moral; and of this no Man can doubt, who confiders the Nature, End, and Design of Religion; or the Weakness and Narrowness of Man's Understanding, or the Wisdom, Power, and Authority of God.

Religion is the Performance of all those Acts of Obedience which every rational Creature owes to God, who gave him his Reason and his Being, and who is thereby entitled to all the Homage he can pay him. Duty is the Obligation which every fuch Creature lyes under, to comply with the Commands of his Lord and Governor, which Way foever they come to the Knowledge of them; and this Obligation arifes from the Will and Authority of that God who made him, and from the Neceffity every rational Being lyes under of rendring himself acceptable to him, if he would fhun Mifery, and attain to Happiness. The End and Defign of all Religion is to avoid God's Anger, and to procure his Favour and Love; and the proper Means to obtain that End can only be, a ready Obedience to his Laws, of whatever Kind; a Compliance with his Commands, of what Nature foever, provided they have the Mark and Authority of his Will and Pleafure. He only is to direct and prefcribe; Man is to acquiefce, fubmit, and obey him in all his Difpenfations. Whatever has the Sanction of his Authority does indifpenfibly oblige his Creatures, for whom it is defigned, and to whom it is declared; how difficult foever in itself this Obedi

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Obedience may be, or how contrary foever to the received Customs and Opinions of Men. He cannot indeed command any thing that is impofible or wicked in itself; and every fuch Law may fafely be rejected and disobeyed, as being none of his. Because we are as fure, that the Almighty cannot contradict his own Attributes, as we can be that any particular Precepts can come from him. But whatever Rule does not clearly and demonftrably contradict his Attributes, does ftrictly oblige, as foon as known to be his; and confequently thofe Laws, which are called pofitive, when proved to be his Will, do as indifpenfibly require our Obedience, fo far as he requires us to obey them, tho' not for the fame Reasons as those which are called moral.

By pofitive Laws I mean thofe Precepts, which could not, or at least would not, have appeared to have been any Matters of Duty to us, if they had not been made known to us by a Revelation from Heaven. And by the moral Laws I mean those Duties, which we can now draw from the present Fitness, Convenience, and Neceffity of them; from their Suitableness to the known Attributes and Perfections of God, and from thofe Relations out of which they arise. Of the former Kind among the Jews were the Covenant of Circumcifion, and many other Rites and Ceremonies; and among us Chriftians the two Sacraments are generally reckoned as pofitive Injunctions;

junctions; to which I think may be added the Command to believe in a crucified Savi

our.

The moral Duties are thofe of Justice, Chastity, Temperance, and the like, which every Man fees to be very fit and convenient for himself, and for all the World about him. And that the former do as properly and strictly oblige as the latter, may from hence appear, that it is not the Convenience or Fitness of the Thing, but it is the Will of the Lawgiver only, which properly creates the Obligation. The Fitnefs and Unfitness of Things, the Suitableness and Unfuitableness of Actions to our present State and Relations, are the Means by which we discover that it is the Will of God that fome Things fhould be performed, and others omitted by us; but it is then only that the Performance or Omiffion of them becomes Matter of Duty, ftrictly fo called, when we confider them as required by our great Mafter, who will punish or Reward our Diligence or Neglect of them. Indeed, that Fitnefs and Unfitnefs may be the Means whereby we discover that God requires them; and fo far moral Duties are truly faid to be founded in the Reasons and Differences of Things, as that Expreffion may fignify, that it is thofe Reasons and Differences, which fhew us that they are our Duty. But it is not those Reasons and Differences which make them our Duty; they only demonftrate that they are fo.

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We

We have only two Ways of coming at the Knowledge of the Will of God; either by the Use of those reasoning Faculties which he has given us, or by fome Revelation, mediate or. immediate, from himself. And in the former Cafe, the Method by which our Reason informs us what is agreeable or difpleafing to him is, by confidering what fuits with his Wisdom, Justice, Goodness, and other Attributes; and what is agreeable to our State and Nature, and the Relations in which he has placed us. And we very juftly declare and infift, that whatever is agreeable to these must be our Duty; because we know, that whatever is reasonable, and fit to be done by us, must be for ever required of us by an eternally wife and infinitely good God. But if we confider thofe reafonable and fit Actions, as independent of the Will of him who has placed us in fuch a State, as makes it reasonable and fit for us to do them; their Reasonablene fs and Fitness then can only make them Matters of Wisdom or Prudence to us, for the fake of the prefent Usefulness or Convenience of them. And if any Man has a mind to give up that Usefulness and Convenience, or should be fo fituated as to find it more for his prefent Intereft or Pleasure to do what is in general unreasonable or unfit to be done, I cannot fee what he forfeits, but the Character of acting reasonably; or what Ties he is under, more than that of Fame and Opinion, to restrain

his Appetites and Inclinations. Yes, but he is obliged to act according to the Laws of Reafon. But what in fuch Cafe obliges him? Or what Penalty will he incur, if he tranfgreffes them? The eternal Reafons and Differences of Things, confidered in themselves, can only fo far oblige (if it may be called Obligation) as to fhew him that he does not act as a reasonable Creature, if he does not conform to them. And what if he does not care whether he acts reasonably, or not? Why then the Laws of Reafon, as fuch, can take no hold of him; and I don't see that, in themselves confidered, they can oblige him. For how can a Law oblige without a Sanction? Or what Sanction can any Law have, if confidered apart from the Will and Power of the Law-giver? But if the Laws of Reafon are confidered as what they are, the Laws of God, every Man will then find himself under a Neceffity of obeying them, because required by him who has a Right to his Obedience, and who cannot, confiftently with his own Nature, but require that Obedience, and punifh him fooner or later for the Neglect of it. And indeed I cannot fee that any thing, but that Will, can properly create that Neceffity, or make any Rule Matter of Duty to us. And if then it is the Divine Will which only creates the Obligation, it will neceffarily follow, that the fame Will must create the fame Obligation to any other Laws, which shall be VOL. II. known

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