THE SOUL-IS IT MATERIAL. 545 THE SOUL-IS IT MATERIAL? The 1st, declares that the evils of intemperance cannot be overcome while the traffic in liquors is continued, and that the people have a right to bring it to an end by legisla-worthy of consideration, are but two. One tion or other means. THE opinions respecting this, that are is, that consciousness, reason, perception, The 2d, that a prohibitory law is no in-will, memory &c., are the powers of a being fringement of any man's rights, and is as loudly called for as laws against gaming houses, lotteries, or selling poisonous food. The 3d recommends to the people to try every means to suppress the traffic, both by moral suasion and the ballot box. The 4th recommends that all such men be sustained for the Legislature as are favora ble to a prohibitory law. The 5th says that it is not deemed desirable to have a separate political party; but it is the duty of the temperance men to labor in their respective parties for the selection of suitable nominees; and if not successful, to bring forward candidates of their own. The 6th recommends temperance alliances and the adoption of all means to promote the temperance cause. The 7th says, that it is the duty of every Christian to discourage drinking usages. The 8th congratulates Maine on her law. The 9th urges temperance men to cultivate Christian feelings, and expresses a hope of succeeding by the power of truth spoken in love. separate and distinct from the body; and the other, that these are only the result of finely organized matter. Each party holding its separate theory, unites in calling the subject of thought, mind; while one thinks that it is immaterial, and indivisible; and the other asserts that we can trace it no farther than to the brain, and therefore there is no reason to suppose that it is anything aside from the same first matter with the dust of the earth. That we have within us a sentient, acting, willing principle we know by the best of all evidence, our own consciousness, by which we perceive its energies and actions. the materialist and immaterialist, is whether The question then to be decided between Intellect, Perception and Volition can result from any organization of mere matter. If they can, then we must refer them to nothing else in man; if not, it must be granted that the soul is something, separate and distinct, from the clay that surrounds it. Dr. Priestly, one of the most able of all the materialists, after referring to the settled The Presbyterian says:-"The resolutions principle of Philosophy, that we must awere advocated by Mr. Frelinghuyser. in adopt the simplest theory in every case that speech of great sublimity and power. His will explain all the phenomena-that we whole countenance was radiant with joy, as must not multiply causes and kinds of subhe exclaimed, 'A day of brighter hope never stances, unless absolutely necessary-then dawned upon my native State!' Many affirms,that it is not necessary to suppose wept under the tenderness and solemnity of anything other than a particular, material his closing appeal. It was a scene to be re-organization, in order to explain any apmembered in years to come. The Conven-pearance of mind whatever. He says, if we tion adjourned this morning, after a session follow the above named principles, we must of great unanimity and enthusiasm. Three thousand dollars were subscribed towards the publication of documents, and the canvassing the State in behalf of a law prohibitory of the traffic in intoxicating drinks." Vol. VII.-2 naturally conclude that thought, sensation,and will are properties of the same thing which we call matter. We quote his words for the reason of the conclusion: "The powers of sensation or perception, and thought, as belonging to man have never been found but in conjunction with a certain organized sys Because the mind ri the body, and on the of is affected by the mind, that we have the sam tem of matter; and therefore these powers necessarily exist in, and depend upon such a system." This is what the Doctor calls the "direct and proper proof, that the sentient principle in man is the material sub-that the faculty of thin stance of the brain." material organization result of a particular c Granting his premise t ing would be correct, the immateriality we those for the opposite reason for considering from the concussion of bundant reasons for n the result of material We would therefore ly in the former but conclusions, for it is draw such an inferend fection of body and from the fact that mi cally affect each other should say that the Telescope were one a deny the truth of count is given, upon g death of a lady, cause the brain, the brain b water, whose mind v altogether unaffected ber death. A numb He farther enforces this by such thoughts as the following: Whenever we see any particular quality existing always in conneetion with any certain substance, we always infer that quality is inherent in that substance. Now we never see manifestations of the mind, except in connection with matter. Therefore, (judging as we do in other cases,) we must conclude that matter is essential to mind, and that the latter is inberent in, and a property of the former. In every instance where a man loses his brain, the mind also is destroyed; and when the mind is impeded, there is good reason to believe that the brain is correspondingly affected. Also as the mental powers increase and ripen with the body, likewise with it they decay; and if sometimes this does not seem to be true, it is evidently because in those particular cases,the brain is not much affected by the general cause of weakness. But if the brain alone be affected by a blow, by pressure, by inflammation, or by sleep, the faculties of the mind, are, invariably, likewise effected. These he calls irrefraga-be cited of a kindre ble arguments. "In fact" he remarks "there is just the same reason to conclude that the powers of sensation aud thought are the necessary result of a particular organization, as that sound is the necessary result of a a particular concussion of the air. For in both cases equally the one constantly accompanies the other; and there is not in nature a stronger argument for a necessary connection of any cause, and any effect.To form an opinion different from this, is to adopt an hypothesis, without a single fact to support it." We will now state some grounds for re jecting the reasoning of Dr. Priestly the brain have been ent persons till all mained unaffected. moved; but the min Again, he infers b therefore the brain i a man's brains, his tainly is a connectio the brain, the latter manifestation of th and the Hammer, a Blacksmith's craft; conclude that they Dr. Priestly affirm THE SOUL IS IT MATERIAL. 547 It is true that, as mind is never manifested | and all concurring in every sensation, then except in conjunction with matter, we should each of those points must perceive only a as philosophers, infer that the former was single point of the outward object, or the inherent in the latter, unless it could be whole of it. If each point only perceives shown that it was incompatible with other a single part, then there is no part of us that known qualities of matter. Now no one perceives all the outward object, or that can perhaps will contend that a sensation is di- compare one part with another. Again if visible. We never speak of half a thought each point perceives all the outward objects, or the fourth of a perception of a truth.- then there is a number of percepients,a conWe cannot possibly conceive of simple con- clusion directly contrary to the best authorsciousness being divided into halves or any ity and our own consciousness. other number of parts. But if the mind is the result of material organization, as the whole is equal to the sum of all its parts, each particle of that organization must possess distinct powers of sensation. And when these parts are combined into one whole, they possess the powers of indivisible sensation. That is, this indivisible power of sensation, is div ́sible, yea, infinitely divisible, if so be that matter may be infinitely divided. We are then compell-rialist, that if the soul is any thing else ed to acknowle lge that sensation and perception are properties not resulting from a particular organic system, but wholly foreign from it. But let us suppose for a moment that mind is organized matter. Then of necessity the thinking power must be either located in a single least possible physical point, or extended through a number of these points. But it is impossible that the smalest atom, or least possible point of extension should perceive distinctly all the multifarious things around, that is, have delineated on it the forms of larger objects; for that would make it the least; and not the least, point of extension at the same time. It would also be inconsistant to suppose a soul existing in one point of mitter alone-that point sensitive and rational, and all other points lifeless and irrational. Neither can we conceive how this one point should actuate all the rest of the body, and remain the same from infancy to old age, while all the other atoms are continually changing, and new ones taking their places. But if a soul is an extended substance, consisting of many points joined together, Again; we never think or speak of an idea as being either long or short; nor of perception being square, nor of consciousness as being oblong, or extended in any way. But if the soul is material and conse、 quently extended, every perception of truth must be extended also, and have length breadth, and thickness. Our seus tions must be the shape of the extended soul. But it is exultingly affirmed by the mate than matter, then we can know nothing of it. We cannot see it-cannot hear it-cannot feel it,- -or know it by any of the senses by which we know matter. Very true! If we could see it, or feel it, we should all very soon decide that it was matter; for we give the name matter to all t ose things that have color, and therefore can be seen and such as have solidity and extension,and therefore can be felt. Anything that is not possessed of these properties we do not call matter. And as the soul has not these properties, we do not hesitate to say that it is not material. But let us examine the affirmation of the materialist, that we know nothing of the sou So far from coinciding with this view, we do not hesitate to affirm that we may know much more about the soul than we can know about matter. And why can we have a better acquaintance with mind than with matter? Simply because the source of information concerning mind is better than that concerning matter. Our knowledge of matter is obtained only through the medium of the senses; that of mind by consciousness, by our very intuitive natures. Now we apprehend that the evidences or rather the irresistible convictions of consciousness, are much more to be relied upon than the indications of necessarily limited senses. We may think we hear a sound and refer it to some outward cause, and yet be mistaken. But we can not conceive of a sane man being deceived about whether he experiences joy or sorrow; hope or fear; desire, love, hatred &c., because his consciousness unbidden testifies and authoritatively asserts the truth in the case. Those things that we are conscious of are the groundwork for all other belief. All other evidences may be partially set aside, that of con sciousness never, Fourthly; the properties ascribed to matter are entirely different from those ascribed to mind. What resemblances are there between hardness and desire? solidity and vo lition? Impenetrability, and perception?— The man who should confound these would be considered as grossly ignorant, as the blind man who thought that a scarlet color resembled the sound of a trumpet. And again every person by appealing to consciousness, must be perfectly convinced that the qualities of mind cannot belong to matter. By their senses, they perceive that matter is inert, and lifeless. But consciousness testifies that there is a living, acting principle in mind that may not belong to matter. Now we know mind, i. e. we know its states, its properties, and its actions, by consciousness. We therefore confidently assert that we know more of mind than we can know of matter. What the real essence of the mind is we do not pretend to say; but we are perfectly conscious of its properties, viz: voliton, sensation, perception, reasoning &c; also of its states, such as joy, hope, fear, love, desire, shame, pride &c.; and those are at least all that we can know of matter. We perceive through our senses that matter has color, extension divisibility, impenetrability, attraction &c.; also its states such as motion or rest, heat or coldness, solidity or fluidity &c., but what the ultimate essence of matter is, we have no kind of knowledge. The only difference then between our knowledge of mind and that of matter, is, that consciousness by which we know mind, is more authoritative as a source of knowledge, than are the senses by which we know matter, Now with such knowledge as we have of the properties of mind, and of the properties To those who believe in the immortality of matter, we must judge whether those of of the soul, and in future reward and pusthe former may belong to the latter. Weishment,is this an irrefragable argument. Fot. will give some reasons why they may not. First: we have already shown that the properties of extension and divisibility in matter are altogether incompatible with the properties of the mind. Again, it is a well known fact that the particles of matter of which our bodies are composed, are continually changing, so that every few years there is an entire renovation. Now if the material doctrine be correct, we are not the same persons we were a few years since, for there has been a constant change going on in our bodies, so that now every part of our system is composed of different particles from what it then wasBut here again, our own knowledge of ourselves stands directly opposed to this view. No one has a single doubt but that he is the identical being, that he was at the time of his earliest recollection. if a man is all the time losing his old soul and all the time getting a new one, it would certainly be unjust to punish or reward the new soul for things that another one did.And if the soul is a material organization, as all such organizatians are liable to decom HEART MEMORIES. position, we should reasonably infer that it is not immortal, for our material organization is entirely decomposed at death. Matter is subject to fixed, unalterable laws by which it is governed, without any choice of its own. If then mind is matter we, are mere machines; an idea contrary alike to revelation and common sense. HEART MEMORIES. BY AN INVALID. "O fons Bandusiæ splendidior vitro, 549 [HORACE. How beautiful is the doctrine of compencold and heat, storm and sunshine, are found sation, in all God's works! Light and shade, When we walk over the clods of the field, do we ever suppose that they have the pow-in grateful variety. When many evils force er of sensation and volition? or of thought themselves upon our attention, they are aland imagination, so that they can compose the plays of Shakespear, or a Paradise Lost? ways compensated by alleviating circumWe never attribute those properties to mere matter, which would enable it to produce its great work of genius and art, which are the product alone of immortal mind. stances. Glance at New England. Her rude, rough soil, is, in places, almost barren. Her 1ocky hills find their counterpart only in the An argument may be drawn from the stern, massive hearts, and souls of unflinchstructure of languages. Words are the rep-these objectionable features are compensated ing integrity, of her primitive settlers. But resentatives of ideas. And men have geu erally united in the formation of different by a climate of matchless healthfulness; languages, to give different names, and asand that rude, rough soil, prompts to habits cribe essentially different properties to mind of patient industry-themselves the secret of and matter. Thus we health and carefulness. see the principles, deep laid in our very constitution, lead us to Jelieve that there is a generic difference between our mental and bodily natures. From these facts and reasonings we are led to conclude that man has a soul, visible only to the eyes of God, and other disembodied spirits. What the essence of that soul is we know not. Of the nature and cause of its connection with the body, we know nothing. The nearest we can come to philosophizing on this point is to say; "O God, we will praise thee, for we are fearfully made." Go to the El Dorado of the West, where the gentle rains of heaven are restrained for months by the clouds so prodigal of their stores to other sections, and we might suppose its sultry globe unendurable; but earth is there prodigal of her mineral treasures, such as might tempt even Mammon himself Mammon, the least erected spirit that fell from heaven." This world is not all unmitigated evil, nor is it all unchanged perfection. The good and evil mingle, and neither predominate as yet, for at present earth is the grand battlefield on which sin and holiness are conten It is worthy of remark, that the same arguments that are used to prove the immor-ding for the mastery, and they will continue to mingle in the fight until earth's jubilee arrives, and darkness is banished to its pri meval home. A solitary bright spot on the page of mem tality of the soul, will also apply to prove its immortality. For if the soul is immortal and indivisible, it is not liable to be decomposed, and therefore must exist through eternal ages; unless there is passed upon itory has induced these reflections. There an act of annihilation, of which the records of eternity do not furnish to us an example. Knox College, Sept. 30, 1852. ONE doubt may lead to disbelief. are many such bright spots, as I turn over the leaf of that pleasant book-but of this one I would speak particularly. " To the pilgrim of many lands, who has noted his Wanderings beneath the shadow of Mont Blanc," or the "Jungfrau Alp" |