Strategy and Arms ControlTwentieth Century Fund, 1961 - 148 pagina's |
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Pagina 124
... substantially affected . Qualitative Improvements As in any business , accidents and unauthorized actions can be reduced by the expenditure of money . Reliability can be better achieved by spending more money . Restraints can be accommo ...
... substantially affected . Qualitative Improvements As in any business , accidents and unauthorized actions can be reduced by the expenditure of money . Reliability can be better achieved by spending more money . Restraints can be accommo ...
Pagina 137
... substantially changed , the targets and the timing requirements of means of delivery would be changed , the intelligence available to both sides would be sub- stantially changed ; and radically different criteria would be re- quired to ...
... substantially changed , the targets and the timing requirements of means of delivery would be changed , the intelligence available to both sides would be sub- stantially changed ; and radically different criteria would be re- quired to ...
Pagina 142
... substantially the same . Before one consid- ers this an excessively narrow construction of arms control , he should consider whether it cannot just as well be viewed as a very broad statement of what the aims of military strategy should ...
... substantially the same . Before one consid- ers this an excessively narrow construction of arms control , he should consider whether it cannot just as well be viewed as a very broad statement of what the aims of military strategy should ...
Inhoudsopgave
INTRODUCTION | 1 |
Arms Control and General War | 9 |
Arms Control Crises and Limited War | 25 |
Copyright | |
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Veelvoorkomende woorden en zinsdelen
accidental accidents activities advantage agree armaments arms agreement arms arrangements arms control arms limitations arms race balance budget capability cheating civil defense clandestine cold war communication consider costs countries crisis danger decisions defense deployment destruction disarmament discussion Donald G duction effect evaluation evasion event expectations explicit facilities false alarms first-strike formal forms of arms Herman Kahn ICBM implications important improved incentive initiate inspection intelligence interpretation involve kinds of arms less likelihood limited war measures ment military action military forces military policy military services military strategy motives negotiations nuclear weapons nuclear-test other's participants particular political possible potential enemies pre-emptive present problem procedures reason reciprocated reduce relation require response restraint retaliation retaliatory forces secrecy side side's Soviet Soviet Union stabilize deterrence strategic forces strategic weapons submarine surprise attack surveillance targets tegic ternational threat tion tive trol unilateral Univ violation vulnerability weapon systems