Strategy and Arms ControlTwentieth Century Fund, 1961 - 148 pagina's |
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Pagina 22
... restraint , being able to recognize restraint if it occurs , and having some capability for responding to it . Creating a shared expectation of the possibility may therefore be a prerequisite to restraint ; and any understandings , even ...
... restraint , being able to recognize restraint if it occurs , and having some capability for responding to it . Creating a shared expectation of the possibility may therefore be a prerequisite to restraint ; and any understandings , even ...
Pagina 77
... restraint that is consciously contingent on each other's be- havior . Formal vs. Informal Understandings The essence of arms control is some kind of mutual restraint , collaborative action , or exchange of facilities between potential ...
... restraint that is consciously contingent on each other's be- havior . Formal vs. Informal Understandings The essence of arms control is some kind of mutual restraint , collaborative action , or exchange of facilities between potential ...
Pagina 79
... restraints , or restraints in the conduct of a novel activity , may lack the benefit of tradition and require a more ... restraint is pertinent here . In a sense , the kinds of mischief of a military or quasi - military sort that nations ...
... restraints , or restraints in the conduct of a novel activity , may lack the benefit of tradition and require a more ... restraint is pertinent here . In a sense , the kinds of mischief of a military or quasi - military sort that nations ...
Inhoudsopgave
INTRODUCTION | 1 |
Arms Control and General War | 9 |
Arms Control Crises and Limited War | 25 |
Copyright | |
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accidental accidents activities advantage agree armaments arms agreement arms arrangements arms control arms limitations arms race balance budget capability cheating civil defense clandestine cold war communication consider costs countries crisis danger decisions defense deployment destruction disarmament discussion Donald G duction effect evaluation evasion event expectations explicit facilities false alarms first-strike formal forms of arms Herman Kahn ICBM implications important improved incentive initiate inspection intelligence interpretation involve kinds of arms less likelihood limited war measures ment military action military forces military policy military services military strategy motives negotiations nuclear weapons nuclear-test other's participants particular political possible potential enemies pre-emptive present problem procedures reason reciprocated reduce relation require response restraint retaliation retaliatory forces secrecy side side's Soviet Soviet Union stabilize deterrence strategic forces strategic weapons submarine surprise attack surveillance targets tegic ternational threat tion tive trol unilateral Univ violation vulnerability weapon systems