imagination, because it is the primary imagination that creates for us the world of objects. Then if the objects are said to be fixed and dead', Coleridge might be referring to the things prior to their becoming the objects, to the things-in-themselves that may be supposed to exist independent of the precipient. He may also be meaning that the objects of the primary imagination compared with those of the secondary are 'fixed and dead'. In normal life we look at the objects as means, as so many utilities, as counters. But when the conscious imagination is focussed on them they appear as ends in themselves; and they are vitalised because they are integrated, to that consciousness in which the artist participates. Imagination is the process whereby the objects are charged with consciousness. At the level of the primary imagination we are not aware of this because of the ulterior ends governing our experience, and the world at this level may appear vital, but we do not here apprehend the living principle inherent in the world of objects. This living principle for its own sake is apprehended at the level of the secondary imagination. This vitality may be a case of self-projection at the earlier level, but at this level it is vitality that is felt to be real. Consequently the objects appear more complex and more significant.

The objects at the level of the primary belong to the epistemological situation; and at that of the secondary they are apprehended as having an ontological status. This status is intuited; and in intuiting we create for ourselves that existence or that value which they embody. The creative act in one of its essential forms is present in such a situation if only because the intuited value renders the object vital to us. In itself the object is fixed and definite. But in relation to the percipient it reveals a life that is dynamic, a life which is its specific characteristic. It is an element in the creative process of the universe.

CT

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10. When Coleridge spoke of the imaginative act as the dim analogue of the creation', he had in his mind Berkeley's remark : Certainly we ourselves create in some wise whenever we imagine (Commonplace Book, 101). More or less in the same in the same manner, Coleridge said in his famous Ode:

According to Berkeley the action of the will is necessary for giving rise to the ideas of the imagination. The spirit producing or otherwise operating about' ideas is called will (Principles, 27). The ideas formed by the imagination have an entire dependence on the will' (Third Dialogue). Coleridge spoke of choice being present in the primary imagination, and of will in the other. As an activity, the imagination

too must arise from the volition. The volitional can have a conscious or unconscious purpose. The former is the character of the secondary which in intuiting the nature of the world, intuits its real character, its essential truth.

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In his letter of 23rd March, 1801 to Poole he speaks of truth being a species of revelation. Then he proceeds to examine the nature of the mind. He is convinced that the mind is not passive. 'If the mind he not passive, if it be indeed made in God's Image, and that, too, in the sublimest sense, the Image of the Creator, there is ground for suspicion that any system built on the passiveness of the mind must be false, as a system". It is the dynamism of the mind that is basic to any system of thought seeking to interpret the nature of the world in which we live, struggle and realise. Here he feels the need for a new theory of perception because he is convinced that the mind is not a passive receptacle. Sensation is not the whole of perceptual awareness. mind is active because it brings together the varied data of sense. activity is called the primary imagination which gives a form or shape to the varied impressions. Even then the shape given is purely intellectual or ideational; and it may or may not agree with that of the given manifold. It is here that the secondary imagination operates by revealing the agreement of the external with the internal, by revealing the organic unity of the world with the consciousness of the individual, and by revealing the oneness of the creativity of Nature with that of the human mind.

The

This

Imagination secondary thus seeks to reveal the animating principle operating in the Universe, a principle which alone can explain Reality. In a letter to Godwin (1800), he speaks of his "endeavour to destroy the old antithesis of words and things, elevating, as it were, words into things and living things too". The primary imagination destroys the old antithesis, the old dualism of words and things. It elevates the word into the thing. But the secondary imagination completes this process by elevating it into a living thing. In this process it works as passion.

In a letter of December 1811 he observes: "It will not be by dates that posterity will judge of the originality of a poem; but by the original spirit itself. This is to be found neither in a tale however interesting, which is but the canvas; no, nor yet in the Fancy or the imagery—which are but forms and colours-it is a subtle spirit, all in each part, reconciling and unifying all. Passion and imagination are its most appropriate names; but even these say little-for it must be not merely passion but poetic passion, poetic imagination". Now the nature of passion is to make the individual forget himself, forget the

proper distinctions governing the familiar world of selfish solicitude. Poetic passion is a more refined one. It reconciles and unifies all. It is all-inclusive.

At its height the imagination secondary is poetic passion. The poetic passion impregnates the data of experience and contemplation 'with an interest not their own' (L 312). The aesthetic pleasure thus arises not from the thing presented prior to the creative act, but from what is represented by the artist (L 312). Prior to the act the data are not unified, not significant enough. In unifying them, imagination breathes into the whole something of its own character.

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11. Imagination has a tendency to use words by elevating them into things. In other words, it seeks to employ words metaphorically. Metaphors are apprehended primarily as images. These images exist at the two levels of imagination in two different ways. At the lower level, the image does not absorb our attention into itself; it claims no independent or significant character. It functions almost like a counter. Imagery, affecting incidents, just thoughts, interesting personal or domestic feelings ", and expression of these in the form of a poem may all by incessant effort be acquired as a trade." But there is a power which is inborn. It is "the sense of musical delight which is a gift of imagination". This gift This gift" together with the power of reducing multitude into unity of effect, and modifying a series of thoughts by some one predominant thought or feeling, may be cultivated and improved, but can never be learned. It is in these that poeta nascitur non fit ”. (BL 2.14). The image resulting from poetic passion is a product of the secondary imagination. As emerging from this source, it carries with it the character of passion and moves in the same rhythm. Yet it is something not common to all human beings. The primary imagination is present in all, but the secondary is only in a few; and these few are the creative artists who are born with the gift. Consequently what distinguishes an artist from any other human being is the presence in him of the secondary imagination.

If the images themselves are not modified by the imaginative activity, poetry becomes flattened into mere didactics of practice, or evaporated into a hazy, unthoughtful day-dreaming" (L 11). This modifying process secures the definiteness and articulation of imagery', and also the framework of objectivity.' And the two forms in which the images exist are present in two different activities. In the activity of fancy the images are unrelated, and they have no necessary origination from the poetic imagination. They are merely the images existing at the level of the primary imagination. The images modified into a unity are those charged with the poetic passion; and these images offer the

clues to an apprehension of the poetic intuitions. In other words, they offer the clues to an understanding of the existence or being of the world, an understanding with which we are not familiar in normal life because of the selfish solicitude which does not allow us to tear off the film of familiarity.

12. That which distinguishes the normal individual from the genius is the latter's" intuition of absolute existence ". This intuition makes him realise within himself "a something ineffably greater than his own indivdual nature ". How does he have this idea? Our sources of knowledge are the senses and the understanding.

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The senses

supply only surfaces, undulations, phantoms ". The instruments of sensation "furnish only the chaos, the shapeless elements of sense ". The “moulds and mechanism of the understanding" result in individualization, in outlines and differencings by quantity and relation" (Fr 520). Imagination, on the other hand, is concerned with existence; and in the language of the categories it is preoccupied with quality. As a principle of shapeliness it resolves the chaos; and as the secondary imagination it intuits the impersonal, the universal. Such a creative principle, Coleridge says, is not only analogous to the creativity of nature, but basic to the entire human life as such. It is the stuff of our lives and dreams. It intuits the Platonic Ideas.

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The primary imagination is thus essentially utilitarian, concerning itself with the appearance. The secondary is actively concerned with reality, expressing no utilities, but values. The former preserves the dualism of normal life, while the latter seeks to transcend the dualistic or the pluralistic Universe. It is this secondary imagination that contains the seeds of all moral and scientific improvement". This "imagination is the distinguishing characteristic of man as a progressive being (L 300), for the simple reason that it "combines many circumstances into one moment of consciousness", and "tends to produce that ultimate end of all human thought and human feeling, unity' (L 39). It is the greatest faculty of the human mind.

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3-2016P-VI

TITLE TO TERRITORY UNDER

INTERNATIONAL LAW

S. K. MUKHERJEE

Political Science Dept., Calcutta University

In international law 'title to territory' must be an important topic as sovereignty is territorial and not personal. Title to territory again is linked up with the questions of territorial integrity and territorial change. Without a correct ascertainment of title there may be frequent territorial disputes. These may be of a legal or non-legal character. In the former case the task of the court or the tribunal is "to decide on the basis of law where title actually exists.''1 In the other case also it is imperative to ascertain correctly where the title in law resides. Nineteenth century saw a larger number of territorial disputes than any earlier one and we are warned that they are increasing in number. That perhaps lies in the logic of a territorially fragmented world. But in every case the title must be correctly ascer tained.

2

Title to territory has been acquired through various methods. There is no unanimity among the writers with regard to their number.3 Yet state practices and the jurists usually recognize five principal methods which are:- (1) Occupation, (2) Cession, (3) Conquest and Subjugation, (4) Prescription, (5) and Accretion To some occupation and cession are the most important. But perhaps occupation today has not the same significance as it had in the age of discovery, though it is still important in the case of abandonments and boundary disputes. Cession involving territorial change is important, though voluntary cessions are rare. In cession complications may arise regarding the question of plebiscite. Title by conquest and subjugation, though sanctioned by traditional international law, has been rejected sense in the League Covenant, the Kellogg Pact,' and the U.N.

in a

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1 Hill, Norman-Claims to Territory in International Law and Relations (1915), p.26 2 Ibid., p. 29.

3 Oppenheim (Lauterpacht-International Law, Vol, I, 8th Edition (1955), p. 545; Fenwick-International Law, 3rd Edition (1948), p. 313. In Oppenheim we have five methods: Fenwick mentions two more, viz., treaties of peace and assimilation.

4 Brierly-The Law of Nations, 4th Edition (1949), p. 143; Svarlien-An Introduction to the Law of Nations (1955) P. 169.

5 To Fenwick occupation 'has been' the most important method-Dickinson in his book Law of Peace (1951) observes :-". the law of discovery and occupation took shape in the years of colonial expansion and reached maturity in the nineteenth century only to lose most of its practical importance". pp. 46-7.

6 Article 10.

7 Article I