probability that the righteous will have the advantage over the wicked in a future life; and thereby exhibits the obligations of religion.

2ndly. When (as religion teaches) God shall reward and punish virtue and vice, according to each one's deserts, this distributive justice will not differ in kind, but only in degree, from what is apparent in His present government; it will be that in effect, towards which we now see the tendency; the completion of that moral government, the principles of which are now plainly discernible in the course of nature. Hence

3rdly. As the happiness and misery we experience under the natural government of God, lead us to suppose far higher degrees of both hereafter; so what we observe in His moral government, in rewarding or punishing virtue and vice, affords a probability of this being done in a higher degree in a future state. This receives a corroboration, if

Lastly, We consider the tendencies of virtue and vice; for these are essential; but the obstacles to their full effect are generally accidental and artificial; and hence the essential tendencies, being far more likely to remain hereafter, than the accidental hinderances, will become effectual to the perfection of moral government. But, when, where, or how, can only be known by revelation.

RECAPITULATION.—On the whole, there is a kind of moral government implied in God's natural government; virtue and vice are naturally rewarded and punished, as beneficial and mischievous to society; and rewarded and punished directly, as such. Hence the notion of a moral government is a natural one, suggested by the constitution and course of nature affording numerous instances of it. This is a sort of declaration of the Author of nature on the side of virtue, and against vice; and leads to an inference that they will be rewarded and punished in a higher degree hereafter. And this is confirmed by the natural tendencies (obstructed only by accidental hinderances) towards the perfection of this moral scheme. Hence again the notion of a much more perfect moral government, is a natural one, suggested by the essential tendencies of virtue and vice; which tendencies are intimations from the Author of nature that much greater rewards and punishments shall follow virtue, and vice, than do at present.

Hence arises a presumption that the moral scheme in nature will be carried on hereafter to perfection: and this presumption joined to the suggestions of our moral sense or conscience, amounts to a practical proof that it will be so.

CHAPTER IV.

ON THE PRESENT STATE, AS A STATE OF PROBATION, IMPLYING TRIAL, DIFFICULTIES, AND DANGER.

ARGUMENT.-The moral government of God implies, that our present life is a state of trial and probation for a future one; the fact of our temporal interest and happiness, whilst we are now under God's natural government, being made to depend upon our conduct here, renders it highly credible that our future interests and happiness will be regulated in an analogous manner; and that as dangers and difficulties beset us in the former, rendering prudence on our parts highly necessary,—so, there is great hazard and risk as to the latter, calling for the exercise of virtue to secure it.

RELIGION teaches us that our present state is one of probation;—the general meaning of which is, that our

future interest is depending upon ourselves; and that there are both scope and incitements to good, and also to bad conduct, which God will reward or punish hereafter.

And, this is almost tantamount to saying, we are under the moral government of God; only the word probation seems more particularly expressive of allurements to wrong, and obstacles in the way of doing right.

As God's moral government implies a state of trial with respect to a future world, so His natural government does with respect to the present one. Now the natural government of God consists in annexing pleasure or pain, of which we are previously apprised, to voluntary actions; and hence our happiness or misery in some measure depends upon ourselves; a temptation to do what will occasion greater temporal uneasiness than satisfaction, is a trial as to our temporal interest. Many in a great degree (and perhaps every one does, in some degree) fail to obtain such a measure of happiness as he might have enjoyed. Many plunge themselves into distress and misery ; and this frequently not through incapacity, but by their own fault. Temptations, therefore to such courses of vice as are contrary to our temporal good, are temptations to forego our present and future in

terest. Thus our natural condition is a state of natural trial, analogous to moral and religious trials.

That which constitutes this trial in both capacities, is something either in external circumstances, or in our nature. For persons may be surprised and overcome into wrong, by sudden or extraordinary external occasions; whence the wrong would be imputable to those circumstances. But men having become habitually vicious, will seek occasions to gratify their evil passions, at the expense of wisdom and virtue, not induced by external temptation, but led by their own lusts. These passions, therefore, are as much opposed to worldly interest, as to religion; and, consequently, are as much temptations to act imprudently, as they are, to act viciously.

However, as when men are misled by external temptation, there must be something within, susceptible of the outward impression; so, when they are misled by passions, there must exist some external object of gratification. And, therefore, temptations from within, and from without, mutually imply each other.

Now, external objects of gratification, offering themselves, as well when they may be indulged in innocently, as also where they can only be so, imprudently and viciously, form a temptation for men to forego their