GENERAL POLITICS.

A GREAT deal that should naturally come under this title has been unavoidably given already, under that of History; and more, I fear, may be detected under still less appropriate denominations. If any unwary readers have been thus unwittingly decoyed into Politics, while intent on more innocent studies, I can only hope that they will now take comfort, from finding how little of this obnoxious commodity has been left to appear in its proper colours; and also from seeing, from the decorous title now assumed, that all intention of engaging them in Party discussions is disclaimed.

I do not think that I was ever a violent or (consciously) uncandid partisan; and at all events, ten years of honest abstinence and entire segregation from party contentions (to say nothing of the sobering effects of threescore antecedent years!), should have pretty much effaced the vestiges of such predilections, and awakened the least considerate to a sense of the exaggerations, and occasional unfairness, which such influences must almost unavoidably impart to political disquisitions. In what I now reprint I have naturally been anxious to se lect what seemed least liable to this objection: and though I cannot flatter myself that a tone of absolute, Judicial impartiality is maintained in all these early productions, I trust that nothing will be found in them that can suggest the idea either of personal animosity, or of an ungenerous feeling towards a public opponent.

To the two first, and most considerable, of the following papers, indeed, I should wish particularly to refer, as fair exponents both of the principles I think I have always maintained, and of the temper in which I was generally disposed to maintain them. In some of the others a more vehement and contentious tone may no doubt be detected. But as they touch upon matters of permanent interest and importance, and advocate opinions which I still think substantially right, I have felt that it would be pusillanimous now to suppress them, from a poor fear of censure, which, if just, I cannot but know that I deserve or a still poorer distrust of those allowances which I have no reason to think will be withheld from me by the better part of my readers.

(November, 1812.)

Essay on the Practice of the British Government, distinguished from the abstract Theory on which it is supposed to be founded. By GOULD FRANCIS LECKIE. 8vo. London: 1812.* THIS is the most direct attack which we The pamphlet which contains these conhave ever seen in English, upon the free constitution of England;—or rather upon political liberty in general, and upon our government only in so far as it is free-and it consists partly in an eager exposition of the inconveniences resulting from parliaments or representative legislatures, and partly in a warm defence and undisguised panegyric of Absolute, or, as the author more elegantly phrases it, of Simple monarchy.

* I used to think that this paper contained a very good defence of our free constitution; and especially the most complete, temperate, and searching vindication of our Hereditary Monarchy that was any where to be met with: And, though it now appears to me rather more elementary and elaborate than was necessary, I am still of opinion that it may be of use to young politicians, and suggest cautions and grounds of distrust, to rash discontent and thoughtless presumption.

solatory doctrines, has the further merit of being, without any exception, the worst written, and the worst reasoned, that has ever fallen into our hands; and there is nothing indeed but the extreme importance of the subject, and of the singular complexion of the times in which it appears, that could induce us to take any notice of it. The rubbish that is scattered in our common walks, we merely push aside and disregard; but, when it defiles the approaches to the temple, or is heaped on other rites of expiation, and visited with sethe sanctuary itself, it must be cast out with verer penalties. When the season is healthy, we may walk securely among the elements of corruption, and warrantably decline the inglorious labour of sweeping them awaybut, when the air is tainted and the blood impure, we should look with jealousy upon every speck, and consider that the slightest

remission of our police may spread a pesti-dition, he candidly admits that none of those lence through all the borders of the land. would reach to the root of the evil; which There are two periods, it appears to us, consists entirely, it seems, in our "too great when the promulgation of such doctrines as jealousy of the Crown:" and accordingly proare maintained by this author may be con- ceeds to draw a most seducing picture of his sidered as dangerous, or at least as of evil favourite Simple monarchy; and indirectly inomen, in a country like this. The one, when deed, but quite unequivocally, to intimate, the friends of arbitrary power are strong and that the only effectual cure for the evils under daring, and advantageously posted; and when, which we now suffer is to be found in the total meditating some serious attack on the liber- abolition of Parliaments, and the conversion ties of the people, they send out their emis- of our constitution into an absolute monarchy: saries and manifestoes, to feel and to prepare or, shortly to "advert," as he expresses himtheir way-the other, when they are sub- self, "to the advantages which a Monarchy, stantially weak, and unfit to maintain a con- such as has been described, has over our flict with their opponents, but where the great boasted British Constitution." These advanbody of the timid and the cautious are alarmed tages, after a good deal of puzzling, he next at the prospect of such a conflict, and half settles to be-First, that the sovereign will be disposed to avert the crisis by supporting "more likely to feel a pride, as well as a zeal, whatever is in actual possession of power. to act a great and good part;"-secondly, that Whether either of these descriptions may suit the ministers will have more time to attend to the aspect of the present times, we willingly their duties when they have no parliamentary leave it to our readers to determine: But be- contentions to manage-thirdly, that the pubfore going farther, we think it proper to say, that lie councils will be guided by fixed and steady we impute no corrupt motives to the author principles;-fourthly, that if the Monarch before us; and that there is, on the contrary, should act in an oppressive manner, it will be every appearance of his being conscientious- easier for the people to get the better of him ly persuaded of the advantages of arbitrary than of a whole Parliament, who might act in power, and sincerely eager to reconcile the the same manner;-fifthly, that the heir apminds of his countrymen to the introduction parent might then be allowed to travel in of so great a blessing. The truth indeed foreign countries for the improvement of his seems to be, that having lived so long abroad manners and understanding;-sixthly, and as evidently to have lost, in a great degree, lastly, that there would be no longer any prethe use of his native language, it is not sur-text for a cry against "what is styled backprising that he should have lost along with stair influence!” it, a great number of those feelings, without which it really is not possible to reason, in this country, on the English constitution; and has gradually come, not only to speak, but to feel, like a foreigner, as to many of those things which still constitute both the pride and the happiness of his countrymen. We have no doubt that he would be a very useful and enlightened patriot in Sicily; but we think it was rather harsh in him to venture before the public with his speculations on the English government, with his present stock of information and habits of thinking. Though we do not, however, impute to him any thing worse than these disqualifications, there are persons enough in the country to whom it will be a sufficient recommendation of any work, that it inculcates principles of servility; and who will be abundantly ready to give it every chance of making an impression, which it may derive from their approbation; and indeed we have already heard such testimonies in favour of this slender performance, as seem to impose it upon us as a duty to give some little account of its contents, and some short opinion of its principles.

The first part of the task may be performed in a very moderate compass; for though the learned author has not always the gift of writing intelligibly, it is impossible for a diligent reader not to see what he would be at; and his doctrine, when once fairly understood, may readily be reduced to a few very simple propositions. After preluding on a variety of minor topics, and suggesting some curious enough remedies for our present unhappy con

Such is the sum of Mr. Leckie's publication; of which, as a curious specimen of the infinite diversity of human opinions and endowments, and of the license of political speculation that is still occasionally indulged in in this country, we have thought it right that some memorial should be preserved a little more durable than the pamphlet itself seemed likely to afford. But though what we have already said is probably more than enough to settle the opinion of all reasonable persons with regard to the merits of the work, we think we can trace, even in some of the most absurd and presumptuous of its positions, the operation of certain errors, which we have found clouding the views, and infecting the opinions of persons of far sounder understanding; and shall presume, therefore, to offer a few very plain and simple remarks upon some of the points which we think we have most frequently found either misrepresented or misunderstood.

The most important and radical of those, is that which relates to the nature and uses of Monarchy, and the rights and powers of a sovereign; upon which, therefore, we beg leave to begin with a few observations. And here we shall take leave to consider Royalty as being, on the whole, but a Human Institution,-originating in a view to the general good, and not to the gratification of the individual upon whom the office is conferred; or at least only capable of being justified, or deserving to be retained, where it is found, or believed, to be actually beneficial to the whole society. Now we think that, generally speak

ing, it is a highly beneficial institution: and that the benefits which it is calculated to confer are great and obvious.

From the first moment that men began to associate together, and to act in concert for their general good and protection, it would be found that all of them could not take a share in consulting and regulating their operations, and that the greater part must submit to the direction of certain managers and leaders. Among these, again, some one would naturally assume a pre-eminence; and in time of war especially, would be allowed to exercise a great authority. Struggles would as necessarily ensue for retaining this post of distinction, and for supplanting its actual possessor; and whether there was a general acquiescence in the principle of having one acknowledged chief, or a desire to be guided and advised by a plurality of those who seemed best qualified for the task, there would be equal hazard, or rather certainty, of perpetual strife, tumult, and dissension, from the attempts of ambitious individuals, either to usurp an ascendancy over all their competitors, or to dispute with him who had already obtained it, his right to continue its possession. Every one possessed of any considerable means of influence would thus be tempted to aspire to a precarious Sovereignty; and while the inferior persons of the community would be opposed to each other as adherents of the respective pretenders, not only would all care of the general good be omitted, but the society would become a prey to perpetual feuds, cabals, and hostilities, subversive of the first principles of its institution.

premacy of the richest and most accomplished, may be considered as the primeval state of society. Now this, even if it could be supposed to be peaceable and permanent, is by no means a desirable state for the persons subjected to this multifarious and irregular authority. But it is plain that it could not be peaceable,—that even among the rich, and the accomplished, and the daring, some would be more rich, more daring, and more accomplished than the rest; and that those in the foremost ranks who were most nearly on an equality, would be armed against each other by mutual jealousy and ambition; while those who were a little lower, would combine, out of envy and resentment, to defeat or resist, by their junction, the pretensions of the few who had thus outstripped their original associates. Thus there would not only be no liberty or security for the body of the people, but the whole would be exposed to the horror and distraction of perpetual intestine contentions. The creation of one Sovereign, therefore, whom the whole society would acknowledge as supreme, was a great point gained for tranquillity as well as individual independence; and in order to avoid the certain evils of perpetual struggles for dominion, and the inim hent hazard of falling at last under the absolute will of an exasperated conqueror, nothing could be so wisely devised as to agree upon the nomination of a King; and thus to get rid of a multitude of petty tyrants, and the risk of military despotism, by the establishment of a legitimate monarchy. The first king would probably be the most popular and pow erful individual in the community; and the first idea would in all likelihood be to appoint his successor on account of the same qualifi cations: But it would speedily be discovered, that this would give rise at the death of every sovereign—and indeed, prospectively, long before it-to the same fatal competitions and dissensions, which had formerly been perpetual; and not only hazard a civil war on every accession, but bring the successful competitor, to the throne, with feelings of extreme hostility towards one half of his subjects, and of extreme partiality to the other. The chances of not finding eminent talents for command in the person of the sovereign, therefore, would soon be seen to be a far less evil than the sanguinary competitions that would ensue, if merit were made the sole ground of preferment; and a very little reflection, or experience, would also serve to show, that the sort of merit which was most likely to succeed in such a competition, did not promise a more desirable sovereign, than might be probably reckoned on, in the common course of hereditary succession. The only The steps, then, by which we are conducted safe course, therefore, was, to take this Great to the justification of Hereditary Monarchy, Prize altogether out of the Lottery of human are shortly as follows. Admitting all men to life-to make the supreme dignity in the state, be equal in rights, they can never be equal in professedly and altogether independent of natural endowments,-nor long equal in wealth merit or popularity; and to fix it immutably and other acquisitions: - Absolute liberty, in a place quite out of the career of ambition. therefore, or equal participation of power, is This great point then was gained by the altogether out of the question; and a kind of mere institution of Monarchy, and by renderAristocracy, or disorderly and fluctuating suing it hereditary: The chief cause of internal

Among the remedies which would naturally present themselves for this great evil, the most efficacious, though not perhaps at first sight the most obvious, would be to provide some regular and authentic form for the election of One acknowledged chief, by a fair but pacific competition;-the term of whose authority would be gradually prolonged to that of his natural life,--and afterwards extended to the lives of his remotest descendants. The advantages which seem to us to be peculiar to this arrangement are, first, to disarm the ambition of dangerous and turbulent individuals, by removing the great prize of Supreme authority, at all times, and entirely, from competition; and, secondly, to render this authority itself more manageable, and less hazardous, by delivering it over peaceably, and upon expressed or understood conditions, to an hereditary prince; instead of letting it be seized upon by a fortunate conqueror, who would think himself entitled to use it as conquerors commonly use their booty-for his own exclusive gratification.

discord was removed, and the most dangerous may appear, that as kings are now generally incentive to ambition placed in a great mea- allowed to be mere mortals, they cannot of sure beyond the sphere of its operation;-and themselves have any greater powers, either this we have always considered to be the pe- of body or mind, than other individuals, and culiar and characteristic advantage of that must in fact be inferior in both respects to form of government. A pretty important chap- very many of their subjects. Whatever powers ter, however, remains, as to the extent of the they have, therefore, must be powers conferPowers that ought to be vested in the Mon- red upon them by the consent of the stronger arch, and the nature of the Checks by which part of their subjects, and are in fact really the limitation of those powers should be ren- and truly the powers of those persons. The dered effectual. And here it will be readily most absolute despot accordingly, of whom hisunderstood, that considering, as we do, the tory furnishes any record, must have governchief advantage of monarchy to consist in its ed merely by the free will of those who chose taking away the occasions of contention for to obey him, in compelling the rest of his subthe First Place in the state, and in a manner jects to obedience. The Sultan, as Mr. Hume neutralizing that place by separating it entirely remarks, may indeed drive the bulk of his from any notion of merit or popularity in the unarmed subjects, like brutes, by mere force; possessor-we cannot consistently be for al- but he must lead his armed Janissaries like lotting a greater measure of actual power to it men, by their reason and free will. And so it than is absolutely necessary for answering is in all other governments: The power of the this purpose. Our notions of this measure, sovereign is nothing else than the power-the however, are by no means of a jealous or pe- actual force of muscle or of mind-which a nurious description. We must give enough of certain part of his subjects choose to lend for real power, and distinction and prerogative, to carrying his orders into effect; and the check make it truly and substantially the first place or limit to this power is, in all cases, ultimately in the State, and also to make it impossible and in effect, nothing else than their refusal for the occupiers of inferior places to endan- to act any longer as the instruments of his ger the general peace by their contentions; pleasure. The check, therefore, is substanfor, otherwise, the whole evils which its in- tially the same in kind, in all cases whatever; stitution was meant to obviate would recur and must necessarily exist in full vigour in with accumulated force, and the same fatal every country in the world; though the likecompetitions be renewed among persons of lihood of its beneficial application depends disorderly ambition, for those other situations, greatly on the structure of society in each parby whatever name they might be called, in ticular nation; and the possibility of applying which, though nominally subordinate to the it with ease and safety must result wholly throne, the actual powers of sovereignty were from the contrivances that have been adopted embodied. But, on the other hand, we would to make it bear, at once gradually and steadily, give no powers to the Sovereign, or to any on the power it is destined to regulate. It is other officer in the community, beyond what here accordingly, and here only, that there is were evidently required for the public good; any material difference between a good and a and no powers at all, on the exercise of bad constitution of Monarchical government. which there was not an efficient control, and for the use of which there was not a substantial responsibility. It is in the reconciling of these two conditions that the whole difficulty of the theory of a perfect monarchy consists. If you do not control your sovereign, he will be in danger of becoming a despot; and if you do control him, there is danger, unless you choose the depository of this control with singular caution, that you create anotherpower, that is uncontrolled and uncontrollableto be the prey of audacious leaders and outrageous factions, in spite of the hereditary settlement of the nominal sovereignty. Though there is some difficulty, however, in this problem, and though we learn from history, that various errors have been committed in an attempt at its practical solution, yet we do not conceive it as by any means insoluble; and think indeed that, with the lights which we may derive from the experience of our own constitution, its demonstration may be effected by a very moderate exertion of sagacity. It will be best understood, however, by a short view of the nature of the powers to be controlled, and of the system of checks which have, at different times, been actually resorted to.

In the first place, then, we must beg leave to remind our readers, however superfluous it

The ultimate and only real limit to what is called the power of the sovereign, is the refusal or the consent or co-operation of those who possess the substantial power of the community, and who, during their voluntary concert with the sovereign, allow this power of theirs to pass under his name. In considering whether this refusal is likely to be wisely and beneficially interposed, it is material therefore to inquire in whom, in any particular case, the power of interposing it is vested; or, in other words, in what individuals the actual power of coercing and compelling the submission of the bulk of the community is intrinsically vested. If every individual were equally gifted, and equally situated, the answer would be, In the numerical majority: But as this never can be the case, this power will frequently be found to reside in a very small proportion of the whole society.

In rude times, when there is little intelligence or means of concert and communication, a very moderate number of armed and disciplined forces will be able, so long as they keep together, to overawe, and actually overpower the whole unarmed inhabitants, even of an extensive region; and accordingly, in such times, the necessity of procuring the good will and consent of the Soldiery, is the

those in whom the real power is vested, to lend it to the monarch for purposes which they do not approve, is yet infinitely more beneficial in its operation, in consequence of the more fortunate position of those to whom that power now belongs.

only check upon the power of the Sovereign; | for the general good; and, though the same or, in other words, the soldiers may do what in substance with those which have been they choose and their nominal master can already considered, namely, the refusal of do nothing which they do not choose. Such is the state of the worst despotisms. The check upon the royal authority is the same in substance as in the best administered monarchies, viz. the refusal of the consent or cooperation of those who possess for the time the natural power of the community: But, from the unfortunate structure of society, which (in the case supposed) vests this substantial power in a few bands of disciplined ruffians, the check will scarcely ever be interposed for the benefit of the nation, and will merely operate to prevent the king from doing any thing to the prejudice or oppression of the soldiery themselves.

Thus we see that Kings have no power of their own; and that, even in the purest despotisms, they are the mere organs or directors of that power which they who truly possess the physical and intellectual force of the na tion may choose to put at their disposal; and are at all times, and under every form of monarchy, entirely under the control of that only virtual and effective power. There is at bottom, therefore, no such thing, as an unlimited monarchy; or indeed as a monarchy that is potentially either more or less limited than every other. All kings must act by the consent of that order or portion of the nation which can really command all the rest, and may generally do whatever these substantial masters do not disapprove of: But as it is their power which is truly exerted in the name of the sovereign, so, it is not so much a necessary consequence as an identical proposition to say, that where they are clearly opposed to the exercise of that power, the king has no means whatever of asserting the slightest authority. This is the universal law

When civilisation has made a little further progress, a number of the leaders of the army, or their descendants, acquire landed property, and associate together, not merely in their military capacity, but as guardians of their new acquisitions and hereditary dignities.Their soldiers become their vassals in time of peace; and the real power of the State is gradually transferred from the hands of detached and mercenary battalions, to those of a Feudal Nobility. The check on the royal authority comes then to lie in the refusal of this body to co-operate in such of his measures as do not meet with their approbation; and the king can now do nothing to the prejudice of the order of Nobility. The body of the peo-indeed of all governments; and though the ple fare a little better under the operation of this check;-because their interest is much more identified with that of their feudal lords, than with that of a standing army of regular or disorderly forces.

whom it is substantially vested.

different constitution of society, in the various stages of its progress, may give a different character to the controlling power, the principles which regulate its operation are substantially the same in all. There is no As society advances in refinement, and the room, therefore, for the question, whether arts of peace are developed, men of the lower there should be any control on the power of orders assemble, and fortify themselves in a king, or what that control should be; be Towns and Cities, and thus come to acquire a cause, as the power really is not the king's, power independent of their patrons. Their but belongs inalienably to the stronger part consent also accordingly becomes necessary of the nation itself, whether it derive that to the development of the public authority strength from discipline, talents, numbers, or within their communities; and hence another situation, it is impossible that it should be check to what is called the power of the sove- exercised at his instigation, without the conreign. And, finally, to pass over some inter-currence, or acquiescence at least, of those in mediate stages, when society has attained its full measure of civility and intelligence, and Such, then, is the abstract and fundamental is filled from top to bottom with wealth and doctrine as to the true nature of Monarchical, industry, and reflection; when every thing and indeed of every other species of Political that is done or felt by any one class, is com- power; and, abstract as it is, we cannot help municated on the instant to all the rest,-and thinking that it goes far to settle all controa vast proportion of the whole population takes versies as to the rights of sovereigns, and an interest in the fortunes of the country, and ought to be kept clearly in mind in proceedpossesses a certain intelligence as to the public ing to the more practical views of the subject. conduct of its rulers,-then the substantial For, though what we have now said as to all power of the nation may be said to be vested actual power belonging to the predominant in the Nation at large; or at least in those mass of physical and intellectual force in every individuals who can habitually command the community, and the certainty of its ultimately good-will and support of the greater part of impelling the public authority in the direction them--and the ultimate check to the power of its interests and inclinations, be unquestionof the sovereign comes to consist in the gen-ably true in itself; it is still of infinite impor eral unwillingness of The People to comply tance to consider what provisions are made by with those orders, which, if at all united in the form of the government, or what is called their resolution, they may now effectually its Constitution, for the ready operation of disobey and resist. This check, when ap- those interests and inclinations upon the implied at all, is likely, of course, to be applied mediate agents of the public authority. That