CHAPTER FOURTH.

BENEVOLENCE TOWARD THE INJURIOUS

THE cases to be considered here are three :

I. Where injury is committed by an individual upon an individual.

II. Where injury is committed by an individual upon society.

III. Where injury is committed by a society upon a society.

I. Where an injury is committed by an individual upon an individual.

In this case, the offender is guilty of wickedness, and of violation of our personal rights.

1. In so far as the action is wicked, it should excite our moral detestation, just as in the case in which wrong is done to any one else.

2. In so far as the wicked man is unhappy, he should excite our pity, and our active effort to benefit him.

3. As the cause of this unhappiness is moral wrong, it is our duty to reclaim him.

4. Inasmuch as the injury is done to us, it is our duty to forgive him. On this condition alone can we hope to be forgiven.

5. Yet more; inasmuch as the injury is done to us, it gives us an opportunity of exercising special and peculiar virtue. It is therefore our special duty to overcome it by good; that is, the duty of reclaiming him from wrong rests specially upon us; and is it to be fulfilled by manifesting towards him particular kindness, and the most cheerful willingness to serve him. "Be not overcome of evil, but overcome evil with good." That is, it is our special duty, by an exhibition of peculiar benevolence, to reclaim the injurious person to virtue.

Such is plainly the teaching of the Holy Scriptures. It will require but a few words to show that this is the course of conduct indicated by the conditions of our being.

1. I think that every one must acknowledge this to be the course pointed out by the most exalted virtue. Every man's conscience testifies, that to reward evil with good is noble, while the opposite course is mean. There is nothing more strongly indicative of littleness of spirit, than

revenge.

2. This mode of treating injuries has a manifest tendency to put an end to injury, and every form of ill-will:

For, 1. No man can long continue to injure him, who requites injury with nothing but goodness.

2. It improves the heart of the offender, and thus not only puts an end to the injury at that particular time, but also greatly diminishes the probability of its recurrence at any subsequent time. Were this course universally pursued, there would be done on earth the least possible injury.

3. It improves, in the most signal manner, the offended person himself; and thus renders it less likely that he will ever commit an injury himself.

In a word, the tendency of this mode of treating an injurious person, is to diminish indefinitely the liability to injury, and to render all parties both happier and better.

On the contrary, the tendency of retaliation is exactly the reverse. We should consider,

1. That the offender is a creature of God, and we are bound to treat him as God has commanded. Now, no treatment which we have received from another, gives us, by the law of God, any right to treat him in any other manner than with kindness. That he has violated his duty towards us and towards God, affords no reason why we should be guilty of the same crimes.

2. The tendency of retaliation is, to increase, and foster, and multiply wrongs, absolutely without end. Such, we see, is its effect among savage nations.

3. Retaliation renders neither party better, but always renders both parties worse. The offended party who retaliates, does a mean action when he might have done a noble one.

Such, then, is the scriptural mode of adjusting individual differences.

II. When the individual has committed an injury against society.

Such is the case when an offender has violated a law of society, and comes under its condemnation. In what way and on what principles is society bound to treat him?

1. The crime being one which, if permitted, would greatly injure if not destroy society, it is necessary that it be prevented. Society has, therefore, a right to take such measures as will insure its prevention. This prevention may always be secured by solitary confinement.

But, this being done, society is under the same obligations to the offender, as the several individuals composing the society are under to him. Hence,—

2. They are bound to seek his happiness by reclaiming him; that is, to direct all treatment of him, while under their care, with distinct reference to his moral improvement. This is the law of benevolence, and it is obligatory no less on societies than on individuals. Every one must see that the tendency of a system of prison discipline of this kind must be to diminish crime; while that of any other system must be, and always has been, to increase it.

Nor is this chimerical. The whole history of prisons has tended to establish precisely this result. Prisons which have been conducted on the principle of retaliation, have every where multiplied felons; while those which have been conducted on the principle of rendering a prison a school of moral reformation, have, thus far, succeeded beyond even the anticipations of their friends. Such a prison is also the greatest terror to a wicked man; and it ceases not to be so, until he becomes, at least, comparatively virtuous. The whole experience of John Howard is summed up by himself in a single sentence: "It is in vain to punish the wicked, unless you seek to reclaim them."

By what I have said above, I would not be understood to deny the right of society to punish murder by death. This right, I think, however, is to be established, not by the principles of natural law, but by the command of God to Noah. The precept, in this case, seems to me to have

been given to the whole human race, and to be still obligatory.

III. Where one society violates the rights of another society. The principles of the gospel, already explained, apply equally to this as to the preceding cases.

1. The individual has, by the law of God, no right to return evil for evil; but is bound to conduct towards every other individual, of what nation soever, upon the principle of charity.

2. The individual has no right to authorize society to do any thing contrary to the law of God; that is to say, men connected in societies are under the same moral law as individuals. What is forbidden to the one is forbidden also to the other.

3. Hence, I think we must conclude that an injury is to be treated in the same manner; that is, that we are under obligation to forgive the offending party, and to strive to render him both better and happier.

4. Hence, it would seem that all wars are contrary to the revealed will of God, and that the individual has no right to commit to society, nor society to commit to government, the power to declare war.

Such, I must confess, seems to me to be the will of our Creator; and, hence, that, to all arguments brought in favor of war, it would be a sufficient answer, that God has forbidden it, and that no consequences can possibly be conceived to arise from keeping his law, so terrible as those which must arise from violating it. God commands us to love every man, alien or citizen, Samaritan or Jew, as ourselves; and the act neither of society nor of government can render it our duty to violate this command.

But let us look at the arguments offered in support of

war.

The miseries of war are acknowledged. Its expense, at last, begins to be estimated. Its effects upon the physical, intellectual, and moral condition of a nation, are deplored. It is granted to be a most calamitous remedy for evils, and the most awful scourge that can be inflicted upon the human race. It will be granted, then, that the resort to it, if not necessary, must be intensely wicked; and that

if it be not in the highest degree useful, it ought to be universally abolished.

It is also granted, that the universal abolition of war would be one of the greatest blessings that could be conferred upon the human race. As to the general principle, then, there is no dispute. The only question which arises is, whether it be not necessary for one nation to act upon the principle of offence and defence so long as other nations continue to do the same?

I answer, first. It is granted that it would be better for man in general, if wars were abolished, and all means, both of offence and defence, abandoned. Now, this seems to me to admit, that this is the law under which God has created man. But this being admitted, the question seems to be at an end; for God never places men under circumstances in which it is either wise, or necessary, or innocent, to violate his laws. Is it for the advantage of him who lives among a community of thieves, to steal; or for one who lives among a community of liars, to lie? On the contrary, do not honesty and veracity, under these very circumstances, give him additional and peculiar advantages over his companions?

Secondly. Let us suppose a nation to abandon all means, both of offence and of defence, to lay aside all power of inflicting injury, and to rely for self-preservation solely upon the justice of its own conduct, and the moral effect which such a course of conduct would produce upon the consciences of men. How would such a nation procure redress of grievances? and how would it be protected from foreign aggression?

I. Of redress of grievances. Under this head would be comprehended violation of treaties, spoliation of property, and ill-treatment of its citizens.

I reply, 1. The very fact that a nation relied solely upon the justice of its measures, and the benevolence of its conduct, would do more than any thing else to prevent the occurrence of injury. The moral sentiment of every community would rise in opposition to injury inflicted upon the just, the kind, and the merciful. Thus, by this course, the