fpherical figures of the planets, and their regu lar motions; the conception we have of their activity and enormous bulk being more obfcure: the beauty accordingly of that system, raises a more lively emotion than its grandeur. But if we could comprehend the whole system at one view, the activity and irrefiftible force of thefe immenfe bodies would fill us with amazement: nature cannot furnish another scene fo grand.

Motion and force, agreeable in themselves, are also agreeable by their utility when employed as means to accomplish fome beneficial end. Hence the fuperior beauty of fome machines, where force and motion concur to perform the work of numberlefs hands. Hence the beautiful motions, firm and regular, of a horse trained for war: every single step, is the fittest that can be, for obtaining the purposed end. But the grace of motion is vifible chiefly in man, not only for the reasons mentioned, but because every gefture is fignificant. The power however of agreeable motion is not a common talent every limb of the human body has an agreeable and difagreeable motion; fome motions being extremely graceful, others plain and vulgar; fome exprefling dignity, others meannefs. But the pleasure here, arifing, not fingly from the beauty of motion, but from indicating character and fentiment, belongs to different chapters *.

Chap. 11. and 15,

I should conclude with the final cause of the relish we have for motion and force, were it not fo evident as to require no explanation. We are placed here in fuch circumftances as to make industry effential to our well-being; for without industry the plaineft neceffaries of life are not obtained. When our fituation, therefore, in this world requires activity and a constant exertion of motion and force, Providence indulgently provides for our welfare by making these agreeable to us it would be a grofs imperfection in our nature, to make any thing difagreeable that we depend on for existence; and even indiffe rence would flacken greatly that degree of acti vity which is indispensable.

VOL. I.

R

CHAP

CHAP. VI.

NOVELTY, AND THE UNEXPECTED AI ́PEARANCE OF OBJECTS.

Ο

F all the circumftances that raise emotions, not excepting beauty, nor even greatness, novelty hath the moft powerful influence. A new object produceth inftantaneously an emotion termed wonder, which totally occupies the mind, and for a time excludes all other objects. Converfation among the vulgar never is more interesting than when it turns upon ftrange objects and extraordinary events. Men tear themfelves from their native country in search of things rare and new; and novelty converts into a pleasure, the fatigues and even perils of travelling. To what cause fhall we afcribe these fingular appearances? To curiofity undoubtedly, a principle implanted in human nature for a purpose extremely beneficial, that of acquiring knowledge; and the emotion of wonder, raifed: by new and strange objects, inflames our curiofity to know more of them. This emotion is different from admiration: novelty where-ever found, whether in a quality or action, is the cause of wonder; admiration is directed to the perfon who performs any thing wonderful.

During

During infancy, every new object is probab. < ly the occafion of wonder, in fome degree; because, during infancy, every object at first fight is ftrange as well as new but as objects are rendered familiar by cuftom, we ceafe by de-

to wonder at new appearances, if they hate any resemblance to what we are acquainted with; for a thing must be fingular as well as < new, to raise our wonder. To fave multiplying words, I would be understood to comprehend both circumftances when I hereafter talk of novelty.

In an ordinary train of perceptions where one thing introduces another, not a fingle object makes its appearance unexpectedly *: the mind thus prepared for the reception of its objects, admits them one after another without perturbation. But when a thing breaks in unexpectedly, and without the preparation of any connec tion, it raises an emotion, known by the name of furprise. That emotion may be produced by the most familiar object, as when one unexpecedly meets a friend who was reported to be dead; or a man in high life lately a beggar. On he other hand, a new object, however ftrange, will not produce the emotion, if the fpectator be prepared for the fight: an elephant in India will not surprise a traveller who goes to fee one; and yet its novelty will raise his wonder: an

See chap. 1.

R 2

Indian

Indian in Britain would be much furprised to ftumble upon an elephant feeding at large in the open fields: but the creature itself, to which he was accustomed, would not raife his wonder.

Surprife thus in feveral refpects differs from wonder: unexpectedness is the cause of the former emotion; novelty is the caufe of the latter. Nor differ they lefs in their nature and circumftances, as will be explained by and by. With relation to one circumftance they perfectly agree; which is, the fhortnefs of their duration the inftantaneous production of thefe emotions in per fection, may contribute to that effect, in conformity to a general law, That things foon decay which foon come to perfection: the violence of the emotions may alfo contribute; for an ardent emotion, which is not fufceptible of increase, cannot have a long courfe. But their fhort duration is occafioned chiefly by that of their causes: we are foon reconciled to an object, however unexpected; and novelty foon degenerates into familiarity.

Whether these emotions be pleasant or painful, is not a clear point. It may appear ftrange, that our own feelings and their capital qualities, fhould afford any matter for a doubt but when we are engroffed by any emotion, there is no place for fpeculation; and when fufficiently calmı for fpeculation, it is not eafy to recal the emotion with accuracy. New objects are fometimes terrible,