merit of actions.* What would be the merit, the chastity of those of whom Jesus Christ says† that they came eunuchs from their mother's womb. Why boast so much the denial of one's self, if it supposes no injurious propensities which one has succeeded in subduing?‡ All philosophers, ancient and modern, Plato, Aristotle, Cicero, Seneca, Pascal, Kant, as well as the fathers of the church, have founded the notion of virtue on the victory, which we obtain over our vicious propensities. Can the old man, who has passed his youth in dissoluteness, be called continent and moderate, because his desires have abandoned him? It is precisely those evil || propensities, which many persons consider incompatible with the glory of God, with the dignity of man, and the welfare of society, which give to man the possibility of being virtuous and vicious: it is only by means of these that actions can have merit or demerit; and whoever should extinguish in man the belief in perverse inclina * Non virtus est, non posse peccare. Cum renunciatur improbitati. Statim adsciscitur virtus. Egressus enim malitiæ virtutis operatur ingressum St. Ambrosius. Posse peccare datum est primo homini, non ut proinde peccaret, sed ut gloriosior appararet, si non peccaret, quum peccare posset. St. Bernardus, de libero arbitrio. + St. Matthew xix. 12. Castitas est virtus sub jugo rationis impetum libidinis refrenans. St. Augustinus de finibus. § Vila nostra in hac peregrinatione non potest esse sine peccato, sine tentatione; quia profectus noster per tentationem nostram fit, nec sibi quisquam innotescit, nisi tentatus; nec potest coronari, nisi vicerit: nec potest vincere, nisi certaverit; nec potest certare, nisi inimicum et tentationes habuerit. S. August. super psalm. 60. Caro si sale non aspurgatur, quamvis sit sana et præcipua, corrumpitur; ita et anima nisi tentationibus assiduis saliatur, continuo resolvitur et relaxa tur. Origines, super lib. arbitr. N. S. Chrystomus, Hom. iv. de pænitentia. Nulla sine labore virtus est. S. Ambrosius in psalm. 118. Non est gloriosa victoria, nisi ubi fuerint gloriosa certamina. S. Ambrosius de off. Nulla sunt sine tentationum experimentis opera virtutis; nulla sine pertubationibus fides; nullum sine hoste certamen, nulla sine congressione victoria. Leo, sermo 35; etc. || Quidam in juvente luxuriose viventes, in senectute continentes fieri delectantur et tum eligunt servire castitati, quando libido eos servos habere contempsit. Nequaquam in senectute continentes vocandi sunt qui in juventute luxuriose vixerunt; tales non habent præmium, quia laboris certamen non habuerunt; eos enim exspectat gloria, in quibus fuerunt gloriosa certamina. Isidor. de summo bono, lib. i. c. 31. tions, would also extinguish in him the fear of punishment, and the hope of future reward. How do primitive Dispositions, essentially good, degenerate into evil Propensities? Bad propensities and moral evil are, therefore, inherent in human nature, notwithstanding the efforts which some men think it their duty to make, to conceal their true origin.* Let us, as physiologists, examine how far the fundamental qualities and faculties of man, may become evil propensities, and, consequently, the source of moral evil. The brain, the instrument of the moral qualities and intellectual faculties, is essentially the same in all wellconstituted men; but the various integrant parts of the brain, or the different organs, are not equally developed in all. The relations of these developments are infinitely varied. Hence, the infinite variety in the moral and intellectual character of men. In the same individual, all organs do not receive the same degree of development. It follows, hence, that no man possesses all qualities and all faculties to the same degree. The function, or the tendency of the activity of an organ, is graduated according to the degree of its development or excitement; the function of an organ, moderately developed, is not similar to the defective or excessive development of the same organ. The propensity to propagation is, certainly, the most necessary institution of the Creator; but, when its organ is too little developed, we experience impotence, indifference, or even aversion to the other sex. Too much developed, on the contrary, it degenerates into a propensity to salacity and all its excesses. The love of children is one * It would be more correct to say the abuse of the propensities, than to denominate them bad. There can be nothing bad, absolutely, in nature. of the first qualities of a mother; but too small a development of the same organ produces indifference, and even hatred to children, and may become one of the causes of infanticide. This organ, too much developed, is the source of the weaknesses which fathers and mothers allow themselves toward their children. There have even been instances of females, condemned to celibacy or to sterility, being tempted to commit the crime of child-stealing. The instinct of self-defence, a necessary quality, becomes, in its exalted action, courage, inclination for combat, temerity; in its depression, on the contrary, timidity, dastardliness, cowardice. No one will say, that it is a misfortune for man to be destined to live on flesh, as well as on vegetables; yet, it is an excessive activity of this same inclination, which produces, step by step, insensibility to others' sufferings; pleasure at causing and witnessing pain; the inclination to destroy, kill, burn. The sentiment of property, innate in man, and even in animals, will always be one of the principal bonds of social order; but, give too much energy to this same sentiment, and the man will be tempted by inclination to fraud, usury, corruption, venality, theft. The love of honor, the source of so many noble actions, if too eager and ill-directed, seeks flattery, luxury, ostentation. Noble pride degenerates into presumption, insolence, contempt, and despotism. It is thus, that raillery, mockery, the spirit of sedition and independence, insubordination, disobedience, obstinacy, credulity, superstition, idolatry, have their origin in dispositions primitively good, and essential to the human race. Qualities and talents, peculiarly distinguished, are of the same origin. It is always a very favorable development of an organ, an unaccustomed energy of its function, which produces the disposition to benevolence, religious sentiments and ideas, the talent for poetry; without such development there would be neither great musicians, nor great sculptors, nor great orators; all the arts and all the sciences would remain in a state of obscure mediocrity. This explanation of the degeneracy and of the improvement of man's moral and intellectual forces, of the origin of his vicious and virtuous propensities, of genius, and of weakness of intellect, is most in conformity with his nature. It is now time to meet the great question, namely, as man cannot, in any manner, arrest the development of his organs, nor, consequently, relax the energy of their functions and cause himself to be urged either more or less imperiously to do good or evil, are his actions, also, submitted to the same fatality? Does he do good or ill by irresistible impulses? or does his organization permit him a voluntary determination? Are actions evidence of merit or demerit? It is important, that I should put this subject in the clearest light; and as there result from it the most important practical consequences, I shall treat it with peculiar attention and perfect frankness. May my readers bring to the examination the same love of truth, which will guide me in the whole of this great discussion ! Free Will. Free will has always been the stumbling-block of most of the philosophers. A great number have succeeded, by force of reasoning, in proving that all which happens, happens necessarily; and as all actions are the necessary consequence of preceding ones, in the same manner as an effect is the necessary consequence of a cause, they have concluded from this necessity, from this relation between cause and effect, that there can be no voluntary act, and have, therefore, denied all liberty. Others, on the contrary, have made a romance of the nature of man, and, comparing him to the Deity, have assigned to him liberty without bounds. Others, again, think, that they see freedom, where there exists in fact nothing but its image. A few only have regarded free will in its true and correct point of view. Whether we allow too much or too little liberty to man, we shall always do wrong to morality; and the judgments we form on our own actions, and those of others, will even lead to error. It is, therefore, important to clear up this obscurity, and to determine, to what extent a man in possession of his faculties, enjoys the power of choosing between such and such an action. Unlimited Liberty. There are not wanting philosophers, who, seeing in man the image of the Deity, make him almost as free as God himself. They give him unlimited liberty; but unlimited liberty would imply, that man created his own nature; that he is himself the author of his desires and faculties; that he governs himself independently of all law. As man has not unlimited power over his birth, nor over the duration of his existence, nor over his sex, nor his temperament, nor the influence of external things, such a liberty is completely in contradiction to his nature. All that can be said in favor of this boastful opinion reduces itself to emphatic declamations, void of sense and truth. Absolute Liberty. Other persons think it proper to admit at least an absolute liberty, by virtue of which a man may act without motive, internal or external. But, as there is no effect without a cause, as one thing is always the cause of another, and as nothing in nature can happen except in accordance with determinate laws, it follows that every phenomenon, such as that of an absolute liberty which might take effect without cause, is absolutely impossible. If man could act without motive, and solely from caprice, there would be no certainty, nor even probability, that, under given circumstances, he would |