virtue, can neither excite them, or prevent their being excited. They are felt, when the objects of them are present to the mind, antecedently to all consideration whether they be lawful or not; natural objects of affection, as necessaries or pleasures of life, remain naturally desirable, even though they cannot be innocently obtained, or even not obtained at all And whenever an object can only be obtained unlawfully, though the original desire after it be innocent and natural, it ha a tendency to incline men to unlawful means, and therefore to put them in danger. Now as the danger is, so must the security be,—from within; from the practical principle of virtue. The improvement of this principle then, will lessen the danger by increasing the security and this moral principle is capable of improvement from discipline and exercise; from our impressions of example and experience; and from our attending to, and acting upon, the principles of equity and right, as conducive to our final interest.

"Thus the principle of virtue, improved into a habit, (of which we are capable) will plainly be, in proportion to its strength, a security against the danger we are in from particular affections."

And even if, (what we can scarcely suppose), particular affections should not exist in a future state, requiring habits of virtue to regulate them; yet

acquired habits of virtue, constitute an improvement therein, and as such, must be (under a moral government) an advancement of happiness.

From these considerations we may proceed to show, how creatures made upright, might fall; whilst those who preserve their uprightness, do thereby attain a more secure state of virtue. The former is conceivable from the very nature of particular affections or propensions.

Suppose creatures endued with propensions necessary for a particular state, together with a moral understanding, and a practical sense and perception of virtue; and that these principles (forming a natural and moral constitution) were most exactly proportioned to their intended state; such creatures would be upright, or finitely perfect. Now the propensions must be felt, whenever the exciting objects are present, even if they cannot be gratified without violating the moral principle; and then they must have some conceivable tendency to induce to forbidden gratification, which may be increased by circumstances, in one propension more than another; indulgence of the least kind, even in thoughts, may further increase it; till by conspiring occasions, it becomes effect; and thus the danger which might have been escaped, ends in actual deviation. This first overt-act would disorder the constitutional adjustments and proportions, wherein

uprightness consisted; repetitions thereof would produce habits; and creatures once upright, would become proportionably depraved. Whereas by steadily adhering to the moral principle, and preserving their integrity, the propensions would be inured to submit; the danger of defection would lessen; and the principle itself gaining strength by exercise, creatures would thus attain a higher and more secure state of virtue.

Thus, as vicious indulgence is criminal in itself, and also depraves the moral character; so virtuous selfrestraint is right in itself, and improves it; and may do so to such a degree, as, though not to render men absolutely indefectible, yet to lessen the danger of deviation to an almost infinite degree, by the increased security, from virtuous habits. And thus creatures, though proceeding from God's hands without blemish, and having a moral principle in their nature, may need an acquired security of virtuous habits; and consequently a condition fitted to the formation thereof by discipline.

How much more strongly does this apply to those that have corrupted their nature, and rendered their passions excessive, by repeated transgression! Upright creatures may want improvement, and education may therefore be expedient for them; but, depraved creatures require to be renewed, and therefore discipline (even sometimes of the severest kind) is absolutely

necessary for them, to wear out vice, to repair the moral principle, and raise it into a habit.

Now the present world is peculiarly fit for the above state of discipline. Our experience of its temptations, and deceits, of the miseries consequent upon vice, either in ourselves or others; all have a direct tendency to bring us to settled reasonable moderation, quite opposite to the unrestrained self-will of undisciplined minds. The experience of our own frailty;—of the extravagance of passion ;—of the power of an infinite Being, who has endued us with such capacities of misery;—and of the risk of our becoming absolutely vicious and wretched;-has a tendency to form in us a practical sense (very different to a mere speculative knowledge) of vice and misery; such as may probably contribute very materially to the security of that highest state of perfection, from the everlasting impression made upon our minds in this state of probation.

To enter into some detail:-allurements to wrong— obstacles to duty-opportunities of avoiding or gaining what we like or dislike unlawfully; in short, snares and temptations of vice, are what render the present world peculiarly fit for a state of discipline, to those who would preserve their integrity; because they render caution, resolution, and self-denial, necessary to that end. And the exercise of these principles,

tends to form habits of virtue firmer and stronger, in proportion to its frequency; the very length or frequency of temptation, calling for a more continued exertion of virtue, and ultimately establishing a more confirmed habit thereof.

Whatever exceptions may arise, as to the incapability of moral powers (like bodily or intellectual ones) being improved beyond a certain point; the general rule plainly holds, that the present world is peculiarly fit to be a state of discipline for the improvement in piety and virtue, of those who are willing to acquire it. For in fact, men often, instead of a discipline of virtue, make it a discipline of vice, and, indeed, it is the very viciousness of the world, that renders it a fit state for virtuous discipline to the good.

The whole end and occasion of man's being placed in such a state as the present, is not pretended to be accounted for. The chief point is, that it is, to some persons in it, calculated to form an exercise and improvement of their virtue, even beyond what could be in a perfectly virtuous society. And that it does not become such to many, even to the generality, is no proof that it was not intended to be such, when we consider the Analogy of Nature. Of the various seeds put into the earth for improvement and growth, scarcely one in a million does arrive at maturity. But