From The National Review. RUSSIA'S STRENGTH. "Is there any ground for this unwholesome and abject terror that Russia appears to inspire in other powers?" This question, put to me in these words by a friend who is deeply interested in matters of European policy, leads so directly to the root of the present situation that it may be worth while attempting an answer for the benefit of the readers of the National Review. It has for some time been the fashion when such questions are asked, to seek the answer in military and naval statistics. Those who consult tables giving the grand total of persons upon whose military service in some capacity the Russian government considers that in the last resort it can count, may feel awed by the four or six millions of armed men who will in this way be paraded before the imagination. But totals of this kind are of little practical value. The real military force of a nation is represented by the armies that it can put into the field for specific purposes of attack or defence. In recent years, since the death of Alexander II., Russia has considerably strengthened her military power by preparing it for definite campaigns. Before the accession of Alexander III., Russia's army was spread over the greater part of her European territory. There was, and still is, a large force in the provinces south of the Caucasus, and a smaller force dispersed over the vast Asiatic territories under Russian rule. Of late the garrisons in the extreme East have been strengthened, but a quite recent estimate does not put the Russian force in Asia, apart from the army of the Caucasus, higher than seventy-five thousand men. The great change has been in Europe. From Odessa to St. Petersburg is about a thousand miles, and from Warsaw to Kazan about twelve hundred. So long as the permanent quarters of the troops were spread over a parallelogram of these dimensions, even though the western districts contained Lore than their share, the army was doomed to perpetual unreadiness. In as It a country with hardly any metalled roads and few railways, the collection into one district of contingents So widely scattered was so slow a process to be impracticable; wars were ended before all the forces that should have been employed had been brought on to the scene of action. In 1860, Moltke, discussing the chance of Russian intervention in a war in Germany, wrote: "Moscow, which we may regard as the centre of gravity of Russia, is as far from Berlin as Madrid or Naples. The Russian army is spread over an area of a million square miles. needs a long time to assemble, and has to cover from the Volga to the Vistula, a distance of fourteen hundred miles, without a railway. The Russian army can reach our frontier only after we have been victorious, or have already suffered defeat." During the reign of Alexander III., the Russian government became aware that the fashioned distribution of its troops rendered it comparatively impotent either for attack or defence at any given point. The remedy was found by choosing the region where it would be useful to be strong, and by moving into that region so much of the army as would make possible its complete concentration there in case of need. The question which was the proper district for this purpose must evidently depend upon the object for which it was thought most likely the army would be employed, and when we know the answer given we shall hardly be wrong in making inferences as to the policy of Russia. The army was moved to the Western frontier. old To understand its present distribution it is necessary only to remember one or two leading features of its organization. Four battalions form a regiment, and four regiments an infantry division, to which is attached an artillery brigade of six batteries. with forty-eight guns. A cavalry division is comprised of twenty-four squadrons. The field army is made up of infantry divisions and cavalry divisions, and will be augmented in case of war, not only by bringing the in fantry divisions up to war strength, which is about double the peace effective, but also by expanding the rifle brigades and reserve brigades, which in peace are composed of the cadres of four rifle battalions or eight infantry battalions. The cavalry division numbers about three thousand nine hundred sabres; the infantry division on a war footing about sixteen thousand bayonets; the reserve brigade half, and the rifle brigade a quarter of that strength. Beyond these components of the field army, there are, of course, fortress garrisons of various arms and the troops of the several auxiliary services. These are for the most part quartered in the great fortresses of the Western frontier. By the present distribution the whole European army of Russia is contained in six districts, those of Wilna, Warsaw, Kief, and Odessa, which together form the Western frontier belt, and those of St. Petersburg and Moscow, from which railways run to the frontier. The principal military centre is Poland, the great tongue of land that protrudes towards Germany between Prussia and Austrian Silesia. Here there are no less than eleven infantry divisions, and eight and a half cavalry divisions, which on a war footing would make two hundred and seventeen thousand men. The infantry is arranged in a horseshoe line facing the German and Austrian borders.1 Seven of the cavalry divisions are on the outside of the horseshoe, five on the north side facing Prussia and two on the south towards Galicia. In the district of Wilna there are eight infantry and two cavalry divisions, at war strength one hundred and forty-two thousand men. The corner points of the district are at Riga, Witebsk, Bobruisk, and Grodno, so that its area is about two hundred and fifty miles square, but the divisions are stationed at places in direct railway communication with Wilna and Kovno, the great frontier fortress on the Njemen. 1 The headquarters of divisions are at Bielos. tok, Lomsha, Ostrolenka, Pultusk, Warsaw (2), Radom, Ljublin (2), Brest Litewsk, and Kobrin. On the south of the great marshlands that stretch eastward from Brest Litewsk, a third army of one hundred and fifty-four thousand men, when completed to war strength (five cavalry and eight infantry divisions), is dotted by divisions along the railway from Charkow and Pultawa through Kief to Luzk, near the Galician border. fourth army has its headquarters at Odessa, its four infantry divisions, except that at Sebastopol, being stationed near the Roumanian frontier, or the railways leading towards Bessarabia. Its war force would be about seventy thousand men. A Behind these four armies are the great reserves at St. Petersburg and Moscow. At St. Petersburg, in direct railway communication with Wilna and Warsaw, are six infantry and two cavalry divisions, with a war strength of one hundred and eleven thousand, and at Moscow, with a direct railway to Warsaw, and less direct railways to Kief and Odessa, are one cavalry and seven infantry divisions, making one hundred and twenty-one thousand. These various bodies are the whole field army of Russia in Europe, nine hundred and seventeen thousand men. But, as has been noted, the outbreak of war will see them strengthened by rifle and reserve brigades, which might, after a time, add two or even three hundred thousand to the total force. In case the government required to use all or any of these armies, it would be necessary first to call out the reserve men needed to fill up the cadres to the war complement, and to transport them from their homes to the present quarters of their regiments. This process would hardly be accomplished in less than a month. It would be followed by the concentration in its district of the army to be employed, which in Poland might be effected in ten marches; in the district of Wilna, where the railways are convenient, in about the same time; but in the regions of Kief and Odessa would probably involve further delay. The Moscow and St. Petersburg contingents might by this time be approaching the frontier districts, and the expansion of the reserve cadres might be beginning. The forces that would thus be put in motion are no doubt large. But it must be observed that the distribution here described admits of the full effort being made only in one eventuality, that of a war in which Russia is opposed at the same time by Germany, AustriaHungary, and Roumania, or at least by Germany and Austria-Hungary. The armies of Kief and Odessa are too far away to be available within any reasonable time against Germany, and those of Wilna and St. Petersburg could not without very great difficulty and delay be removed to the Galician or Roumanian frontiers. The arrangement is evidently based upon the assumption of a common policy uniting Germany and Austria-Hungary. For the contingency of a war in which these two powers were arrayed against Russia, the Russian force can hardly be thought extravagant, in view of Bismarck's famous declaration that Germany could place a million men on each of her frontiers, and have a third million in reserve, and of the probability that the greater part of the AustroHungarian army would be employed against the Russians. Further, it may reasonably be held that the disposition of four armies at points of assembly along a frontier eight hundred miles long (in a straight line from Odessa to Memel) is defensive rather than offensive. The essence of attack consists in concentrating the available force against a single enemy; a course which has been shown to be in this case hardly practicable. No doubt the distribution of forces points to a preponderance in the quarter opposite the German frontier, which is watched by a very large body of cavalry, and upon which the armies of Wilna and Warsaw could be supported both by that of Moscow and that of St. Petersburg. This preponderance, however, is no more than a well-deserved compliment to the superiority of the German army in numbers, organization, and readiness, to that of the dual monarchy. At the present moment, then, the mil itary strength of Russia consists in her The Russian navy is hardly in itself strong enough to cause much apprehension to any of the great powers. It may, perhaps, be described as generally about equal to that of Germany or of Italy, with the qualification that the special effort of the present time to increase the number of modern battleships tends to make it in that important element of force superior to either of them. But as it is usually divided between the Black Sea and the Baltic, and as all its possible enemies have their bases at points on the route joining those two seas, it must be regarded as subject to some embarrassment due to this strategical situation. The very great influence exerted by Russia is due, not to her own forces, which are by no means disproportionate to the tasks of defence incumbent upon them, but to her alliance with France. The Russian and French armies together are more numerous and probably as efficient as the German and Austro-Hungarian armies combined. The addition of the Italian army gave a slight preponderance of force to the Triple Alliance; but the exhaustion of Italy has rendered this advantage doubtful, while the combined navies of France and Russia are more than a match for the navies of the central powers. A war between the two groups would be an exhausting, ruinous effort to both sides; the balance of forces promises no decided success to either party, and therefore the great interest of most of them is to avoid it. The temper of the French is, however, still thought to be correctly described by the Bismarckian words, that, if there were war between Germany and Russia, "the chassepots would go off of themselves." In other words, French feeling places French policy at the disposal of Russia, although the Russian government will hardly begin a war for any merely French object. This situation makes the Russian emperor the arbiter of peace or war, and for this reason so much deference is paid to him. The action of Russia in preparing her army for campaigns against possible European enemies seems to have been the outcome of a natural and reasonable policy. In general terms this policy may be described as the effort to bring the power or influence of Russia to bear upon the centre of gravity of the political world (or at least of the old world) which lies in Europe, rather than to disseminate that power by employing it in fragments at points far away from the centre of gravity. The effect has been to diminish Russia's military activity in Asia without diminishing her political influence there. The movement of troops was carried out in the main in 1887. No thorough local preparations had been made, and large masses were quartered in districts where there were neither houses nor huts. Disease ravaged among the troops, and a long time passed before camps had been replaced by barracks or other permanent quarters. This carelessness of life and want of forethought is hardly a good omen for the future operations of these armies. The principal difficulty attaching to the movements of very large forces consists in securing that all the men shall be properly fed and shall have such rest and shelter as may suffice for health. During the campaign France these difficulties were overcome by the exertions of a splendidly prepared service directed by the perhaps unique talent of the late General von Stosch. Stosch was far from sanguine as to the possibility of properly supplying in the field the greatly increased numbers of more recent times. He once said that he neither knew how it could be done nor who could do it. In view of the inefficiency of Russian communications, the impossibility of a in large army in the region eastward of the Oder, or, indeed, eastward of the Weser, living upon the country it passes through, and the traditional weakness in point of exactitude of the Russian administrative officials, the westward march from Warsaw and Wilna presents to the imagination dreadful possibilities of privation, disease and starvation. But this by the way. The first effect of the changed distribution of the Russian army was to compel the German government to a large increase of its available force, produced by extending the age of reserve liability so as to make liable in case of war several annual classes that had before been exempt. At the same time German policy was brought up very sharply. Bismarck's last great parliamentary speech, that of February, 1888, was the announcement that in order to avoid a war with Russia and France at once, from which Germany could have nothing to gain, and everything to lose, the German government must make every sacrifice short of that of honor to propitiate Russia. Austria was to be defended if attacked, but not to be supported in her traditional Eastern policy, or at least not in any attempt either to extend her own influence or to stem the extension of Russian influence in the regions now or formerly under Turkish dominion. The normal and natural tendencies of Russian and of Austrian policy in regard to the Eastern question have never been better set forth than in Moltke's introduction to his history of the war of 1828-9. "The task which of necessity Austria will sooner or later have to perform" is "to prevent the downfall of the Ottoman Empire, or to regulate the course of that, perhaps, inevitable event." On the other hand, "Russia is absolutely driven, by her geographical and commercial position, to exercise at Constantinople a predominant influence, without which she can insure neither. the internal prosperity of her southern provinces, the development of her maritime enterprise, nor the security of her southern border." The balance of force be tween the combination of which Austria is a member, and that of which Russia is the head, coupled with the dan, gers to all parties attending a conflict between the two sides, has necessitated a compromise in regard to Turkey, based upon the status quo, interpreted, so far as the minor states, Bulgaria and Servia are concerned, in the sense favorable to Russia, expounded by Bismarck in the speech to which reference has been made, and so far as the Ottoman Empire is concerned, in the sense that its territorial integrity is to be maintained, but that Russia is to exert the influence which she desires. Thus the first result of the new Russian policy, and of the new distribution of her army, has been a great success in Europe. Austria and her allies are cowed by the prospect of a conflict which to avert they have given Russian influence full scope in Turkey and its former dependencies, the only reservation being apparently that Russia is not to conquer or annex territory. The collapse of the Ottoman Empire is to be postponed, and the delay is to be for the benefit of Russia. This being the constrained attitude of the German and Austrian governments, the public discussion of the nature of the Turkish dominion, such as it has shown itself in Armenia, cannot but be distasteful to them, for it can only lead to the inference that they are actuated in their conduct by the dread of a conflict with the Dual Alliance, an inference which they cannot wish their subjects to draw. In Asia, also, the new policy has yielded good results. In Persia Russia's influence is already sufficiently strong, and in the direction of India no immediate action seems to be contemplated. An attack upon India, or even upon Afghanistan, will hardly be undertaken until the newly acquired districts of Central Asia have been fully Russified, and until it becomes practicable to assemble a considerable force beyond the Caspian. It would be folly to diminish the force in Europe, which, rationally disposed, produces such a great effect, for an enterprise of which in present conditions the execution is impracticable. An attack upon India ought to be preceded by a considerable weakening of the general position and status of the British Empire, and this must be effected by means of Russia's European policy. In the far East, however, a delicate situation was created by the Japanese conquest of Korea, and of the great naval bases on the Gulf of Pechili. If the Japanese were allowed to establish themselves here, the path of Russian extension would be barred, and Japan in possession could, with naval help from England, prevent Russia from ever developing her naval ambition in the Northern Pacific. Prompt, direct, isolated action was not practicable. A Russian army could not be marched across Asia. The Japanese forces were too strong for the Russian forces on the spot, and naval help from European Russia could not be rendered if England should determine to help the Javanese. The danger was that England might see her advantage; might mediate between Japan and China, and guarantee to Japan against Russia the positions she had conquered. A fairly strong British government would hardly have been deterred by joint declarations from Russia and France alone, for prompt action would have given England a great opportunity both in the far Eastern and in European waters, and a serious repulse to Russia in the far East would have reacted on her position in other parts of Asia and in Europe. The accession of Germany to the combination was, therefore, a great service to Russia, and enabled her to recover, without a blow, an important position already lost, to inflict upon England a humiliation which in the far East was palpable, and to reveal to Japan that English governments are not to be trusted to assert the evident, interests of their own nation. That Russia aiming at predominance in Asia, and France seeking to make the Mediterranean a French lak.. should see their rival in England the |