since, perhaps, even to others, there may be something apparently objectionable in it; a few observations thereupon may not be unprofitable.

Objectors say, "It is a poor thing to solve difficulties in Revelation, by saying that there are the same in natural religion; and a strange way of vindicating the justice and goodness of the Author of Nature, to show that the system of religion, and that of natural providence, lie open to the same objections."

First, then Such objectors seem to require "to have all difficulties cleared;" but this seems to be something equivalent to their requiring to comprehend the Divine Nature, and the whole plan of Providence from everlasting to everlasting. Now it has been always an allowed thing, "to argue from what is acknowledged, to what is disputed;" in the way of probable deduction and inference. And as to the epithet poor,—it may, indeed, in this sense, be applied to most things in life; e. g. it is a poor thing for the most eminent physician to have so little knowledge of disease, as to act chiefly from conjecture, where human life is concerned; but this is better than his having no skill at all, and being entirely in the dark.

Moreover, such objections are unfairly urged; because those using them assert they are arguing only against Revelation: whereas, they are really arguing against a moral providence, which, nevertheless, is dis

tinctly admitted to be true. The objections against Revelation are equally applicable against natural religion; the things objected to in the one, being of the same kind precisely with what is matter of our daily experience in the other.

Secondly. Religion is a practical thing; consisting in such a course of action as seems likely to conduce to our happiness under God's government. Now, if men can be convinced, that they have the like reason to believe this, as to believe that taking care of their temporal affairs, will be advantageous,—(i. e. if it can be proved so by analogy,)—it must be a powerful argument for religious practice, especially because of the infinitely greater interest that it involves. This is unanswerable. Now, in fact, under the natural constitution of things, we do act in our temporal concerns, upon precisely similar evidence with respect to the probable result, as we are called upon to do in the matter of religion; and, therefore, the conclusion is just.

Thirdly. As the design of this Treatise is not to vindicate the character of God, but to show the obligations of men; so these two subjects must not be confounded: a justification of God's providence, and an exhibition of human obligations, are two distinct things. It is not necessary to justify the dispensations of Providence against objections, further than to show, that the things objected against, may after all be consistent with

goodness and justice: and this is highly credible from the analogy of the natural world; inasmuch as similar objections precisely, against its constitution, have been already shown to be highly inconclusive.

Besides some matters of fact in religion are strictly analogous to those in the natural world; e. g. the fact of future rewards and punishments is rendered credible by the fact, that God does, by his present method of government, reward and punish men for their actions here. The general obligations of religion are established, by proving the reasonableness of its practice: and though the Analogy of Nature does not furnish an immediate or direct answer, to all objections against the wisdom, goodness, or justice of every doctrine or precept of religion; yet it does so to this extent, that it proves the things objected against not to be incredible.

Fourthly. This Treatise does not claim to be completely satisfactory;—very far from it: but so would every natural institution of life be, if reduced into a system, together with its evidence. Leaving religion out of the question, men are divided in opinion, whether, from a comparison of its pleasures and pains, on the whole, life be desirable;—and even were reason to be convinced of what nature prompts, viz., that it is so ;— yet in all our aims for our well-being, we are left in much uncertainty as to the issue; and are obliged to

take up with very much unsatisfactory evidence in the daily course of life. But men do not throw away life, or disregard the interests of it, on account of this doubtfulness. Positive satisfaction in such points, belongs not to our present condition; neither does it, to the very nature of religion; for religion was intended to try and exercise men's honest integrity, in order to improve it and therefore the question is not "Whether the evidence of religion be satisfactory;" but, "Whether it be reasonably sufficient to prove and discipline the virtue, which it presupposes to exist." Now it is sufficient for this purpose of probation, though it may not be so as to satisfy all curiosity. And in short, as in common life, we determine on much slighter evidence, what it is prudent for us to pursue, as to our temporal affairs; so ought we to be determined, in a much higher degree, in matters of religion, in proportion to their infinitely higher importance.

Fifthly. As to the objection, that men will be rarely influenced by this sort of argument; we may observe, that religion being intended for a trial and exercise of men's characters, the point to be regarded is not, "What they are:" but "What, from their light and knowledge, they should be." Too many disregard it. But religion nevertheless has its end, upon all to whom it is proposed; being laid before them, with its proper evidence, whether they regard or disregard it, still

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they are thereby put into a state of probation; and the obedience or disobedience to its evidence, is the personal concern of each man in particular.

Sixthly. And in the whole of these objections, it must be observed, that the author has argued from the principles of others, and not from his own; i. e. he has proved his point, not from the principles of others, but notwithstanding them. And he has not urged those principles of his own, as the basis of an argument, which they might not admit, but which he himself should deem highly important; such as the moral fitness and unfitness of actions, prior to all will and precept. Hence religion has been herein considered simply as a matter of fact, and Christianity, and the proof of it, as historical facts: as even Natural Religion is properly a matter of fact;—viz., that there is a righteous Governor of the world, independently of all abstract truth as to liberty and moral fitness.

Now God has given a moral faculty to man, approving the good, and condemning the bad; and that He will finally reward the former, and punish the latter, is no abstract truth, but a mere fact, just as His doing so at the present would be. This fact has not been so strongly proved as it might be, were the principles of moral fitness and liberty taken into the argument: but without adverting to them, it has had a really conclusive practical proof given to it, and one