HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,

DEFENSE POLICY PANEL OF THE

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES,

Washington, DC, Tuesday, December 2, 1986.

The panel met, pursuant to call, at 10:05 a.m., in room 2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Les Aspin (chairman of the panel) presiding.

STATEMENT OF HON. LES ASPIN, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM WISCONSIN, CHAIRMAN, DEFENSE POLICY PANEL OF THE HOUSE COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

The CHAIRMAN. The meeting will come to order.

This is the fourth in a series of hearings by the Defense Policy Panel into the Reykjavik summit-both the substance of the summit and the process by which it was handled.

Yesterday we had been scheduled to hear from Ambassador Paul Nitze. The Ambassador asked to be excused at the last minute because of illness and that hearing was canceled. I'm trying to reschedule Ambassador Nitze and hope we will soon be able to hear from him.

Thus far we have heard from officials of the current administration-Richard Perle, Ken Adelman, and Adm. William Crowe. Today we will hear from a former officeholder, with experience as a Cabinet member in both Republican and Democratic administrations, a rare occurrence indeed in our Nation's history-and one he may recommend not repeating.

But I asked Jim Schlesinger to appear before us today not simply because he was a very good Secretary of Defense, but because he has been a very thoughtful participant in the debates on strategic issues for a quarter of a century. For someone with as much experience in the bureaucracy as Jim, he has retained a remarkable facility for always having something of substance to say, and for always saying it with clarity and without jargon.

Secretary Schlesinger, we welcome you before the panel. Please proceed as you wish.

STATEMENT OF JAMES R. SCHLESINGER, FORMER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Mr. SCHLESINGER. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman, for that overwhelming introduction. I am delighted to appear before you today to discuss Reykjavik. This hearing, to me, is very important because we should know two things: First, what went wrong in the process, and second, what the consequences would be if the proposals put forward and to some extent accepted at Reykjavik were to be implemented.

The events at Reykjavik have been overtaken, as we recognize, by the developments in Iran and funding of the Contras. Those

events are perhaps more dramatic. They constitute an embarrassment to the United States. They represent a severe diplomatic setback, but they do not have the capacity that Reykjavik has to upset the equilibrium in the balance between East and West. Therefore, as dramatic as events are in Iran and in the funding of the Contras, I believe that we must focus attention, as you are doing, on Reykjavik. Reykjavik is more important because it would upset the military balance, and it has the capacity to alter the alliance strategy and thereby theater alliance cohesion.

Let me start with two points. To call Reykjavik ill-prepared is to indulge in classic understatement. It is the most ill-prepared summit that we have had since Vienna in 1961, and it ended as disastrously as the 1960 summit when Mr. Khrushchev walked out after the shooting down of the U-2. Its potential for ill is the most serious since 1945. It was ill-prepared; it was ill-executed; there were spur-of-the-moment proposals, and spur-of-the-moment despair. Both the spur-of-the-moment proposals and the spur-of-themoment despair were quite unjustified.

Second, let me underscore the fundamental truth that the Western World has defended since the close of World War II, and explicitly since the early 1950's, on nuclear defense. In order to preserve the security of the West, we must be very careful in adjusting nuclear forces so that the pursuit of the goal of a world without nuclear weapons, as the President has stated, does not undermine the security of the West. That was the regrettable outcome in Reykjavik.

Nuclear weapons have long played a role in the alliance. They are the glue that holds the alliance together. For some 30 years now, Mr. Chairman, as your comments indicated, I have been a student of the Atlantic alliance. Preservation of a free Western Europe is the fundamental goal of American foreign policy. That is unlikely to change. Because we work in association with other free States, there must be an evolution, a slow adjustment of alliance doctrine. Even in the 1950's, when the relative role of the United States was much greater than it is today-indeed our role was overwhelming-there had to be slow adjustments of alliance doctrine taken in association with our allies.

In the 1960's the same phenomenon was observed. It took us 3 years of careful negotiations to develop MC/3, the movement toward flexible response, and it required very careful negotiation with our allies.

In light of this background, let me turn to the proposals that surfaced at Reykjavik. The first one that I should comment on, although it has now happily been answered, is Mr. Gorbachev's proposal, which the President accepted, at least temporarily, for the elimination of all strategic offensive weapons.

The consequence of the elimination of all strategic offensive weapons by 1996 would have been the end of the shield that has protected the Western World. We depend upon nuclear weapons simply because the Soviet Union has been adjudged over the years to have substantial superiority in conventional forces. That superiority not only numerical, but the nature of the alliance as a coalition. We must recall Napoleon observed that when he wanted to wage war he preferred to wage war against a coalition. The nature

of coalition forces is that their cohesion is less than that of a single state.

I am happy to say that whatever the agreement between Mr. Gorbachev and Mr. Reagan about the elimination of all strategic offensive weapons, which would at one blow have eliminated the underlying concept of nuclear deterrence, it has been abandoned. Later the administration stressed just the elimination of all ballistic missiles by 1996.

The problem with this lesser version is still substantial, even though it does not have the result of wiping out nuclear deterrence. It may substantially weaken the deterrent.

It was only 3 years ago that the Scowcroft Commission reported, as you will all recall, to the President, on strategic forces. The report embraced the concept known as the triad, of SLBM's, ICBM's, and bombers, as essential to the preservation of the effectiveness of the American deterrent. The Scowcroft Commission's recommendations were embraced, as you will recall, by the administration. Let me just read a few words from the Scowcroft report:

The triad of forces, however, serves several important purposes. First, the existence of several strategic forces requires the Soviets to solve a number of different problems in their efforts to plan how they might try to overcome them. Our objective, after all, is to make their planning of any such attack as difficult as we can. If it were possible for the Soviets to concentrate their research and development efforts on putting only one or two components of U.S. strategic forces at risk, that is, by an intensive effort at antisubmarine warfare, to threaten our ballistic missile submarines, both their incentive to do so and their potential, again, would be sharply increased.

I do not want to read these pages from the Scowcroft Commission report because it would take too much time. Suffice it to say that every Secretary of Defense going back some 25 years has emphasized the necessity of the triad because we do not want to have the deterrent eggs all in one basket. As the Scowcroft Commission underlines, each of the forces, by their existence, reduces the risk of the total force being overwhelmed.

In short, the triad has provided us with stability. The United States at Reykjavik, regrettably in my judgment, proposed the elimination of all ballistic missiles, which means the elimination of two of the three legs of the triad. It is conceivable that the elimination of all ballistic missiles might be beneficial to stability, but it has not been studied.

You have had hearings with Admiral Crowe. It was plain that the JCS was not seriously consulted about the elimination of all ballistic missiles by 1996. It had been previously consulted in the letter of last July to Gorbachev about the desirability of eliminating all ballistic missiles some day in the 21st century, but the JCS was not consulted in this matter, and you gentlemen will recall that it is only a few months ago that you passed legislation making Admiral Crowe the chief military adviser to the President.

I should point out that despite the radical consequences for NATO strategically, General Rogers, on whom we repose the responsibilities for the defense of Western Europe, was not consulted either. If the rumor mill and press commentatory are accurate, General Rogers is quite disturbed by the proposal to eliminate all ballistic missiles, starting with those in Western Europe.

The consequence of eliminating all ballistic missiles would be to put us back into the 1950's. Some of you will recall the 1950's when we depended on a soft bomber force located at 55 SAC bases. You will remember, I think, the highly secret Rand reports indicating how a surprise Soviet attack might eliminate our bomber deterrent force. Of course when the Soviets moved to ICBM's it became correspondingly more easy to attack those bomber bases.

At that time, in the 1950's, we were radically concerned with the possibility of the elimination of the deterrent, and by sweeping away two legs of the triad we move back toward that position. I think Mr. Bennett may recall the long argument between the Congress and President Eisenhower. The Congress, concerned that a Soviets surprise attack might come, pressed additional money on the administration to maintain a substantial force of bombers in the air at all times.

President Eisenhower commented that the only effect of that would be to give us a lot of wornout bombers. I recall that not to emphasize whether the Congress was more prudent than the President or the President more economy minded than the Congress at the time, but simply to underscore the risk associated with a single leg of the deterrent. One of the ironies of Reykjavik is that we were saved from a near disaster by the strategic defense initiative, which has probably now done more to protect the United States and its allies than it will ever do in the future.

The strategic defense initiative would be preserved and deployed after 1996 and would be a very rudimentary defense based upon kinetic kill vehicles. All exotics, lasers, and particle beams are things that one may only envision some time well into the 21st century. The deployment of such a defense would be for insurance purposes. Presumably, there is always a level of Soviet ballistic missile offense forces sufficiently low that the strategic defense could cope with it. And by the proposed elimination of all Soviet ballistic missiles we ease the problem for a strategic defense. But we certainly raise even greater questions about its cost effectiveness.

Now, this proposal that we tabled at Reykjavik was not checked with the allies, who were disturbed, to put it mildly, immediately after the event. It was not checked with the JCS, as I have indicated, and it was not checked with the Congress. There were no studies of the consequences. Indeed, the national security decision document calling for such a study went out 2 weeks after Reykjavik. That would seem to me to be, at least in a logical sense, the wrong order.

Before we table a proposal, the consequences of that proposal should be studied. What has been the aftermath? The administration has happily had second thoughts. Mrs. Thatcher came to the United States, met with the President, and expressed the deep misgivings not only of the United Kingdom but of all of the Europeans about the consequences for NATO strategy. They emerged having established priorities in arms control.

The agreement stated that priority should be given to an INF agreement, with sweeping reductions, but not the elimination of INF forces. The agreement also called for reductions of short-range systems that the Soviets have deployed in Eastern Europe. Second, it called for emphasis on the elimination of chemical weapons. The

Soviets, as we all know, have a vast advantage in chemical weapons, and the elimination of the nuclear response would provide even greater weight for those advantages in chemical weapons.

Third, it emphasized only a 50-percent cut over a 5-year period rather than the total elimination of either the strategic offensive force or ballistic missiles.

Mrs. Thatcher went on to say that the NATO strategy of flexible response has been confirmed, and that would require a continuation of effective nuclear deterrence based upon a mix of systems.

In short, moving away from the initial agreement, Mrs. Thatcher, who has come to save the Americans from themselves in the past, has once again I think succeeded in helping us back away from proposals that we would have been rash to implement. As I mentioned a moment ago, with respect to the study of the consequences of the elimination of the ballistic missiles, normally one establishes priorities before negotiations rather than after the conclusion of the negotiations.

There continues to be some debate and confusion within the administration. Secretary Shultz and the President have adjusted to the altered priorities that emerged from the Camp David discussion with Mrs. Thatcher.

Secretary Perle, in testimony the other day, emphasized, at least in his view, that the administration remains committed to the elimination of all ballistic missiles.

I think that this interplay within the administration deserves further clarification by the administration.

Breathtaking as the proposals were, it is equally breathtaking how quickly they have been withdrawn. We have been engaged in shedding the substance of those proposals while attempting to maintain an upbeat mood.

Mr. Regan, the White House Chief of Staff, observed some weeks ago, "We took Reykjavik and turned what was really a sour situation into something that turned out pretty well," end of quote.

Reykjavik did not turn out particularly well, save in the sense that it was only a near disaster, a near disaster, and that we escaped. What does this imply for the future?

First, it suggests that where we contemplate major changes in doctrines, particularly longstanding doctrines on which the alliance is based, that we introduce those changes very slowly and prudently after due consultation with our allies rather than instantly, proposing them without prior consultation and without prior study.

Second, the failure at Reykjavik-the happy failure, I might say-may have a beneficial result in that it may serve to inoculate us against our own rashes.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Mr. Schlesinger.

Nick Mavroules.

Mr. MAVROULES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you very much for your very candid testimony, Mr. Schlesinger. I truly appreciate it.

With your background, I am sure that you are aware of past negotiations and past agreements. Just quickly, if you could, I have a number of questions on SALT II.