I think he is right. It is very unlikely that we will build an antimissile defense to go into effect in 10 years according to the proposal that is on the table in Geneva, at just the point when the missiles have disappeared. I understand you know we say third countries, and cheating, and all that, but you know subtleties like that are going to be lost.

I also think that if our position is to eliminate all ballistic missiles in 10 years, we are going to find a lot of people using that as an argument against funding modernization of our ballistic missile force in the short run.

Mr. PERLE. Oh, no, sir. The MX could become controversial under those circumstances.

The CHAIRMAN. Right. Trident might become controversial, which it currently is not.

Mr. PERLE. There are two obvious observations. One is we do not yet have and we may not get Soviet agreement to the elimination of offensive ballistic missiles. You have expressed and your colleagues have expressed some skepticism that they would agree to that. I am not in favor of operating as though an agreement existed before it does.

But, second, the elimination of offensive ballistic missiles means that we turn over the last one in our inventory as the Soviets turn over the last one in theirs, and I think the argument for an insurance policy against Soviet cheating is overwhelming, and the American people would, in my view, gladly support such a deployment.

The CHAIRMAN. How are you going to argue for these modernization funds? We say, OK, we will modernize the ICBM force a little bit, but we are not going to go into a big modernization program. If the missiles are going to be gone in 10 years, why are we building the MX? Let's just rely on the Minuteman. If the missiles are going to be gone in 10 years, why don't we stop the Trident Program? You can rely on the Poseidons for 10 years.

Mr. PERLE. If and when an agreement is reached that would lead to the elimination of those missiles, then we would obviously alter radically our request for funds for modernization of those forces.

The CHAIRMAN. I am just saying the administration takes these positions: On the one hand, we argue we have got the upper hand, we are more antinuke than the Soviets; and, on the other hand, oh, don't worry, don't worry, this will never really happen. These positions we argue five ways from Sunday. In the meantime, no arms control happens, the whole defense gets trivialized, you have chaos in the administration as to what we are for and what we are not for, a bad process.

Mr. PERLE. On this point of chaos, you have really overstated the differences in the precise statements that individuals have made. There are two ways you can look at these materials that you were reading to me earlier. You can either say it is perfectly natural, with a great many people talking after an event like Reykjavik, that there are going to be differences that one can pose, and develop, and talk about, or one can recognize that it isn't in our interest to put a microscope to the statements of various officials looking for differences.

The point is that the Congress needs to know what our policy is, and you have very good means for establishing what our policy is, and you don't have to turn to a New York Times account of what Ken Adelman might have said or a Washington Post account of what George Shultz might have said. The Congress is in no doubt as to what our policy is, and if the policy is to have any nuance to it, if the people are not to recite, like Soviet diplomats, the same rigid formulas in exactly the same words, we have got to have a little bit of freedom to talk about these issues without that being a device that is used to make it awkward for the administration.

So my appeal to you is to search, by all means, until you are satisfied that you know what our policy is. I urge you not to exploit these differences that are always going to exist.

The CHAIRMAN. Fair enough, and I think that is a good point on which to quit, because that leads into our next hearing where Ken Adelman will come and give his version, and then we will have Admiral Crowe and Paul Nitze, and we will have plenty of chances to go on. Richard, I appreciate it. I always enjoy it. It is always great fun. Thank you very much.

Mr. PERLE. Thank you.

[Whereupon, at 12:45 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned subject to the call of the Chair.]

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,

DEFENSE POLICY PANEL OF THE

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES,

Washington, DC, Monday, November 24, 1986.

The panel met, pursuant to call, at 10 a.m., in room 2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Les Aspin (chairman of the panel) presiding.

STATEMENT OF HON. LES ASPIN, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM WISCONSIN, CHAIRMAN, DEFENSE POLICY PANEL OF THE HOUSE COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order this morning. This is the second in a series of hearings by the Defense Policy Panel into the Reykjavik Summit, both the substance of the summit and the process by which it was handled. On Friday, in the first hearing of this series, we heard from Richard Perle of the Department of Defense, who added another layer of information but not the final word by any means. After his testimony, plus the many briefings and comments made in the last month about the Reykjavik Summit, I think these hearings might best be entitled "Who is in charge and where do we go from here?"

A week ago, I recall that Secretary of State Shultz was asked if he could speak for the administration on Iran. He responded no. On arms control it seems that a similar thing is happening: everyone can speak, but no one seems to be saying exactly the same thing. What we don't know and what we are trying to find out is what the administration did at Reykjavik, why they did it, and where we stand now on arms control.

The answers certainly aren't at all clear to me, and I am concerned they aren't clear to the administration either. I hope these hearings will help not only Congress and the public sort out the facts and find out who is in charge and where we are going from here but will help the administration answer those questions, too. This morning we have as our witness the Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Ken Adelman. Let me say while I have often disagreed with Ken on arms control issues over the years, I have always found him to be articulate and knowledgeable. Most importantly, I know he is capable of analyzing arms control issues to great depth, far greater than most others in this administration. And he has real skill at outlining the fine points of policy options.

I am happy to welcome you before the panel, Ker., and you may proceed as you wish.

STATEMENT OF KENNETH L. ADELMAN, DIRECTOR OF U.S. ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY

Mr. ADELMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate those kind words. I think they are best given before this hearing than during or after it.

I thought I would just take some of the highlights of my statement address some of the highlights of your statement opening up these hearings, and then give overall reflections of where we go from here.

Let me begin with a comment: I believe the Reykjavik meeting marked an important shift in the terms of our negotiations with the Soviet Union on nuclear weapons. Reykjavik clearly demonstrates that the United States approach is paying off. We made substantial progress toward an agreement providing for reduction in offensive nuclear arms, 50 percent reduction in strategic weapons, and the global ceiling of 100 warheads on INF, dimensions thought inconceivable only a few years ago.

Let me say when I appeared before this committee a few years ago and spoke to members of this committee, the kind of cuts we were talking about in strategic weapons and INF were thought to be nonnegotiable. It was claimed this administration was not sincere about arms control because we were asking for too many cuts and for too ambitious an arms control program from the Soviets

Let me tell you, Mr. Chairman, that what was considered by you and probably others nonnegotiable just 4 years ago or 3 years ago is precisely that which we are negotiating in Geneva today. We believe that stability can be substantially enhanced at lower levels by focusing reductions on the most threatening systems, as you well know, and that is land-based heavily MIRV'd systems. Our approach toward the future evolution of strategic relationships is one that recognized the continuous need to rely on deterrence into the future. Any transition toward greatly reduced reliance on nuclear weapons must be carefully conceived, carefully coordinated with Congress and our allies, and carefully phased to assure stability along the way.

Last week President Reagan noted his agreement with Prime Minister Thatcher on our priorities, 50 percent cuts in strategic weapons, an INF agreement and a ban on chemical weapons. They are nothing more or less. They do not and were never intended to represent the entirety of the U.S. proposals that remain on the table. They do, however, represent areas where we feel initial emphasis should be given.

The point here is that progress in real arms control, as with many endeavors related to public policy and international politics, is usually incremental. All problems cannot be solved in a single bound. In a sense, the grand visions of arms control are often mugged by reality. And the main problem in arms control has been over the years, not that the United States has given away the store, but rather that various people believe that arms control will solve all the problems of commerce with one fell swoop; and that is just not the way, in my mind, the world works, diplomacy works or arms control works.

Let me end by saying that by continuing to strengthen our deterrent forces, by continuing to explore through SDI programs that hold out the prospect for effective defenses against ballistic missiles, and by combining firmness with flexibility, we have made possible far-reaching strides in arms control. We have come very far, and we need to stay the course.

Now, if I could, with your permission, put my entire statement in the record, I would like to go on and mention just some of the opening comments you made in your statement, Mr. Chairman.

For one thing, you say that in October you backed off in response to the President's request that his hands not be tied going to Reykjavik. His hands weren't tied, and I don't see that he brought an agreement home. I guess this begs the question, would the President have done better at Reykjavik were his hands tied? Was the reason he didn't bring home an agreement at Reykjavik that this committee and the House did not tie his hands? Then you go on and say, if Reagan can't bring home the bacon after 6 years in office, perhaps it is time for Congress to try its hand.

I hope, Mr. Chairman, you really don't mean that, because-I know that that would be a very big disaster for arms control and for our relations in foreign affairs generally. It is not the proper function of Congress to negotiate with the Soviet Union, and I am glad to say that in the lingo of today, you deemphasize that position in your very next page by saying, "After all, only the Chief Executive can negotiate with the Soviets."

Third, you say that you conclude that Margaret Thatcher's visit last week effectively canceled everything the President has been saying about arms control since Reykjavik. That is not the case at all. We have our proposals we discussed in Reykjavik on the table, and they are the subject of continuing dialog with the Soviets.

Fourth, you talk about the mysteries of Reykjavik. I hope especially after these hearings the mysteries will be cleared up. In my own mind, Reykjavik has been the most analyzed meeting since Yalta, and whatever mysteries remain about Reykjavik should be cleared up quickly. Unlike Yalta, as you know, there are a thousand flowers blooming and people took to the airwaves and the diplomatic trails to explain what happened there. I am not sure that any mysteries existed but I would be happy to entertain your questions on that.

Last, you stated, "The administration has a lot to learn, and that is one of the purposes of this hearing." I am always pleased to come before this committee for information and to learn. I would like to just mention that it seems to me there are three objections that you have given in your statements on Friday and in the press and today having to do with the product, the pace and the process at Reykjavik.

You have called Reykjavik a fundamentally flawed product. I don't see it. What is so bad about a strategic arms control package that would reduce to 1,600 United States and Soviet strategic nuclear delivery vehicles, which is some 20 to 25 percent below SALT II levels, and 6,000 ballistic missile warheads and air-launched cruise missiles? This is a substantial reduction from where we are today, and far below what I at least thought was possible a few years ago.