produces great stupidity of conscience, or, as it is frequently termed, hardness of heard. But no one ever considers this stupidity as in any manner an excuse. It is, on the contrary, always held to be an aggravation of crime. Thus, we term a man, who has become so accustomed to crime, that he will murder without feeling and without regret, a remorseless murderer, a cold-blooded assassin; and every one knows that, by these epithets, we mean to designate a special and additional element of guiltiness. This I take to be the universal feeling of man. 2. The assertion of the contrary would lead to results manifestly erroneous.

Suppose two men, of precisely the some moral attainments, to-day, to commence, at the same time, two courses of conduct, diametrically opposed to each other. The first, by the scrupulous doing of right, cultivates, to the utmost, his moral nature, and increases, with every day, his capacity for virtue. The sphere of his benevolent affections enlarges, and the play of his moral feelings becomes more and more intense, until he is filled with the most ardent desire to promote the welfare of every fellow-creature, and to do the will of God with his whole heart. The other, by a continued course of crime, gradually destroys the susceptibility of his conscience, and lessens his capacity for virtue, until his soul is filled with hatred to God, and no other feeling of obligation remains, except that of fidelity to his co-partners in guilt.

Now, at the expiration of this period, if both of these men should act according to what each felt to be the dictate of conscience, they would act very differently. But, if a man can be under obligation to do, and to leave undone, nothing but what his conscience, at a particular moment, indicates, I do not see but that these men would be, in the actions of that moment, equally innocent. The only difference between them, so far as the actions of a particular moment were concerned, would be the difference between a virtuous man and a virtuous child.

From these facts, we are easily led to the distinction between right and wrong, and innocence and guilt.

Right and wrong depend upon the relations under which beings are created; and, hence, the obligations resulting from these relations are, in their nature, fixed and unchangeable. Guilt and innocence depend upon the knowledge of these relations; and are, moreover, affected by the degree in which the imperfection of conscience is the result of the voluntary agency of the individual himself. As these are manifestly susceptible of variation, while right and wrong are invariable, the two notions may manifestly not always correspond to each other.

man may

Thus, for example, an action may be wrong; but, if the actor have no means of knowing it to be wrong, he is held morally guiltless, in the doing of it. Or, again, a have a consciousness of obligation, and a sincere desire to act in conformity to it; and may, from ignorance of the way in which that obligation is to be discharged, perform an act in its nature wrong; yet, if he have acted according to the best of his possible knowledge, he may not only be held guiltless, but even virtuAnd, on the contrary, if a man do what is actually right, but without a desire to fulfil the obligation of which he is conscious, he is held to be guilty; for he has not manifested a desire to act in obedience to the obligations under which he knew himself to be created. Illustrations of these remarks may be easily drawn from the ordinary affairs of life, or from the Scriptures.

ous.

And, hence, we also arrive at another principle of importance in our moral judgments, namely, that our own consciousness of innocence, or our not being conscious of guilt, is by no means a sufficient proof of our innocence. A man may never have reflected on the relations in which he stands to other men, or to God; and, hence, may be conscious of no feeling of obligation toward either, in any or in particular respects. This may be the fact; but his innocence would not be established, unless he can also show that he has faithfully and impartially used all the powers which God has given him, to obtain a knowledge of these relations. Or, again, he may understand the relation, and have no corresponding

sensibility. This may be the fact; but his innocency would not be established, unless he can also show that he has always faithfully and honestly obeyed his conscience, so that his moral insensibility is, in no manner, attributable to his own acts. Until these things can be shown, the want of moral consciousness will be no proof of innocence. To this principle, if I mistake not, the Apostle Paul alludes, in 1 Cor. iv, 3, 4: "But with me, it is a very small thing to be judged of you, or of man's judgment: yea, I judge not my ownself, for I know nothing of my ownself (or, rather, I am conscious of nothing wrong in myself; that is, of no unfaithfulness in office); yet, am I not hereby justified: but he that judgeth me is the Lord." And, thus, a man may do great wrong, and be deeply guilty, in respect to a whole class of obligations, without being, in any painful degree, sensible of it. Such I think to be the moral state in which men, in general, are, in respect to their obligations to God. Thus, saith our Savior to the Jews: "I know you, that ye have not the love of God in you;" while they were supposing themselves to be the special favorites of Heaven.

From these remarks, we may also learn the relation in which beings, created as we are, stand to moral law.

Man is created with moral and intellectual powers, capable of progressive improvement. Hence, if he use his faculties as he ought, he will progressively improve; that is, become more and more capable of virtue. He is assured of enjoying all the benefits which can result from such improvement. If he use these faculties as he ought not, and become less and less capable of virtue, he is hence held responsible for all the consequences of his misimprovement.

Now, as this misimprovement is his own act, for which he is responsible, it manifestly does not affect the relations under which he is created, nor the obligations resulting from these relations; that is, he stands, in respect to the moral acquirements under which he is created, precisely in the same condition as if he had always used his moral powers correctly. That is to say, under the present moral

constitution, every man is justly held responsible, at every period of his existence, for that degree of virtue of which: he would have been capable, had he, from the first moment of his existence, improved his moral nature, in every respect, just as he ought to have done. In other words, suppose some human being to have always lived thus (Jesus Christ, for instance), every man is, at every successive period of his existence, held responsible for the same degree of virtue as such a perfect being attained to, at the corresponding periods of his existence. Such I think evidently to be the nature of the obligation which must rest upon such beings, throughout the whole extent of their duration.

In order to meet this increasing responsibility, in such a manner as to fulfil the requirements of moral law, a being, under such a constitution, must, at every moment of his existence, possess a moral faculty, which, by perfect previous cultivation, is adapted to the responsibilities of that particular moment. But, suppose this not to have been the case; and that, on the contrary, his moral faculty, by once doing wrong, has become impaired, so that, it either does not admonish him correctly of his obligations, or that he has become indisposed to obey its moni> tions. This must, at the next moment, terminate in ac tion more at variance with rectitude than before. The adjustment between conscience and the passions, must become deranged; and thus, the tendency, at every successive moment, must be, to involve him deeper and deeper in guilt. And, unless some other moral force be exerted in the case, such must be the tendency for ever.

And suppose some such force to be exerted, and, at any period of his existence, the being to begin to obey his conscience in every one of its present monitions. It is manifest, that he would now need some other and more perfect guide, in order to inform him perfectly of his obligations, and of the mode in which they are to be fulfilled. And supposing this to be done as he is at this moment responsible for such a capacity for virtue, as would have been attained by a previously perfect recti

tude; and as his capacity is inferior to this; and as no reason can be suggested, why his progress in virtue should, under these circumstances, be more rapid than that of a perfect being, but the contrary; it is manifest, that he must ever fall short of what is justly required of him,nay, that he must be continually falling farther and farther behind it.

And hence, the present constitution tends to show us the remediless nature of moral evil, under the government of God, unless some other principle, than that of law, be admitted into the case. These conditions of being having been violated, unless man be placed under some other conditions, natural religion would lead us to believe, that he must suffer the penalty, whatever it be, of wrong. Penitence could in no manner alter his situation; for it is merely a temper justly demanded, in consequence of his sin. But this could not replace him in his original relation to the law which had been violated. Such seems to be the teachings of the Holy Scriptures; and they seem to me to declare, moreover, that this change in the conditions of our being, has been accomplished by the mediation of a Redeemer, by which we may, through the obedience of another, be justified (that is, treated as though just), although we are, by confession, guilty.

And hence, although it were shown that a man was, at any particular period of his being, incapable of that degree of virtue which the law of God required, it would neither follow that he was not under obligation to exercise it, nor that he was not responsible for the whole amount of that exercise of it; since, if he have dwarfed his own powers, he is responsible for the result. And, conversely, if God requires this whole amount of virtue, it will not prove that man is now capable of exercising it; but only, that he is either thus capable, or, that he would have been so, if he had used correctly the powers which God gave him.

A few suggestions respecting the moral relations of habit, will close this discussion.

Some of the most important facts respecting habit, are the following: