Process and Implications of the Iceland Summit: Hearings Before the Defense Policy Panel of the Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives, Ninety-ninth Congress, Second Session, November 21, 24, 25; December 2, 3, 4, 5, and 10, 1986, Volume 5
U.S. Government Printing Office, 1987 - 344 pages
Avis des internautes - Rédiger un commentaire
Aucun commentaire n'a été trouvé aux emplacements habituels.
Autres éditions - Tout afficher
able ABM Treaty accept ADELMAN administration Admiral CRowe agree agreement allies American arms control believe bombers CHAIRMAN clear committee concerned Congress consulted continue conventional deal decision defense deploy deterrent Dicks discussed don't effect elimination Europe fact forces Geneva give going Gorbachev happen hear idea important interested issue Joint Chiefs kind letter limits look mean meeting ment military mobile move negotiations never NitzE nuclear nuclear weapons offensive period PERLE political position possible prepared President problem progress proposal question reason reductions result Reykjavik Rogers SALT Secretary seems serious side Soviet Union Staff statement strategic defense summit sure talking testing Thank things thought tion trying understand United verification warheads weapons zero ballistic missiles
Page 34 - Union would lose the capacity provided by ballistic missiles to deliver large numbers of nuclear weapons on each others' homelands in less than thirty minutes tir.e. But Western strategy is, in fact, defensive in nature, built upon the pledge that we will only use our weapons, nuclear and conventional, in self-defense Therefore, the loss of this quick-kill capability -- so suited to preemptive attack — will ease fears of a disarming first strike. For our friends and allies in Europe and Asia, the...
Page 15 - That proposal read that the two sides would be prepared not to exercise their existing right of withdrawal from the ABM Treaty for a period of 10 years; that we would be prepared during that 10year period, to confine our research, development and testing, to that permitted by the ABM Treaty...
Page 224 - First, both sides would agree to confine themselves through 1991 to research, development, and testing — which is permitted by the ABM treaty — to determine whether advanced systems of strategic defense are technically feasible. Second, a new treaty signed now would provide that if, after 1991, either side should decide to deploy such a system, that side would be obliged to offer a plan for sharing the benefits of strategic defense and for eliminating offensive ballistic missiles.
Page 224 - ... after 1991, either side should decide to deploy such a system, that side would be obliged to offer a plan for sharing the benefits of strategic defense and for eliminating offensive ballistic missiles. And this plan would be negotiated over a 2year period. Third, if the two sides can't agree after 2 years of negotiation, either side would be free to deploy an advanced strategic defensive system after giving 6 months notice to the other.
Page 30 - SOI program, we judge defenses to be desirable only if they are survivable and cost-effective at the margin. Defenses that meet these criteria — those which cannot be easily destroyed or overwhelmed — are precisely the sort which would lead Soviet military planners to consider reducing, rather than continuing to expand, their offensive missile force. But only a dynamic and ongoing research program can play this role, And for their part, the Soviets are making every effort to cripple our program....
Page 4 - Union, such 102 technologies could fundamentally alter the nature of the strategic relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union. Advanced ballistic missile defenses have the potential for reducing the military value of ballistic missiles and lessening the importance of their role in the strategic balance. In reducing the value of these weapons, defensive technologies could substantially increase Soviet incentives...
Page 157 - Strategic Forces As A Whole The development of the components of our strategic forces — the multiplicity of intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), and bombers — was in part the result of an historical evolution. This triad of forces, however, serves several important purposes. First, the existence of several strategic forces requires the Soviets to solve a number of different problems in their efforts to plan how they might try to overcome...
Page 224 - Both sides would agree to confine [themselves] to research, development and testing which is permitted by the ABM Treaty, for a period of five years, through 1991, during which time a 50 percent reduction of strategic nuclear arsenals would be achieved.
Page 44 - Well, Trudie, the thing is, about that situation, they are not widely scattered. All the agreements, or the apparent places where we agreed at Reykjavik, are on the table now with our arms negotiators in Geneva. And for the first time there was an agreement reached on the desirability of eliminating all strategic nuclear missiles in a 5-year period and then dealing with the intermediate-range missiles in Germany.
Page 31 - Even after the elimination of all ballistic missiles, we will need insurance policies to hedge against cheating or other contingencies, We don't know now what form this will take. An agreed-upon retention of a small nuclear ballistic missile force could be part of that insurance.