Strategy and Arms ControlTwentieth Century Fund, 1961 - 148 pagina's |
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Pagina 57
... questions , mentioned in Part I , of whether larger forces are con- ducive to keeping limited a war once it starts , and ... question of whether total disarma- ment with respect to strategic weapons is the wrong goal THE STRATEGIC BALANCE 57.
... questions , mentioned in Part I , of whether larger forces are con- ducive to keeping limited a war once it starts , and ... question of whether total disarma- ment with respect to strategic weapons is the wrong goal THE STRATEGIC BALANCE 57.
Pagina 92
... question - what we need to know or to verify about the other side's compliance with the agreement — is commonly con- sidered the main or sole focus of inspection . This is a faulty notion . An agreement to limit a particular weapon or ...
... question - what we need to know or to verify about the other side's compliance with the agreement — is commonly con- sidered the main or sole focus of inspection . This is a faulty notion . An agreement to limit a particular weapon or ...
Pagina 118
... question is not simply the one of cheating or playing fair . The process may be more like a regulatory function than like a criminal procedure . True , there can be willful cheating on a large scale of a sort that , if one can find ...
... question is not simply the one of cheating or playing fair . The process may be more like a regulatory function than like a criminal procedure . True , there can be willful cheating on a large scale of a sort that , if one can find ...
Inhoudsopgave
INTRODUCTION | 1 |
Arms Control and General War | 9 |
Arms Control Crises and Limited War | 25 |
Copyright | |
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accidental accidents activities advantage agree armaments arms agreement arms arrangements arms control arms limitations arms race balance budget capability cheating civil defense clandestine cold war communication consider costs countries crisis danger decisions defense deployment destruction disarmament discussion Donald G duction effect evaluation evasion event expectations explicit facilities false alarms first-strike formal forms of arms Herman Kahn ICBM implications important improved incentive initiate inspection intelligence interpretation involve kinds of arms less likelihood limited war measures ment military action military forces military policy military services military strategy motives negotiations nuclear weapons nuclear-test other's participants particular political possible potential enemies pre-emptive present problem procedures reason reciprocated reduce relation require response restraint retaliation retaliatory forces secrecy side side's Soviet Soviet Union stabilize deterrence strategic forces strategic weapons submarine surprise attack surveillance targets tegic ternational threat tion tive trol unilateral Univ violation vulnerability weapon systems