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The second thing mentioned as necessary to unbelief assuming a moral character, and becoming chargeable with guilt, is as obviously essential as the first-opportunity of knowledge. The unbelief condemned in the Bible is not that which arises from unavoidable or involuntary ignorance :-for this, indeed, cannot with propriety be denominated unbelief at all. No man can be said to disbelieve that which he has not the means of knowing that which, from whatever circumstances, has never been brought before his mind. This, it is plain, can never be a legitimate ground of condemnation. The Bible condemns no man for not knowing what he never heard of, or for not believing

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In such cases, it must be obvious, there can be no respon sibility. There is one apparent exception indeed—when the mental powers have been disordered in their exercise, and bereft of their energy, by moral causes,-by any description, for example, of dissipation and profligacy. But the exception, after all, is only apparent: for in such instances, the person's guilt does not properly consist in his not exerting a capacity of which he is not possessed, but in his having, by his previous misconduct, deprived himself of that capacity.

what he could not know,—for not obeying a law which was never promulgated to him, or not receiving a message which never reached his ears. No such thing. The principles of the Bible on this subject are those of the most unimpeachable equity. Ignorance is criminal, only when it arises from wilful inattention, or from aversion of heart to truth. Unbelief involves guilt, when it is the effect and manifestation of the same aversion,-of a want of will to that which is right and good.

The necessity of the third thing mentioned to the criminality of unbelief, namely sufficiency of evidence, may be confirmed by an appeal to the very highest authority, that of the Divine Author of the gospel himself. Look to John xv. 22, 24. "If I had not come and spoken to them, they had not had sin; but now they have no cloak for their sin. If I had not done among them the works which no other man did, they had not had sin; but now have they both seen and hated both me and my Father."-In this

passage, all the three particulars may be considered as united; the second and third being expressly specified, and the first clearly presupposed. The statement of the Saviour is, that, had they been without either means of knowledge or sufficiency of proof, or, by obvious implication, natural capacity of apprehending the meaning and discerning the evidence of what was taught them, they should not have been chargeable with sin, in rejecting his claims, in denying his doctrine; there would have been no guilt in their unbelief.

But here a question comes in our way, of essential consequence in our present investigation-a turning point in the inquiry:What is to be understood by sufficiency of evidence?-Essential, however, as the question is, it is so only in some of its general principles. It is not necessary that we take upon us (what would be far beyond our province as creatures) to specify, theoretically and a priori, the precise description and amount of evidence which the Divine Being

should be required to furnish, as sufficient to establish, to the satisfaction of his intelligent creatures, a testimony from himself. Such principles as I shall now proceed very briefly to state, seem enough for our purpose.

First of all, then, the principle itself already laid down, must be universally admitted as an obvious and incontrovertible one,

that a revelation which men are required to believe, and unbelief of which incurs condemnation and punishment, must be accompanied with evidence really sufficient of its Divine original. This, it is manifest, is the only ground on which a command to believe can legitimately rest, or a threatening of punishment to unbelief be susceptible of vindication. And this being granted, it is further clear, that the Author of the testimony, who is at the same time the author of our rational constitution, and who "knows what is in man," and has a perfect discernment of the description of evidence which the nature of the case admits, and which the reason

of the creature requires, must have it in his power to produce such a proof as shall, in kind and in measure, be adapted to both, and such therefore as shall be reasonably suf ficient for the conviction of every one, pos sessed of intellect, to whom it shall be presented.

But there is another general principle not less obvious than these, that sufficient evidence must not be understood to mean such evidence as shall infallibly constrain the believing assent of every individual. When the subject is a physical force, applied for the accomplishment of a physical purpose, the raising of a weight, for instance, or the removal of an obstacle ;-if the force have a direct and fair application, we judge of its sufficiency by its efficiency:if the weight is not raised, if the obstacle does not give way, the conclusion is, that the power is not sufficient. But it is not thus we must form our judgment on subjects of moral evidence. Such evidence every discerning mind must at once perceive, may

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