year 1648, and to examine the bearings of those transactions on this very question of Radical Reform. He will find, Gentlemen, that the House of Commons of that day passed the following Resolution:

"Resolved, That the people are, under God, the original of all just power!'

"Well, can any sentiment be more just and reasonable? Is it not the foundation of all the liberties of mankind? Be

it so. Let us proceed. The House of Commons followed up this Resolution by a second, which runs in something like these terms:

"Resolved, That the Commons of England assembled in Parliament, being chosen by and representing the people, have the supreme authority of this Nation.'

"In this Resolution leap is taken from the premises of the Radical Reformers to a conclusion which I know not how they are to deny, especially with such a precedent before them. But the inference did not stop there. The House of Commons proceeded to resolve (and I wish I could see the logical discrepancy between the premises and the conclusion),

"That whatsoever is enacted and declared law by the Commons of England assembled in Parliament, hath the force of law, and binds the people of England, without the consent and concurrence of the Lords or of the Crown.'

"Such was the theoretical inference of the House of Commons in 1648, the logical dependance of which upon the premises laid down by them, I say, I should be glad to see logically disproved. The practical inferences were not tardy in their arrival, after the theory. In a few weeks the House of Lords was voted useless; and in a few more we all know what became of the Crown.

Such, I say, were the radical doctrines of 1648, and such the consequences to which they naturally led. If we are induced to admit the same premises now, who is it, I should be glad to know, that is to guarantee us against similar conclusions?

"I have no sort of objection to doing, as Parliament has often done (supposing always the case to be proved), to disfranchising a borough, and rendering it incapable of abusing its franchise in future. I will take away a franchise, because it has been practically abused, not because I am at all prepared to inquire into the origin, or to discuss the utility of all such franchises, any more than I mean to inquire, Gentlemen, into your titles to your estates. Disfranchising Grampound (if that is to be so), I mean to save Old Sarum.

"I am for the House of Commons as a part and not as the whole of the Government. And, as a part of the Government,

I hold it to be frantic to suppose that, from the election of Members of Parlia ment, you can altogether exclude, by any contrivance, even if it were desirable to do so, the influence of property, rank, talents, family connexion, and whatever else, in the radical language of the day, is considered as intimidation or corruption. I believe, that if a Reform to the extent of that demanded by the Radical Reformers were granted, you would, before an annual election came round, find that there were new connexions grown up which you must again destroy, hew influence acquired which you must dispossess of its authority, and that in these fruitless attempts at unattainable purity you were working against the natural current of human nature.

"I would have by choice-if the choice were yet to be made-I would have in the House of Commons great variety of interests, and I would have them find their way by a great variety of rights of elec tion; satisfied that uniformity of election would produce any thing but a just representation of various interests. As to the close boroughs, I know that through them have found their way into the House of Commons men whose talents have been an honour to their kind, and whose names are interwoven with the history of their country. I cannot think that system altogether vicious which has produced such fruits. I cannot think that there should be but one road into that assembly, or that no man should be presumed fit for the deliberation of a Senate, who has not had the nerves previously to face the storms of the bustings.

"But, Gentlemen, though the question of Reform is made the pretext of those persons who have vexed the country for some months, I verily believe that there are very few even of them who either give credit to their own exaggerations, or care much about the improvements which they recommend. Why, do we not see that the most violent of the Reformers of the day are aiming at seats in that Assembly which, according to their own theories, they should have left to wallow in its own pollution, discountenanced and unredeemed? It is true, that if they had found their way there, they might have endeavoured to bring us to a sense of our misdeeds, and to urge us to redeem our character by some self-condemning ordinance: but would not the authority of their names, as our associates, have more than counterbalanced the force of their eloquence as our Reformers?

"But, Gentlemen, I am for the whole Constitution. The Liberty of the Subject as much depends on the maintenance of the Constitutional Prerogatives of the Crown, on the acknowledgment of the

of considerable length; but as Mr. Jus tice Bayley's admirable and impartial charge to the Jury contains he substance of the whole evidence, we shall content ourselves with presenting a copious abstract from the same.

Mr. Justice Bayley, in summing up, said, it was his duty to lay down the law, and to make such remarks on the evidence as might assist them in forming their judg ment. They were to put entirely out of view, on the present occasion, the conduct of the magistrates and military, whether right or wrong, and to confine themselves to the consideration of the character and conduct of the meeting, and those of the defendants as connected therewith. The indictment against the defendants contained a charge of conspiracy, a charge of unlawful assembly, and a charge of riot. The last-mentioned charge might be, in this case, put entirely out of consideration. There were different counts; one charging the defendants with conspir ing to meet, and causing others to meet, for the purpose of disturbing the public peace; another charged them with having met together for the purpose of raising and exciting discontent and disaffection in the minds of the subjects of our Lord the King, and also to incite them to contempt and hatred of the Government and Constitution, as by law established. Another count set forth, "That the defendants met and assembled, together with divers others, to a very great number, in a threatening and menacing manner, with sticks and other offensive weapons, and with divers seditious ensigns and flags, on which there were various inflammatory inscriptions and devices, to the great terror of the peaceable subjects of our Lord the King." It would be for the Jury to consider whether the conduct of the defendants fell under any, and which of these charges. It had been laid down by Serjeant Hawkins, that bodies of armed men meeting to consider of grievances, or numerous bodies meeting, though unarmed, under such circumstances as could not but endanger the public peace, and raise fears and jealousies among the King's subjects, were unlawful assemblies. In ap. plying this doctrine to the case under consideration, the Jury were to look to the purpose for which the people met, the manner in which they came, and the means which they were using to effect their purpose. A great number of persons might meet under such circumstances as were not calculated to raise terrors, fears, or jealousies, in the minds of the people in the neighbourhood. But, in an assembly so constituted, and met for a perfectly legal purpose, if any individuals introduced themselves illegally, in order to give to that meeting an undue direction,

which would produce terror in the minds of his Majesty's subjects, although 59,000 persons out of a meeting of 60,000 were completely innocent, yet there might be twelve or twenty illegally met there, and those twelve or twenty would be liable to be tried on the ground of having illegally assembled. The case, as it was stated by Mr. Serjeant Hawkins, seemed to contemplate the event of immediate danger resulting from the meeting. He, however, was not prepared in his own mind to say that the appearance of immediate danger was necessary to constitute this offence. If the Jury conceived that, from the peaceable demeanour of the people at the time, and the association of the women and children on the ground, the meeting was not sufficient to produce a feeling of immediate danger, though it might of future danger, he would recommend it to the Jury to find a special verdict. With respect to the subject of conspiracy, it was necessary to observe that the defendants were not liable to be found guilty, although they were seeking the same end, if the Jury were not of opinion that they were acting in pursuance of one common design, with the privity of all. It might be, that, in a case of this kind, twelve or twenty persons might go to a meeting, each of them intending to sow sedition; yet, if such person intended to sow that sedition, from the mere motive and impulse of his own mind, and not in common with the other parties, they could not be found guilty of conspiracy. On the other hand, to prove conspiracy, there was no necessity to show the absolute meeting together of the parties accused. If the circumstances were such as to induce the Jury to believe that they could not have occurred without the previous concert and combination of the parties accused, it was sufficient. But if the Jury were of opinion that they might have met together by accident, without previous arrangement, then the charge of conspiracy must be dismissed from their minds. A party expressing an intention to go to this or any other meeting might induce other persons who heard of it through him, to attend also, without any previous design. They could only implicate, in the offence of conspiracy, those persons who the evidence showed either actually were, or from circumstances must have been, parties to the formation of the original plan. Those who joined in a plan, though at a late period of the transaction, could not be distinguished from those with whom it originated, because they agreed to all that had previously been done, and thus became conspirators. As to the question of assembling it might be, that the avowed object of the meeting was lawful, but it might be attended by twelve per sons intending or attempting to give an

improper

alone to attend to viva voce evidence, given in open Court. Nadin's statement to Mr. Hulton might justify the latter in issuing the warrant, but Nadin had not been produced to prove the circumstances under which he acted; neither had any of the magistrates been brought forward in corroboration of Mr. Hulton's evidence; and sitting there, as he (the Judge) was to administer equal justice to all, it was his duty to tell them, if the omission were calculated to raise a doubt in the minds of the Jury, the defendants were most certainly entitled to the benefit of that doubt.

His Lordship then went on to recapitulate the leading points of the defence, as it bore on the defendants generally. As to Saxton, the Crown has very properly given up the case against him. The character of the meeting was decidedly peaceable, and no proof had been adduced that terror was excited in the town of Manchester; but it had been suggested that future and not immediate disturbances were in contemplation; this was for the consideration of the Jury. He then repeated his observations as to what would constitute the meeting, or any part of it, illegal or otherwise. The meeting, it was said, had been called by 700 housekeepers, but of this no proof had been given. It did not appear what resolutions Mr. Hunt intended to propose; if the same as at Smithfield, and that the Jury conceived they were calculated to excite discontent and disaffection, then quoad Mr. Hunt, the meeting would be illegal; and if he communicated such intentions to any others, and that they approved of them, then there would be a conspiracy; and if any three of them went to the meeting with such intent, the meeting would, as far as they were concerned, be illegal. He then stated the mottos on the different banners, with the interpretation put on them by the defendants and the prosecution. If any of those banners were meant to convey to the eye what in such a meeting no voice could convey to the ear- -if they meant that the people should be disaffected or discontented till they had obtained those objects-then the parties who bore the flags, and those who marched with them, would be guilty of an illegal act, and the meeting, as far as they were concerned, would be illegal. The training and drilling, if intended merely to produce greater order and regularity in those who attended the meeting of the 16th, was perfectly harmless; but if it was intended, by giving this regularity, to give a greater degree of strength to the party, and thereby to overawe the Government, or to gain confidence to any seditious opinions to procure a legal object by motives of fear, then it would have been illegal, and the

meeting at which they assembled, after such training, would be illegal also, as to those privy to such purpose, though it might have been attended by thousands of innocent persons. The Learned Judge then took a brief view of the evidence on both sides, as it affected the defendants individually.

He would now leave the case to them, with this one observation-not to give a verdict of guilty, unless they were fully satisfied of the sufficiency of proof-nor a verdict of acquittal, while such proof existed in their minds. If they had any doubt, they would give all the defendants the benefit of it.

It was very near twelve o'clock when his Lordship concluded; and, in a few minutes after the Jury retired, and, after consulting together for five hours, returned into Court at five o'clock. The Foreman held a paper in his hand, and said the Jury had agreed upon their verdict, which be read as follows:

Mr. Justice Bayley. "Do you mean that they themselves intended to incite?" - The Foreman. "Yes." Mr. Littledale. "This verdict must be taken on the fourth count." Mr. Justice Bayley. "Let the verdict be so recorded. You find, gentlemen, on such counts as the words of your verdict are applicable to. You do not mean to find that they created terror, or incited it in the minds of the liege subjects of our King."-The Foreman. "We meant, my Lord, to find on the first count, omitting a few words."The Learned Judge then requested they would retire and look over the counts of the indictments again, and say to which count they meant to apply their verdict.

The Jury withdrew for a few minutes, and returned with a verdict of Guilty generally on the fourth count, and Not Guilty upon the remaining counts.-Mr. Justice Bayley. "I take it for granted the defendants are still under recognizances."Mr. Hunt. "We are, my Lord."- Mr. Justice Bayley. "Then let them now additionally, in Court, enter into their own recognizances to keep the peace and good behaviour for six months, Mr. Hunt in the sum of 2000. Mr. Johnson of 1000 Knight, Bamford and Healey 500l. each..

The parties immediately entered into their several recognizances.

ABSTRACT