waters. In the philosophy of the day, men thought of ruling the world without a Deity; and any appeal to his word would have been scouted by the warriors who, succeeding to the office of barbarous Saracens and ferocious Turks, were instrumental in fulfilling it. The fool hath said in his heart, there is no God. But there is no wisdom, nor understanding, nor counsel against the Lord. The heathen are sunk down in the pit they have made; in the net which they hid is their own foot taken. The first successor of Mahomet issued his instructions to the Saracen invaders of the Roman empire, in exact conformity with the prophetic announcement "it was commanded them that they should not hurt the grass of the earth, neither any green thing, neither any tree; but only those men which had not the seal of God in their foreheads." Whether they be occupied in narrating, devising, or acting, God turns the .counsels or labours of the adversaries of the faith into credentials of his word: and they may be raised up for the execution of a purpose, of which it is not in their heart to think. And as Volney and Gibbon wrote as if they had contended in emulous strife which of them would best illustrate the prophecies, so as soon as infidels presided over one of the finest countries in Europe, and, invested with unchallenged authority, wielded at their will the energies of a great nation, they shewed that, in the execution of their appointed work, they were not to be outdone, at the close of the eighteenth century, by the armed fanatics who, in the seventh, issued from the desert. The apostles of infidelity were not to be restrained, any more than the apostles of Mahomet, though both were fanatics alike, from yielding their testimony to the truth of the Revelation of Jesus Christ. It was not alone enough that infidelity had fallen a noisome and grievous sore upon the men which had the mark of the beast, and upon them which worshipped his image; but, after three years from the time that the vial began ́ to be poured upon the sea, the Directory of France, no less than the Caliph in a remote age, gave the command that the very thing should be done, which was written in the word of God as the note and character of that evil time. In "the Instructions for the GENERAL-IN-CHIEF of the army of Italy," "the Piedmontese" are the first people that are mentioned, almost in the very first line. From that precious document we extract a few sentences, by way of illustrating the power of infidelity-but whether against or for the truth as it is in Jesus, looking to his Revelation also, the reader, were he a sceptic, might tell. "The principal enemies with whom the French republic has to contend on the Italian side, are two-the Piedmontese and the Austrians. The latter are formidable-from the sway which their possessions in Italy enable them to exercise over the Court of Turin" (the capital of Piedmont).-"It is the most immediate interest of the French republic to direct its principal efforts against the Austrian army and possessions in Lombardy.-The mere attack of Piedmont would not fulfil the object which the Executive Directory ought to have in view, that of expelling the Austrians from Italy. Every thing urges us to endeavour, by every means in our power, to force the enemy to repass the Po, and to make our greatest exertion in the direction of the Milanese. It appears that this essential operation cannot take place, unless the French army be previously in possession of Ceva. "The Directory, leave the General-in-Chief at liberty to commence operations by the attack of the enemy at this point; and whether he obtain a complete victory over them, or whether they retreat towards Turin, the Directory authorise him to pursue them, to encounter them again, and even to bombard that capital, if circumstances should render it necessary. "After having made himself master of Ceva, and placed the left of the army of Italy near Coni, in order to menace and keep in awe the garrison of that place, the General-in-chief will supply *To attack Piedmont, is to attack the Austrian army which covers it."-Note by Bonaparte. the wants of the army, as speedily as possible, by means of the resources which Piedmont will afford. He will then direct his forces against the Milanese, and principally against the Austrians; he will drive the enemy beyond the Po, ascertain the means of passing that river, and endeavour to secure the fortresses of Asti and Valenza-to intimidate Italy by advancing as much as possible on the right and towards Tortona, &c. The army ought to make as short a stay as possible in Piedmont, and to advance briskly to engage the Austrians, &c. 66 Although it be the interest of France to direct her principal efforts against the Austrians, and to lead the Piedmontese, by our victories over the former, into an alliance with ourselves, the Piedmontese must not be spared so long as they are our enemies &c. &c. (Signed) Letourneur, Carnot, L. M. Reveillere, Lepaux, Rewbell."* 15th March, 1796. In entering on the prophetic history of the achievements of Bonaparte, we deal only in such plain matters as every newspaper in Europe has recorded, and as every almanac might tell; and for the confirmation of which the remembrance of millions would not be appealed to in vain. Though renewing the risk of superfluous illustration, we still designedly adhere to the words of the historian, in order to exclude even the suspicion of any adaptation of terms, or any forced construction of facts, and to obviate the doubts and distrust which may have been generated in the minds of some inquirers, "Memoirs of the Hist. of France during the reign of Napoleon, dictated by the Emperor at Saint Helena,, &c. vol. iv. pp. 372-393. "Last of the ANOINTED FIVE behold, and least, CANNING. How poor is the keenest satire, in refutation and contempt of their principles, compared with their own signatures to such a document-the command given by these very men, to Bonaparte to pour out the vial upon the predicted spot. by too incautious an acquiesence in imaginary theories, of which time may have brought a speedy refutation. "Bonaparte at the age of twenty-six assumed the command of the army of Italy. He found the army in numbers about fifty thousand; but wretchedly deficient in cavalry, in clothing, and even in food; and watched by an enemy vastly more numerous. It was under such circumstances that he at once avowed the daring scheme of forcing a passage to Italy, and converting the richest territory of the enemy himself into the theatre of war. 'Soldiers,' said he, 'you are hungry and naked; the republic owes you much, but she has not the means to pay her debts. I am come to lead you into the most fertile plains that the sun beholds. Rich provinces, opulent towns, all shall be at your disposal. Soldiers! with such a prospect before you, can you fail in courage and constancy? This was his first address to his army at this period." "This," in the words of Sir Walter Scott, was showing the deer to the hound when the leash is about to be slipped."* "He perceived that the time was come for turning a new leaf in the history of war. With such numbers of troops as the infant republic could afford him, he saw that no considerable advantages could be obtained against the vast and highly disciplined armies of Austria and her allies, unless the established rules and etiquettes of war were abandoned. It was only by such rapidity of motion as should utterly transcend the suspicion of his adversaries, that he could hope to concentrate the whole pith and energy of a small force upon some one point of a much greater force opposed to it, and thus rob them (according to his own favourite phrase) of the victory. To effect such rapid marches, it was necessary that the soldiery should make up their mind to consider tents and baggage as idle luxuries; and that, instead of a long and complicated chain of reserves and stores, they should dare to rely wholly for the means of subsistence on the resources of the country into which their leader might conduct them. They must be contented to conquer at whatever hazard; to consider no sacrifices or hardships as worthy of a thought. The risk of destroying the character of the men by accustoming them to pillage, was obvious. Against the enemies of the republic, its success (of the scheme) was splendid even beyond his hopes. "The objects of the approaching expedition were three: First, to compel the king of Sardinia, who had already lost Savoy and Nice, but still maintained a powerful army on the frontiers of History of Napoleon Bonaparte, No. 1. Family Library, Murray, London. Vol. i. pp. 35, 36. Sir Walter Scott's Life of Napoleon, vol. iiii p. 98. Piedmont, to abandon the alliance of Austria. Secondly, to compel the emperor, by a bold invasion of Lombardy, to make such exertions in that quarter as to weaken those armies which had so long hovered on the Rhine; and if possible to stir up the Italian subjects of that crown to adopt the revolutionary system and emancipate them for ever from its yoke. The third object, though more distant, was not less important. THE INFLUENCE OF THE ROMISH CHURCH was considered by the Directory as the chief though secret cause of the support of royalty within their own territory, and TO REDUCE THE VATICAN INTO INSIGNIFICANCE, or at least to force it into submission and quiescence, appeared indispensable to the internal tranquillity of France. The revolutionary government, besides this general cause of hatred and suspicion, had a distinct injury to avenge. Their agent Basseville had, three years before, been assassinated in a popular tumult at Rome; the papal troops had not interfered to protect him, nor the pope to punish his murderers; and the haughty republic considered this as an insult, which could only be washed out with A SEA OF BLOOD."* "The original idea entertained by the French government for prosecuting their resentment, had been by a proposed landing at Civita Vecchia with an army of ten thousand men, marching to Rome and exacting complete atonement for the murder of Basseville. But, as the English fleet rode unopposed in the Mediterranean, it became a matter of very doubtful success to transport such a body of troops to Civita Vecchia by sea, not to mention the chance that even if safely landed, they would have found themselves in the centre of Italy, cut off from supplies and succours, assaulted on all hands, and most probably blockaded by the British fleet. Bonaparte, who was consulted, recommended that the north of Italy should be first conquered, that Rome might be with safety approached and chastised." Napoleon's plan for gaining access to the fair regions of Italy differed from that of all former conquerors: they had uniformly penetrated the Alps at some point or other of that mighty range of mountains; he judged that the same end might be accomplished more easily by advancing along the narrow strip of comparatively level country, which intervenes between these barriers and the Mediterranean sea, and forcing a passage WHERE THE LAST OF THE ALPS MELT, AS IT WERE, INTO THE FIRST AND LOWEST OF THE APPENINE RANGE." "In penetrating into Italy by the SOURCES of the Bormida, some hopes might be entertained of separating and intersecting the Sardinian and Austrian armies, because from that position Lombardy and Piedmont were both menaced."§ *Hist. of Napoleon, vol. i. pp. 36, 38. † Scott's Napoleon, ib. p. 96. Hist. of Napoleon, p. 38., Las Casas' Journal, vol. i. part 2. p. 184. |