But, though allowed in other matters, this reasoning is often overlooked in religion. Now, suppose it to be asserted that repeated interpositions might prevent the existence of evils and disorders; or if interpositions were incompatible with a system, then that a series of single unconnected acts of justice and goodness, would be preferable to a system (and the objection cannot be carried farther); yet the allegation of our ignorance, as above stated, would be a sufficient answer, even were the assertions true. But they are mere arbitrary ones, without the slightest proof; and we know, even in common affairs, that there are many assertions absolutely impossible, which, at first sight, do not appear

So.

Were any one matter entirely insulated and unconnected with a Providential system, then the plea of our ignorance would be totally inapplicable; but when there may be in it such a relation to other unknown parts, then the very thing objected to may, after all, be conducive to the highest practicable good.

II. Moreover, in the natural world, ends require means to accomplish them; and often undesirable and apparently contradictory means are employed to work desirable ends. The same, by analogy, may hold in the moral scheme of Providence; and things objected to in it, may be the means by which an over-balance of good may, ultimately, be produced; what seem irre

gularities, being perhaps, in fact, the only means for producing it.

And here it may be observed,-to prevent any perversely wicked conclusion of calling “evil, good,”— that although the permission of evil may produce in one sense, benefit to society; yet both to the individual practising the evil, and even to society also, it might have been better if it had not been done at all. Many a man, for instance, might have died, had it not been for a fit of the gout, or a fever, to carry off the peccant humours; but yet no one is mad enough to say that such gout or fever is better than perfect health. And yet some have maintained an argument tantamount to this, with respect to the moral world.

Again: The natural world is governed by general laws,―this, perhaps, for the best reasons. For instance, the enjoyments we procure by our foresight, could not be obtained, without such laws. Now, to prevent all irregularities, where there are general laws, may be impossible, in the nature of things, except by interpositions; and, if these were constantly had recourse to, many bad effects might arise: the natural rules of life would thus be rendered doubtful, and idleness and negligence be encouraged; and further mischiefs also, as connected with the general scheme already mentioned.

Hence there may be the wisest reasons for the world being governed by general laws, and the best

ends accomplished by it. All irregularities, perhaps, could not be prevented; and interpositions might produce more evil in one way, than they prevent in another.

It may be said, "We must judge of religion by what we do know; and that these answers, founded on our alleged ignorance, may, therefore, be applied to invalidate the proof of religion."

But though total ignorance does, yet partial ignorance does not, destroy all proof respecting any matter. If we be convinced of the general character of a person, we conclude that the objects he pursues will be correspondent, though we may not comprehend how the means he adopts will be conducive thereto; but our ignorance, therefore, does not invalidate the proof that such were his objects. Now the proof of religion, is a proof of the moral character of God, and that the end of His government is a dealing with each one, upon the whole, according to his deserts. But we know not the properest way of accomplishing this; and, therefore, our ignorance is an answer to objections as to the seeming irregularities in His government, though it does not affect the proof of it.

Again: Though it were admitted, that unknown relations might invalidate the proof of religion, yet the moral obligations would remain; for these arise from the innate feelings of our own mind, and we

cannot violate them without being self-condemned : and, even though the future results of virtue and vice were doubtful, yet it is credible they may be such as religion teaches; and, therefore, it is prudent to abstain from evil, and to do good.

Moreover, if God exercises a moral government over the world, analogy leads us to conclude it must be a scheme or system beyond our comprehension. Now a thousand particular analogies show us, that certain parts of a system may be necessary to the whole, however at first sight they may appear unsuited or contradictory. And in religion, therefore, could we comprehend the whole, the very things objected against may be very consistent with justice and goodness, and even be instances of them. Now this reasoning is not applicable to the proof of religion, as it is to the objections against it; and, therefore, cannot invalidate the proof, as it does the objections.

The above observations are not vague suppositions of unknown impossibilities and relations, but suggestions forced upon the mind of every observant man, by the analogy of nature, and rendered credible thereby ; teaching us, by experience, that we are not fit and competent judges of the scheme of God's moral go

vernment.

Conclusion.

These last observations lead us to conclude, that this little scene of human life is connected with a much more extensive system. It is evident, from all about us, that we are placed in the midst of some progressive scheme, incomprehensible and wonderful; containing in it things as much beyond our conception as any thing in religion can be. Indeed, it is more difficult to account for the origin and present existence of the world without, than it is with an intelligent Author and Governor of it; and no scheme of government is more readily conceivable than that which we call moral; whilst the contrary suppositions render all things utterly inexplicable.

That there is such an intelligent Author and Governor, is a principle we have hitherto gone upon, as confessedly proved; such a Being, it has been shown, must have a will and character, which the very nature He has given leads us to conclude is moral, just, and good, and cannot be otherwise. Under this will and character of His, all the events of this life are carried on. Now, as reasonable beings, we cannot help inquiring what will be the result to us of this scheme, in the midst of which we are. For particular analogies1

1 See Chap. I.