the expences of the war. The Athenians, animated by the warm exhortations of Pericles, brought from the country their wives, their children, their furniture, and all their effects, after which they pulled down their houses and even carried off the timber. With regard to the cattle of all kinds, they conveyed them into the island of Euboea and the neighbouring isles. However, they were deeply afflicted at this sad and precipitate migration, and it drew plentiful tears from their eyes. From the time that the Persians had left their country, that is, for near fifty years, they had enjoyed the sweets of peace, wholly employed in cultivating their lands, and feeding their flocks. But now they were obliged to abandon every thing. They took up their habitations in the city, as conveniently as they could, in the midst of such confusion; retiring either to their relations or friends; and some withdrew even to the temples and other public places. In the meantime the Lacedæmonians, being set out upon their march, entered the country, and encamped at Enoe, which is the first fortress towards Boeotia. They employed a long time in preparing for the attack, and raising the batteries; for which reason complaints were made against Archidamus, as if he carried on the war indolently, because he had not approved of it. He was accused of being too slow in his marches, and of encamping too long near Corinth. He was also charged with having been too dilatory in raising the army, as if he had desired to give the Athenians opportunity to carry off all their effects out of the country; whereas, (they said) had he marched speedily into it, all they had might have been plundered and destroyed. His design, however, was to engage the Athenians, by these delays, to agree to an accommodation, and to prevent a rupture, the consequences of which he foresaw would be pernicious to all Greece. Finding, after making several assaults, that it would be impossible for him to take the city, he raised the siege, and entered Attica in the midst of the harvest. Having laid waste the whole country, he advanced as far as Acharnæ, one of the greatest towns near Athens, and but 1,500 paces from the city. He there pitched his camp, in hopes that the Athenians, exasperated to see him advanced so near, would sally out to defend their country, and givẹ him an opportunity of coming to a battle. It indeed was not without great difficulty that the Athenians, (haughty and imperious as they were) could endure to be braved and insulted in this manner by an enemy, whom they did not think superior to themselves in courage. They were eye-witnesses of the dreadful havoc made of their lands, and saw all their houses and farms in a blaze. They could no longer bear this sad spectacle, and therefore demanded fiercely to be led out against the Lacedæmonians, be the consequence what it would. Pericles saw plainly, that the Athenians would thereby hazard every thing, and expose their city to certain destruction, should they march out to engage, under the walls of their city, an army of 60,000 fighting men, composed of the choicest troops at that time in Boeotia and Peloponnesus. Besides, he had made it his chief maxim, to spare the blood of the citizens, since that was an irreparable loss. Pursuing inflexibly therefore the plan he had laid down, and studious of nothing but how |