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In March 1992, you asked us to evaluate the (1) technological alternatives
The FBI has classified our analysis of the technological alternatives to wiretapping as National Security Information. In this regard, we provided your office with a classified briefing on our analysis on June 15, 1992.
Results in Brief
The technological wiretap alternatives available to the FBI and the network changes needed to accommodate the least intrusive wiretaps vary depending on the technology used. However, neither the FBI nor the telecommunications industry has systematically identified the alternatives, or evaluated their costs, benefits, or feasibility.
The FBI, in its April 1992 legislative proposal, did not define its wirelapping needs. The May 1992 proposal generally addressed the FBi's needs, but did
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not provide specifics necessary for the telecommunications industry to determine what would constitute full compliance with the proposal in the event it were enacted. For example, the proposal did not specify the length of time allowed to install a wiretap after receipt of a court order. Further, the May 1992 proposal did not address who should pay for the cost of wiretapping solutions. FBI and industry officials have recently begun working together to identify technological alternatives available to the FBI for wiretapping and to select the alternatives that best meet their needs.
The FBI considers wiretapping an essential information gathering tool in fighting crime. The federal government and 37 states have statutes governing wiretapping.
The FBI now has the technical ability required to wiretap certain technologies, such as analog voice communications carried over public networks' copper wire. However, since 1986, the FBI has become increasingly aware of the potential loss of wiretapping capability due to the rapid deployment of new technologies, such as cellular and integrated voice and data services, and the emergence of new technologies such as Personal Communication Services, satellites, and Personal Communication Numbers.
In response to the rapidly changing technology, the FBI prepared two legislative proposals in April and May 1992. The May proposal replaced the April proposal." According to the FBI, these proposals are intended to maintain the same level of wiretapping capability for new telecommunications technology that it has with technologies such as older analog communications using copper wire.
There are six current or imminent telecommunications technologies that
The May proposal has not been formally introduced as legislation in either the Senate or the House of
ll'eds to be able to wiretap any special features, such as till lurwarding or lectronic mail.
Stirrapping careecultat sis posting in itti: Tich: ilir communications ilow-it the premises where the target is dusentert. Deiner's. the premises and the cross-conneet.' at the cross-commeri, or at alandline. cellular or satellite switch.
The technological alternatives for wiretapping vary with the
Because the FBI has classified our analysis of these alternatives as National
As of June 30, 1992, neither the FBI nor the telecommunications industry
had systematically identified the alternative approaches for implementing Studies Exist
minimally intrusive wiretapping capabilities and the costs, benefits, and Identifying Alternatives feasibility of these alternatives. and Their Costs,
The FBI's and telecommunication industry's past efforts to identify Benefits, and
technological alternatives have been unsuccessful. In the past, the FBI met Feasibility
with security officers within the telephone companies to effect wiretaps. According to the FBI and industry officials, these security officers were the designated company contacts for meeting the FBI's wiretapping needs. However, industry security officers did not discuss the FBI's wiretapping needs with the industry's technical experts who develop the technologies. Consequently, these experts were not informed of the FBI's needs and were not involved in identifying technological alternatives and solutions until July 1990, when the FBI began technical discussions with them.
In addition, while the FBI conducted its own research on wiretapping, these research efforts were not coordinated with industry research and
"The cross-connect is located at the central office of the telephone company: this is where
development. As a result, neither the FBI nor the telecommunications Industry had a comprehensive analysis of the technological alicmatives for wiretapping current and emerging technologies.
Recent FBI Actions to
Recently the FBI has taken actions to better define and communicate its
However, the May proposal does not address what the telecoinmunications industry would need to do to be in full compliance with the proposal in the event it is enacted, the meaning of certain technical terms, or who would pay for the cost of wiretapping solutions. For example, the proposal did not specify the length of time allowed to install a wiretap after receipt of a court order. According to the FBI, it will address compliance in its wiretapping requirements document, which is being developed. The proposal also does not address the international implications of future technologies, such as PCN, on wiretapping. PCN will involve assigning a subscriber one telephone number. All calls will be billed to that number regardless of what instrument or network the subscriber uses. Using PCN, the subscriber may be anywhere in the world, and the service may be provided by any service provider using any technology. Since some of the service providers may be international, and since the providers may be outside the United States, the FBI will have to establish cooperative arrangements with foreign law enforcement agencies in order to wirelap.
In May 1992, the FBI formed a technical committee composed of staff from
We identified and assessed the derhunebrogical actives from spelapping: 111
We also assessed the FBI's past and current actions to satisfy ils
We met with the FBI's Assistant Director and Deputy Assistant Director
Our work was performed between April and June 1992 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
We did not obtain written comments on this report. However, we briefed FBI officials, including the Assistant Director and Deputy Assistant Director (Operations), Technical Services Division, on the results of our work and on our discussions with the telecommunications industry. These officials generally agreed with the facts as presented, including our technical assessment of the wiretapping alternatives. We have incorporated their views, as well as their updates on the FBI's planned actions, in the report as appropriate.
As agreed with your office, unless you publicly announce the contents of this report earlier, we plan to make no-further distribution until 30 days from the date of this letter. We will then send copies to the Attorney General; the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation; the Director, Office of Management and Budget; and interested congressional commitees. Copies will also be made available to others upon request. This report was prepared under the direction of Howard G. Rhilc, Director, General Government Information Systems, who can be reached at (202) 512-6418. Major contributors to this report are listed in appendix II.
Biman Po Ralph V. Carlone
Assistant Comptroller General