Strategy and Arms ControlTwentieth Century Fund, 1961 - 148 pagina's |
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Pagina 102
... surveillance procedures , while related , may not be closely related . Problems in Inspection It was mentioned that inspection could lead to an increase in tensions if it were poor at screening out false evidence of violation . The ...
... surveillance procedures , while related , may not be closely related . Problems in Inspection It was mentioned that inspection could lead to an increase in tensions if it were poor at screening out false evidence of violation . The ...
Pagina 103
... surveillance can be simplified and reduced in scope by the use of sampling techniques . Ordinarily sampling , as compared with a complete examination of the entire population of objects to be kept under surveillance , achieves sav- ings ...
... surveillance can be simplified and reduced in scope by the use of sampling techniques . Ordinarily sampling , as compared with a complete examination of the entire population of objects to be kept under surveillance , achieves sav- ings ...
Pagina 131
... surveillance procedures could be invoked in a crisis , one could create a crisis or claim that a crisis was on , in order to in- voke the special surveillance . Furthermore , to the extent that successful measures of arms con- trol ...
... surveillance procedures could be invoked in a crisis , one could create a crisis or claim that a crisis was on , in order to in- voke the special surveillance . Furthermore , to the extent that successful measures of arms con- trol ...
Inhoudsopgave
INTRODUCTION | 1 |
Arms Control and General War | 9 |
Arms Control Crises and Limited War | 25 |
Copyright | |
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accidental accidents activities advantage agree armaments arms agreement arms arrangements arms control arms limitations arms race balance budget capability cheating civil defense clandestine cold war communication consider costs countries crisis danger decisions defense deployment destruction disarmament discussion Donald G duction effect evaluation evasion event expectations explicit facilities false alarms first-strike formal forms of arms Herman Kahn ICBM implications important improved incentive initiate inspection intelligence interpretation involve kinds of arms less likelihood limited war measures ment military action military forces military policy military services military strategy motives negotiations nuclear weapons nuclear-test other's participants particular political possible potential enemies pre-emptive present problem procedures reason reciprocated reduce relation require response restraint retaliation retaliatory forces secrecy side side's Soviet Soviet Union stabilize deterrence strategic forces strategic weapons submarine surprise attack surveillance targets tegic ternational threat tion tive trol unilateral Univ violation vulnerability weapon systems