Strategy and Arms ControlTwentieth Century Fund, 1961 - 148 pagina's |
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Pagina 67
... produce undetected an extra 20 missiles , an extra 50 , an extra 200 , and so on . The factors that go into this estimate are many , and include hidden stock- piles , clandestine production and assembly , and production of parts for ...
... produce undetected an extra 20 missiles , an extra 50 , an extra 200 , and so on . The factors that go into this estimate are many , and include hidden stock- piles , clandestine production and assembly , and production of parts for ...
Pagina 68
... production of clandestine weapons ; in this case the object might be attack out of the blue . But evasion might be carried on in more subtle ways . One side might cheat on production of parts and components , then declare the agreement ...
... production of clandestine weapons ; in this case the object might be attack out of the blue . But evasion might be carried on in more subtle ways . One side might cheat on production of parts and components , then declare the agreement ...
Pagina 73
... production and activities per- mitted under the agreement . ) A second reason is that a given in- crease in weaponry ... production base for the resumption of the arms race may be all- important in a resumed arms race . Productive ...
... production and activities per- mitted under the agreement . ) A second reason is that a given in- crease in weaponry ... production base for the resumption of the arms race may be all- important in a resumed arms race . Productive ...
Inhoudsopgave
INTRODUCTION | 1 |
Arms Control and General War | 9 |
Arms Control Crises and Limited War | 25 |
Copyright | |
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accidental accidents activities advantage agree armaments arms agreement arms arrangements arms control arms limitations arms race balance budget capability cheating civil defense clandestine cold war communication consider costs countries crisis danger decisions defense deployment destruction disarmament discussion Donald G duction effect evaluation evasion event expectations explicit facilities false alarms first-strike formal forms of arms Herman Kahn ICBM implications important improved incentive initiate inspection intelligence interpretation involve kinds of arms less likelihood limited war measures ment military action military forces military policy military services military strategy motives negotiations nuclear weapons nuclear-test other's participants particular political possible potential enemies pre-emptive present problem procedures reason reciprocated reduce relation require response restraint retaliation retaliatory forces secrecy side side's Soviet Soviet Union stabilize deterrence strategic forces strategic weapons submarine surprise attack surveillance targets tegic ternational threat tion tive trol unilateral Univ violation vulnerability weapon systems