Strategy and Arms ControlTwentieth Century Fund, 1961 - 148 pagina's |
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Pagina 73
... violation , may be less if both sides begin from moderate levels of strategic weapons rather than from a position of real or imagined nakedness . One reason is that clandestine violation on any given scale — a scale whose upper limit is ...
... violation , may be less if both sides begin from moderate levels of strategic weapons rather than from a position of real or imagined nakedness . One reason is that clandestine violation on any given scale — a scale whose upper limit is ...
Pagina 99
... Violation Implicit in any desire to monitor compliance is the notion of de- terrence . Inspection is based on the ... violation , the less the violation will be deterred . Just as no system can be confidently expected to detect violation ...
... Violation Implicit in any desire to monitor compliance is the notion of de- terrence . Inspection is based on the ... violation , the less the violation will be deterred . Just as no system can be confidently expected to detect violation ...
Pagina 100
... violation , the advan- tages are lost altogether unless detection is avoided . Finally , the costs and risks of detection itself may be modest or may be enormous . One of ... violations , or to make violation 100 STRATEGY AND ARMS CONTROL.
... violation , the advan- tages are lost altogether unless detection is avoided . Finally , the costs and risks of detection itself may be modest or may be enormous . One of ... violations , or to make violation 100 STRATEGY AND ARMS CONTROL.
Inhoudsopgave
INTRODUCTION | 1 |
Arms Control and General War | 9 |
Arms Control Crises and Limited War | 25 |
Copyright | |
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accidental accidents activities advantage agree armaments arms agreement arms arrangements arms control arms limitations arms race balance budget capability cheating civil defense clandestine cold war communication consider costs countries crisis danger decisions defense deployment destruction disarmament discussion Donald G duction effect evaluation evasion event expectations explicit facilities false alarms first-strike formal forms of arms Herman Kahn ICBM implications important improved incentive initiate inspection intelligence interpretation involve kinds of arms less likelihood limited war measures ment military action military forces military policy military services military strategy motives negotiations nuclear weapons nuclear-test other's participants particular political possible potential enemies pre-emptive present problem procedures reason reciprocated reduce relation require response restraint retaliation retaliatory forces secrecy side side's Soviet Soviet Union stabilize deterrence strategic forces strategic weapons submarine surprise attack surveillance targets tegic ternational threat tion tive trol unilateral Univ violation vulnerability weapon systems