particular, like that portion which we do know; but the contrary for there are in it things exceedingly dissimilar.

II. Neither is there any presumption from Analogy against some things, which would now be called miraculous; particularly none against a Revelation at the beginning of the world. A miracle is a relative term, and necessarily implies a course of nature, from which it differs. Now at "the beginning" there was no course of Nature; and therefore the question of a Revelation being then made, is one of mere fact, the truth of which is to be tested, just as that of other facts stated in history or tradition. In the Creation, there was a power exerted, totally different from the present course of Nature-(it cannot well be called miraculous);and whether this power stopped, after man was made; or it went on, to give him a Revelation, is also a question of mere fact. Or even if the Creation be allowed to be a miracle, then Revelation was only a second miracle following a first. Hence then Analogy affords no presumption against a Revelation being made in "the beginning."

The fact, likewise, of all tradition ascribing religion to a Revelation,—coupled with the pure state of religion in the first ages,-implies that such was its origin, and that it was not reasoned out progressively.

III. Nor yet does Analogy afford any presumption against miracles, after the settlement and during the continuance of a Course of Nature. To raise a proper argument from analogy in this point, we ought to have a parallel case; i. e. one other world at least, similar to our own, wherewith to institute a comparison: but we have not. Now with respect to insulated facts; there may be the strongest objection against any single one, before the proof of it, which nevertheless is overcome by the most ordinary proof: and in 6000 years, many occasions may have arisen for miraculous interpositions, independently even of religion; but when this is taken into the account, there is still stronger probability that they occurred; because there is a special reason for them, in order to give mankind additional instruction to that which is derived from the light of Nature.

Moreover, miracles must not be compared with common events, but rather with extraordinary phænomena of Nature, as comets, magnetism, electricity, &c. And hence a person totally unacquainted with such phænomena, pronouncing, à priori, against the possibility of their occurrence, would only be analogous to the presumptuous à priori objections against Miracles.

Hence there is no such presumption against Mira

cles, as to render them incredible, not even the very lowest degree thereof, from the analogy of extraordinary phoenomena :—but rather there is a positive credibility given them, by our discerning certain reasons for them.

CHAPTER III.

OF OUR INCAPACITY OF JUDGING WHAT WAS TO BE EXPECTED IN A REVELATION; AND THE CREDIBILITY FROM ANALOGY, THAT IT MUST CONTAIN THINGS APPEARING LIABLE TO OBJECTIONS.

ARGUMENT.-Objections against Christianity in particular: those against its scheme (as distinguished from its evidences) answered, by the consideration of the plan of the Natural World being much different, from what might have been expected, à priori. The Analogy of Nature shows, that objections must be expected against Christianity beforehand. No validity in the objection, as to the abuse of miraculous powers. Analogy between the progressive discoveries in science, and the developement of things in Revelation; as also between the remedies for human maladies lying long

concealed, and the Gospel remedy being hidden for ages, from man.

BUT besides the objections against revelation in general, and especially against the miraculous attestation thereof; there are many objections raised against the Christian revelation in particular;—against the whole plan, and scheme of it, and the matters it contains ;independently of objections against its evidences. It has been designated as "foolishness;" as leading to enthusiasm, superstition, tyranny, &c. &c.

But if a Revelation be made, it is, à priori, highly credible, from analogy, that we should not be competent judges of it, and that it would contain many things appearing liable to objection. For if the regular course of Nature, and the revealed scheme of Providence, be both from the same God, the fact of our being incompetent judges of the former, (as it is admitted we are) renders it highly credible, that we should be so with respect to the latter; and if the one is found to contain things which, à priori, we should not expect, so it may very well be, with the other. And as to extraordinary interpositions; if a subject could not competently judge beforehand, of the ordinary rules whereby a wise Prince should govern his kingdom; much less could he determine truly, as to his extraordinary