disuse, and is not likely to be re- ships can find shelter. Eastward of stored.

Trade between civilized countries is never entirely stopped by frontiers and duties, and the land and sea routes of which Constantinople is the centre have here been surveyed in order to show that with the restoration of civilization to the region in which at present the sultan holds sway Constantinople must necessarily become one of the world's great centres for trade and shipping. A different question arises when we ask what is the district of which the natural and necessary capital lies by the Golden Horn. This region must hardly be sought in Europe beyond the immediate shores of the Dardanelles. At any rate, the basin of the Danube and the basin of the Vardar, with Saloniki, cannot be included in it, though a power strong enough to hold Constantinople by its own resources would probably maintain itself at Adrianople, and might very well dominate the Valley of the Maritza, and possibly the eastern part of the Rhodope Mountains. But the history of its foundation suggests, and a study of the map confirms, the belief that Constantinople looks rather to the east than to the west. South of the Dardanelles the west coast will always carry on its trade rather by sea than over the rugged hills which separate it from the remote interior. But the inland region north of the Taurus, and between the Sea of Marmora and Amasia and Samsun, seems by nature to belong to Constantinople. From this region the land routes, as we have seen, all lead to Broussa, Ismid, and the Bosphorus, while from the north coast such traffic as there is, would naturally go by sea to the same point. But the north coast of Asia Minor is by no means favored for navigation. Along its whole length the mountains fall almost straight into the sea, and it has not a single good harbor. In point of climate it is divided into an eastern and a western half, which meet at Sinope. Between Sinope and the Bosphorus the sea is usually cold and stormy, and there is no port in which

Sinope the ports are still only open roads, but the temperature is higher, the wind and the waves are less threatening and there is more possibility of intercourse between sea and land. It is the forbidding aspect of the sea that gives so much importance to the inland communications in northwestern Asia Minor, which for this reason appears to be marked out by nature for the control of a ruler established on the Bosphorus. It is evident, however, that a state confined to this region alone could never be a first-rate power, and that to give to the ruler of Constantinople the control of resources sufficient to ensure his independence among the powers it would be necessary to, add to his dominions the west and south-west coast of Asia Minor. In that case his country would be as large as Spain, and better endowed than the Spanish peninsula in respect of fertility and natural advan tages.

The Gordian knot of the Eastern question is the problem of the future ownership of Constantinople. The subject is beset with SO many difficulties that no one who has thought seriously about it is tempted to offer a dogmatic solution. At any rate no harm can come of the attempt to explain the question by a brief review of some of the issues which are at stake. It is convenient to begin with the commercial interests, which fall under three heads according as they are Russian, Danubian, or British. Russia owns more than half of the coast of the Black Sea, and three of its principal rivers are hers. The whole of the maritime trade of her southern provinces, except in so far as it is a local Black Sea trade, must necessarily pass through the Bosphorus. The maritime trade of the Danubian countries, of Roumania, Bulgaria, Ser bia, and of Hungary and Austria in so far as it does not find a more convenient route by the Adriatic, is also necessarily compelled to pass through the straits. The recent completion of the works by which the rapids at the

The

Iron Gates have peen rendered navi-
gable must greatly increase the im-
portance of the Danubian trade both
to Austria-Hungary and to her neigh-
bors lower down the stream.
British interest arises from the fact
that the imports and exports to and
from both southern Russia and the
Danubian countries are for the most
part carried in British ships.1 But
whereas the Russian and Danubian in-
terests are necessary and permanent,
the British interest may fairly be de-
scribed as accidental and temporary.
The principal maritime and commer-
cial power will probably always be the
principal customer in the trade both of
southern Russia and of the Danubian
countries; so long therefore as Eu-
gland retains her maritime and com-
mercial greatness she may be expected
to retain her share in the Black Sea
trade. That share depends, however,
not upon England's geographical posi-
tion, but upon what may in a large
sense be called the accident of her
maritime pre-eminence.

There would, perhaps, be some justification for putting these commercial interests into the foreground. Against that view may be cited the analogy of the Sound and the Baltic trade which makes it probable that the course of trade would not be greatly affected by the fate of Constantinople provided

that the city passes into the hands of a civilized government. A very strong power might use its establishment on the straits for the purpose of acquiring a monopoly of the Black Sea navigation by means of preferential duties or one-sided regulations. In so far as this is probable it would be an argument against a Russian acquisition of Constantinople.

A weightier factor in the problem is revealed by a consideration of the effect which the fate of Constantinople must have upon the distribution and application of force between the great powers. Perhaps the clearest way of discussing this part of the subject i to examine in turn each of a series of hypotheses. Suppose then, in the first instance, that Constantinople and the Dardanelles passed into the possession of Russia. It would, of course, not be difficult for a civilized power so to fortify the Dardanelles that their pas sage by a hostile fleet would be impracticable, and that the works covering them would form a first-class fortress, that is, a position not to be taken except after a protracted siege. In that case, Russia would be able to exclude from the Black Sea all ships of war but her own; the sea would be for purposes of military transport a Russian lake. Her armies could ba moved across it without any possibility

1 The following figures are taken from the Board of Trade Returns for 1895:

The trade of Russia mostly passes through the Northern Ports, as may be seen from the following return for 1894, which does not distinguish between Northern and Southern Ports :

This gives a clue to the share of foreign (largely British) ships in Russia's trade.

of hostile interference with them, and as there is no means of preventing from the land the landing of an army moving freely by sea (because an army carried in steamers moves many times faster than an army upon land) there would be no possibility of successful resistance to Russian attack by any country bordering on that sea. Roumania, Bulgaria, and northern Asia Minor would at once become in fact, if not in theory, portions of the Russian Empire. The frontier which Rus sia would thus acquire would place the eastern half of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy at her mercy. This solution then is incompatible with the preservation of Austria-Hungary as a great power, as a State strong enough to resist the dictation of any one of its neighbors. It may be assumed then that Austria-Hungary would prefer to this solution of the Eastern question a war in which her independent existence would be staked. But Russia in possession of the Dardanelles would secure a further advantage. Within the Black Sea she could keep in training a navy as large as she pleased, absolutely safe from hostile attack, and yet always at liberty to take the offensive against other navies. The great addition to Russia's resources of every kind and to her forces for attack and defence which she would acquire upon this hypothesis, make it the general interest of the European community to resist the acquisition of the straits by Russia. The present European system is bound up with the coexistence of a number of great powers, and implies that none of them shall be so much stronger than its neighbors as to overshadow and overawe them. In this European interest France is undoubtedly a partner, although her present policy appears calculated to promote her own specific and immediate interests at the expense of those remoter interests which she shares with the rest of the European nations.

The peculiar feature of the present situation is that it is doubtful whether any or all of the powers are in fact

able to prevent Russia's seizing Constantinople and the Dardanelles by a coup de main. If she were to do so Germany and Austria would probably be compelled to invade Russia in order to force her to disgorge her prey. France would then certainly attack Germany, and the success of the central powers would depend upon the extent to which England was willing and able to help them. Lord Salisbury's declaration in 1886 that England would co-operate with Austria in resisting a Russian attempt upon the straits was not without effect. repetition in 1896, though it may perhaps not be appropriate at the Guildhall, would be no less effective.

A second hypothesis is that of the acquisition of Constantinople by Austria. This would involve no menace to the western European powers nor to Germany. Indeed the extension of the Austrian Empire to the Taurus would probably lead to the absorption by Germany of the Western or German half of the present Austrian monarchy. The Black Sea would not become an Austrian lake, but there would sooner or later be a naval war between Austria and Russia for its command, in which, however, the cessation of her trade would paralyze the southern provinces of Russia, and an Austrian victory would be disastrous to the Northern Empire. For these reasons Russia is as strongly driven to resist an Austrian acquisition of Constantinople as Austria to oppose a Russian attempt upon that place.

Neither Russia nor Austria is likely at present to take a step calculated to involve her in a great war; it is much more probable that the two governments have exchanged assurances to the effect that neither of them contemplates obtaining possession of the Bosphorus. No other great power can dream of acquiring the city. The third hypothesis then is that of Constantinople as the seat of government of a prince of European origin acting, either in his own name or under the nominal authority of the sultan, as administrator-general of the district,

A