or similar, to that course of Nature, under which we at present live; that the objections which are brought against Religion may equally be alleged against the Constitution of Nature; and that from this analogy a convincing evidence arises, that both the natural and the moral world are parts of one vast system, and that both proceed from the same author, GOD.

The design of the Treatise is not to prove the truth of Religion, but only to corroborate and confirm the direct proofs we already have of it in Prophecy and Miracles; by showing the Analogy it bears to the known course of Nature or Providence.

Probable Evidence is essentially distinguished from demonstrative by this,—that probable evidence admits of degrees, in every variety, from the highest moral certainty to the very lowest presumption.

A thing cannot indeed be said to be probably true upon a very slight presumption; because there may be probabilities against, as well as for it; and even should there be none against it, yet a slight presumption does not beget that degree of conviction, which is implied in saying a thing is probably true. But the very slightest presumption is of the nature of a probability; and if often repeated, might amount to a moral certainty. Thus the observation of the ebb and flow of

the tide to-day, affords some (though the slightest) presumption that it will happen to-morrow: but the observation of it for so many days, months, and ages together as it has happened, gives us a full assurance (or a moral certainty) that it will happen again to-morrow.

What chiefly constitutes probability, is expressed in the word likely, i. e. “like some truth or true event ;” -like it, in itself, in its evidence, in some of its circumstances. When we determine a thing to be probably true—(for instance that an event has, or will, come to pass)—it is because we remark in it a likeness to some other event, which we have observed come to pass. And this amounts to a presumption,—to an opinion, or to a full conviction;-according as the said like event has happened, under similar circumstances, sometimes,—most commonly,—or always, as far as observation reaches.

Thus also our hopes and fears as to the success of our own pursuits; as well as our expectations and judgment as to the actions and motives of others; all proceed from our having observed the like, either with respect to others or ourselves.

Probable evidence is in itself imperfect; and suited only to beings of limited capacity. To Infinite Intelligence there is no probability; every thing is seen absolutely as it is, either certainly true or certainly false. But to us probability is the very guide of life,

Hence in questions of difficulty, if there appears the lowest presumption on one side, and none on the other; or if there be a greater presumption on one side (though of the lowest degree) than on the other, it determines the question, even in matters of speculation: and in matters of practice, a man will feel bound to act upon that low probability; inasmuch as he will then be doing what on the whole appears best. Nay, in affairs of great consequence, he will act, not only where the probabilities of his success or failure are even, but even where the chances appear against him.

It is plain, therefore, that analogical reasoning is of weight, in various degrees, towards determining our judgment and practice; and that it is a natural, just, and conclusive way of arguing; for no man doubts that the sun will rise to-morrow; and that he will be seen, where he is seen at all, in the figure of a circle, and not of a square.

Hence (viz. from analogical reasoning) Origen very sagaciously observed, "He who believes Scripture to have proceeded from Him who is the Author of Nature, may well expect to find the same sort of difficulties in it, as are found in the Constitution of Nature." And in the same way we may add, he who denies Scripture to be from God, on account of these difficulties, may, for the very same reason, deny the world to have been formed by Him. On the other hand, if

there be an analogy or likeness between that system of things which Revelation informs us of, and that system of things observable in the known course of Nature, this forms a presumption that they have both the same Author.

To form notions about the world, without foundation for our principles, or to apply principles which are certain to cases which they will not suit (e. g. to explain the results of medicine by mathematics), is mere hypothesis. But to join abstract reasoning with observation of facts, and from known facts, to argue with respect to others that are like them, is a just mode of argument. Hence from that part of God's government over intelligent creatures, which comes within our view, we may argue as to that larger and more general government beyond it; and from what is present, we may collect what is likely or credible, or not incredible, to be hereafter.

This method of reasoning being practical, and what our actions in life must be guided by; and being also conclusive in various degrees, according to the degree and exactness of the whole analogy or likeness, we will-(assuming that there is an intelligent Author of Nature,)-apply it to the subject of Natural and Revealed Religion.

As some persons form their notions of God's government upon hypothesis, without attending to what

is, in fact, the constitution of nature; so others indulge in vain speculations, how the world might have been framed and arranged after a better fashion than it is. Supposing, however, that the wisest of men were to arrange any other plan of nature, it would not probably be, after all, the very best, even according to his own ideas of best; whether he thought the exercise of the greatest virtue, or the production of the greatest happiness, constituted that best; or whether he combined those two (viz. virtue and happiness) into one and the same plan.

And as to the speculative emendations;-whether all creatures should be made perfect and happy at once; or that they should always do what was right, and conducive to happiness, either from their having nothing to lead them wrong, or overpowering motives to guide them right; and that thus the awkward system of rewards and punishments could be dispensed with the above considerations, of themselves, may easily show us, that we have not faculties for such sort of speculations. For though the first principles of our nature lead us to judge, that some ends be preferable to others; and though we may admit that the production of the most virtue and happiness possible, be the ultimate end designed in the constitution of nature and conduct of Providence; yet we are not able to judge what disposition of things was best suited, or what