Strategy and Arms ControlTwentieth Century Fund, 1961 - 148 pagina's |
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Pagina 72
... probably no formal lan- guage that can quite make sudden denunciation appear immoral , irrespective of circumstances ; and there is probably no permissive language that can quite dispel all moral inhibitions , or all propa- ganda losses ...
... probably no formal lan- guage that can quite make sudden denunciation appear immoral , irrespective of circumstances ; and there is probably no permissive language that can quite dispel all moral inhibitions , or all propa- ganda losses ...
Pagina 83
... probably a fair observation that arms negotiations involve more , or at least involve technical problems of the kind that are less familiar to professional diplomats and negotiators . It is probably also true that the essential ...
... probably a fair observation that arms negotiations involve more , or at least involve technical problems of the kind that are less familiar to professional diplomats and negotiators . It is probably also true that the essential ...
Pagina 138
... probably be disastrous - one must suppose that the very imposition of agreed arms limitations on the military services would stimulate radical change . And in many cases these changes would rightly prove the original arms limitations to ...
... probably be disastrous - one must suppose that the very imposition of agreed arms limitations on the military services would stimulate radical change . And in many cases these changes would rightly prove the original arms limitations to ...
Inhoudsopgave
INTRODUCTION | 1 |
Arms Control and General War | 9 |
Arms Control Crises and Limited War | 25 |
Copyright | |
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accidental accidents activities advantage agree armaments arms agreement arms arrangements arms control arms limitations arms race balance budget capability cheating civil defense clandestine cold war communication consider costs countries crisis danger decisions defense deployment destruction disarmament discussion Donald G duction effect evaluation evasion event expectations explicit facilities false alarms first-strike formal forms of arms Herman Kahn ICBM implications important improved incentive initiate inspection intelligence interpretation involve kinds of arms less likelihood limited war measures ment military action military forces military policy military services military strategy motives negotiations nuclear weapons nuclear-test other's participants particular political possible potential enemies pre-emptive present problem procedures reason reciprocated reduce relation require response restraint retaliation retaliatory forces secrecy side side's Soviet Soviet Union stabilize deterrence strategic forces strategic weapons submarine surprise attack surveillance targets tegic ternational threat tion tive trol unilateral Univ violation vulnerability weapon systems