in effect, prohibiting the deployment of any strategic defense. And again and again, President Reagan asked General Secretary Gorbachev, what possible objections could you have to the deployment of strategic defenses after we have eliminated offensive ballistic missiles on both sides? Because in those circumstances, those systems could not possibly add to one's offensive capability, they would serve only as an insurance policy against cheating by the other side, and against third countries. We now had a clear division-it must have been 4 o'clock in the afternoon on Sunday. We had 39 hours, correspondents waiting for results of a meeting that should have ended some hours ago and was still in progress, and the Soviets committed to writing their proposal-the proposal that I have just described. Another recess was taken, and we met with the President, examined the Soviet proposal, discussed it at some length, and decided that we would redraft the Soviet proposal preserving as much of the language upon which they insisted as we could, consistent with the fundamentals of our own position and consistent with the strategic concept that I have been outlining. Two of us were tasked to produce a draft which the principal advisors would then be able to examine. And that is the scene, rather colorfully portrayed in some newspaper accounts of the session drafting in the bathroom at the Hofdi House. Actually it was a rather large bathroom, plenty of room for drafting. We set down in writing, incorporating a great deal of the Soviet language in what became the last offer made by the United States, and I believe-in fact I am quite sure that was the last offer submitted in writing by either side, in Reykjavik. That proposal read that the two sides would be prepared not to exercise their existing right of withdrawal from the ABM Treaty for a period of 10 years; that we would be prepared during that 10year period, to confine our research, development and testing, to that permitted by the ABM Treaty; that in the second 5 years of the 10-year period, both sides would eliminate all offensive ballistic missiles; and at the conclusion of the 10-year period, either side would be free to deploy a strategic defense if it chose, unless agreed otherwise and that last phrase was added in the hope that it would elicit a favorable response from the Soviet side. The President was prepared to go very far. What he was not prepared to do was agree to an arrangement on strategic defense that would have made it virtually impossible to carry out the strategic defense initiative. To suggest that one can develop and test strategic defense in the laboratory, or outside space, because some of these systems are either space based or have space based components, is a little bit like suggesting that submarines must be tested on land. You simply can't do it. You can't achieve a result under those circumstances. So, finally, at about 8 o'clock in the evening, the discussion having exhausted all of the participants, and without a clear agreement, the sides parted and divided over the question of what would happen after 10 years, and divided over the Soviet proposal to eliminate all strategic arms, and our counter or our proposal to eliminate all offensive ballistic missiles, divided over the Soviet effort to amend the ABM Treaty by imposing a restrictive regime that exceeds even the restrictive regime that some here would favor. Looking back on what happened at Reykjavik and in the subsequent negotiations, I think a very solid foundation has been laid for what eventually will become an agreement on strategic offensive forces. We have vastly more offensive forces than we need on both sides and both sides could safely reduce them, provided they can reduce them down to equal and lower ceilings. I think we made significant progress with respect to intermediate nuclear forces as well, and in a willingness to agree not to withdraw from the ABM Treaty for 10 years-a suggestion_that_we were hearing from liberal quarters not so long ago-the President demonstrated his good faith and his willingness to reach an agreement on strategic defenses, but he drew the line at a regime that would so cripple the program so as to force its abandonment. In short, the President demonstrated in Reykjavik that he was capable of saying yes, but he was also capable of saying no. And I have to tell you, Mr. Chairman, that privileged as I was to participate in that last round of discussions as the President contemplated whether to respond to the Soviet proposal to eliminate all strategic arms, whether to respond positively to a regime that would have meant the end of the strategic defense initiative. He must have been aware-I am sure he was aware that he could walk out of that room with an agreement that millions would have cheered and a Nobel Prize, but he was persuaded that the agreement that the Soviets put on the table, by forcing us to abandon our nuclear deterrent and by robbing future generations of any prospect of strategic defense, that that agreement would be not in the long term interests of the United States. He had the courage to say no when I think many others might well have been tempted to say yes. The CHAIRMAN. If he had said yes, he probably would have been impeached. He certainly would have had a revolt on his hands with his allies, and he would have had mass resignations from his Government, and he would have had an awful mess on his hands. So, let's not give him too much credit for turning down an obviously kooky proposal on the Soviet side. I would like to address the question then of where our position is now. As I understand it, we came out of Reykjavik with a proposal for 50-percent reduction in 5 years, zero ballistic missiles in the next 5 years, zero-zero in Europe on the INF front, with 100 in Asia, 100 warheads in the United States, and essentially an offer to abide by the ABM Treaty for 10 years, followed by an open question as to what is to happen? Mr. PERLE. Followed by a recognized right to deploy. The CHAIRMAN. Right to deploy. Deployment unless there is an agreement? Mr. PERLE. Unless otherwise agreed. The CHAIRMAN. It is also my understanding that soon afterward we tabled that proposal, in Geneva, in essence that same outline but with more details. What has happened now in the light of Maggie Thatcher's statement of her meeting with the President and George Shultz' statement the other day that we are backing off of the zero ballistic missile option. Is our position still, in Geneva, that we are for zero ballistic missiles? Mr. PERLE. It is. The CHAIRMAN. So that if the Soviets were to pick that up, that piece of paper, and sign it-"give me the paper, I want to sign"we would go ahead and do that? Mr. PERLE. We would. The CHAIRMAN. In spite of what George Shultz said in Chicago the other day? Mr. PERLE. I read George Shultz' speech in Chicago. It might be a good thing to put it in the record. The CHAIRMAN. Let's put it in the record. [The following information was received for the record:] ADDRESS BY THE HONORABLE GEORGE P. SHULTZ SECRETARY OF STATE BEFORE THE INTERNATIONAL HOUSE OF CHICAGO AND THE CHICAGO SUN-TIMES FORUM CHICAGO, ILLINOIS NOVEMBER 17, 1986 NUCLEAR WEAPONS, ARMS CONTROL Questions for the Future I have come here to the University of Chicago to talk about nuclear weapons, arms control and our national security. These issues have been given special timeliness by the President's recent meeting with Soviet General Secretary Gorbachev in Reykjavik. In years to come, we may look back at their discussions as a turning point in our strategy for deterring war and preserving peace. It has opened up new possibilities for the way in which we view nuclear weapons and their role in ensuring our security. We now face a series of questions of fundamental importance for the future: How can we maintain peace through deterrence in the midst of a destabilizing growth of offensive nuclear weapons? How can we negotiate a more stable strategic balance at substantially lower levels of offensive forces? How can we use new defensive technologies to contribute to that stability? How can the West best seek to reduce its reliance on offensive nuclear weapons without running new risks of instability arising from conventional imbalances? They These are exceptionally difficult and complex issues. go to the heart of our ability as a democratic nation to survive in a world threatened by totalitarianism and aggression. These questions should engage the best minds in American society -- and that is why I have come to speak to this particular audience. But I caution you from the beginning. This won't be an easy speech, or a short one. I'11 ask that you listen carefully, and hopefully reflect at greater length on the text of my remarks. |